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ABSTRACT 
In September 2008, when the financial markets faced rising tension and uncertainty, 
many countries introduced a ban on short selling activity. This PhD thesis analyses 
the impact of the bans on banking share price return and volatility in the ban periods 
by using tick by tick data. The study also explores the impact on market liquidity by 
examining the changes in bid-ask spread and trading volume.  
An event study method is applied and distinguishes between equal weighted and 
market value weighted averages. This study compares the impact on banned stocks 
and non-banned stocks identified as control stocks. It also compares performances 
prior to the ban, during the period of the ban and subsequent to the ban.  
Overall, the evidence suggests the abnormal return of banned stocks increased when 
short selling ban was introduced in all countries except the UK. It decreased 
significantly upon lifting of the ban. The abnormal return of both banned and control 
stocks was generally negative in all countries except the US. 
Volatility decreased during the ban and went down further after the ban was lifted in 
Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban], but it did not demonstrate this trend in 
other countries. As such, the mixed evidence suggests a significant shift in volatility 
of banking stocks. 
As expected, bid-ask spread widened when short selling was banned, and it tightened 
thereafter. This consistent trend has been found in all countries under study. 
As for trading activity, banned stocks experienced lower trading volume and 
turnover during the ban and higher volume when short selling was subsequently 
allowed. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The subject of short selling creates some controversy. Since at least the abolition in 
the US in 2007 of the 1930s era uptick rule, which was designed to curb abusive 
short selling, debate has continued over the merits of short selling. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission‘s temporary restrictions on the practice as the market 
crisis unfolded in 2008 provoked strong opinions on both sides of the debate, mainly 
regarding the implications of short selling on the volatility of banking shares.  
Short selling refers to selling a share which the seller does not own (Culp and Heaton, 
2008). To proceed with the trade, the seller needs to borrow the shares from a 
shareholder. This is most commonly done through a broker and the lending of the 
stock is considered a temporary transfer of the security (Chordia and Roll, 2007). 
The seller then delivers the shares to the buyer and later repays the loan by buying 
the shares and delivering them to the original lender (Culp and Heaton, 2008). 
Short selling will be profitable if investors expect the price of a share to fall. 
Investors apply the principle of ‗short sell high, buy back low‘. This means investors 
will be able to sell the shares at the current price and repay the loan by buying the 
shares later when the price has become lower (Culp and Heaton, 2008). The 
difference between the selling price and the lower purchasing price is the investor‘s 
profit.  
Finance academics question short selling constraints, primarily due to the impact of 
the constraints on market efficiency. Proponents of short selling argue that it 
enhances market risk sharing, improves liquidity and promotes information 
symmetry. Short sellers are therefore considered to be the ‗good people‘ (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1987). Opponents, on the other hand, claim short selling causes high 
volatility, panic selling, market disorder and even crash (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1987). Based on hypotheses stated by Boehmer, Huszár and Jordan (2009), abnormal 
return is expected to increase, volatility to decrease, bid-ask spread to widen and 
trade volume to decrease on the imposition of a ban. 
This view is shared by the countries which introduced short selling bans in 2008, for 
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example, Australia, the UK and Germany. When the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) implemented short selling restrictions, the 
justification was that short selling was causing turbulence in the market and extreme 
fluctuations in stock prices (Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
2008). When the Financial Services Authority in the UK decided to impose short 
selling restrictions, it was because the market was particularly unstable. The 
instability cited was also in reference to stock prices which had become very volatile 
and deteriorating fast, particularly stocks in the financial sector (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). Some banks were facing immense pressure in their capital base 
and funding structure because of the decline in their share prices (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). Germany followed suit and introduced a ban on short selling in 
September 2008. The ban was removed in February 2010 but then reimposed a few 
months later, in May 2010. To date, the ban continues. In different countries, short 
selling bans apply to different stocks (all stocks in some countries; financial stocks 
only in others), and they are introduced and lifted at different dates with different 
stringency levels. 
1.2. Motivation of Thesis and Research Questions 
The study is motivated by a desire to develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
financial implications of short selling restrictions on banking stocks. Understanding 
the impact of short selling restrictions is also critical because various contemporary 
issues about short selling and regulatory actions have been raised by regulators 
around the world since the 2008 financial crisis. By measuring abnormal return, 
volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume of banking stocks before, during and 
after the ban, the thesis assesses market quality and uses those measurements as 
proxies to evaluate the success or otherwise of the purposes of the regulators who 
claimed to be calming the market. 
The motivation for this PhD research is underpinned by four factors: 
Firstly, it is to answer the question of whether a short selling ban on banking stocks 
impacts on abnormal return, volatility, spread and trading volume, all of which are 
important to regulators.  
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Numerous attempts have been made to assess the impact of short selling bans on 
markets in general but there appears to be no specific research on the banking sector. 
Banks are important because they are at the heart of the payment system and 
lubricate the economy (Moosa, 2010). Another role of banks is allocating financial 
resources for other industries. The failure of banks has an enormous effect on the 
credit flows of the economy, with significantly bad economic consequences (Moosa, 
2010). The banking sector suffered very severely from the 2008 financial crisis 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, which led many 
countries to ban short selling. Hence, the study is conducted to investigate the impact 
of shorting bans specifically on the banking sector. 
Short selling bans have had a substantial effect on banking stock abnormal return, 
volatility, spread and trading volume during the 2008 financial crisis. The history of 
short selling bans dates back to 1938 (Reed, 2007). Following that earliest short 
selling ban (Regulation RHO in the US), many countries have introduced a ban to 
calm the market, especially during financial crises. The thesis hence exploits the 
natural experiment to assess the impact of short selling bans, which is an 
observational study. 
In discussions on whether or not there should be restrictions on short selling, these 
restrictions fall under the broader issue of the regulation of financial markets. 
Regulations and constraints on financial markets are often implemented mainly to 
maximise the efficiency of the financial system. For this goal to be achieved, the 
shortcomings and failures of the market must be addressed (Gruenewald et al., 
2009). 
Although the principles of a free market do not encourage regulated markets, 
regulation has been justified to serve the greater purpose that the market operates and 
conducts trading for the general public. Regulating the market usually has an 
emphasis on ensuring that there is real competition, avoiding externalities and 
safeguarding investors and market players from being victims of criminal activities 
such as market manipulation and fraud (Gruenewald et al., 2009). 
These discussions relate to a ‗normal‘ market condition. However, during abnormal 
market periods, government regulatory bodies seek to stabilise the market. The lack 
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of consensus among regulators on short selling issue results in more than half of the 
stock exchanges in the world having this constraint. In addition, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is no research to date on a short selling ban‘s impact on the banking 
sector. The main goal of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence on whether a 
short selling ban impacts on abnormal return, volatility, spread and trading volume. 
Secondly, in theory, it is recognised that a short selling restriction affects stock return, 
volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume because pessimistic investors cannot 
short sell any more, which therefore restores a semblance of stability to the market. 
Most empirical studies focus on the influence of short selling restrictions on 
individual stock performance by applying different proxies, but do not examine the 
aggregate market reaction and performance after the restriction (Boehmer et al., 
2008b). Different stocks have different reactions to short selling restrictions due to 
their different characteristics and they might behave differently. By way of further 
diversification, the market-wide performance may react significantly differently 
from individual stocks. In this study, ‗aggregate market‘ refers to the banking sector. 
Banking sector has been the main focus of the ban, as such the thesis uses banking 
stocks as the study sample. The detail of sample construction has been fully 
discussed in Chapter 4 Methodology. 
Thirdly, most of the previous studies use daily data instead of high frequency data to 
examine the impact of short selling constraints. This is relatively easy to calculate 
and model but its precision is an issue (Clifton and Michayluk, 2010). Daily data 
might omit many important market signals and information for investors. Therefore, 
in this study, ultra high frequency tick by tick data is used to enhance the quality and 
precision of the empirical studies by previous researchers. This motivation is 
strengthened by the research methodologies used. While most academic studies use 
fixed-effect regression in testing the impact of short selling bans on share 
performance, concerns have been raised that the fixed-effect method is insufficient 
to ensure robust findings because of statistical problems (Daouk and Charoenrook, 
2005). Therefore, this thesis uses both fixed-effect and random-effect methods with 
the Hausman test for a robust outcome. 
Finally, stock market reactions to short selling bans in Western countries and Asian 
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countries
1
 might behave differently due to their different market microstructures. 
Even though there are numerous studies done for individual countries on short 
selling bans, a study focusing on a particular geographical area in aggregate is 
helpful in understanding a ban‘s true affect. As such, a comparative analysis is 
carried out between Western markets and Asian markets to verify the hypotheses on 
short selling bans. 
Given the significant motivation for studying short selling bans, this thesis aims to 
address the following hypotheses. Theoretical support for each hypothesis is 
separately provided in Chapter 3 Literature Review. 
Hypothesis 1: Banned stocks have greater abnormal return when short selling bans are 
imposed. 
Hypothesis 2: Volatility in banned stocks decreases when short selling bans are imposed. 
Hypothesis 3a: Banned stocks have wider spread while bans are imposed. 
Hypothesis 3b: Banned stocks have lower trading activity after short selling bans are 
introduced. 
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the performance of banking stocks 
between Western markets and Asian markets due to short selling bans. 
These four hypotheses are investigated to explore the impact of a short selling ban. 
1.3. Methodology and Approach 
Ultra high frequency tick by tick data is employed on the history of banking stock 
activities and short selling information from nine countries which have a significant 
share market. The sample consists of tick by tick data for 914 stocks from the nine 
countries.  
Fixed effect and random effect panel regressions are carried out with the Hausman 
test, which can select a better model suitable for a robust outcome. It suggests 
                                                             
 
1 For convenient classification of the thesis, Western markets and Asian markets are identified according to 
geographical boundary. Western countries include Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the US, and Asian 
countries include Australia, Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Each combination is used as a single sample. 
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superior fixed-effect method. Event study is the empirical study approach. Short 
selling bans in different countries vary considerably in terms of duration and scope, 
so that the panel regression method is considered suitable to analyse the data in the 
nine countries. For the panel tests, the study controls for time effect, market effect 
and company-specific characteristics that may affect the results stated in the existing 
finance literature. The panel regressions are conducted to evaluate a ban‘s impact on 
banned stocks with cross-sectional and time-series comparisons over the entire 
sample period. 
A dummy indicator is used to identify when a stock is subject to the ban during the 
ban period. This indicator is used to examine a series of nine countries for which 
stock market data is available from November 2007 to August 2010. The results 
indicate the effect of constraints before, during and after the bans. 
Regression models are constructed with a robustness check to see different ban 
impacts by adding independent variables separately, then interaction variables 
one-by-one to the base model.  
1.4. Overview of Main Results 
The study finds that when short selling was restricted, abnormal returns of banking 
stocks were higher than in the pre-ban period compared to the control group, which 
is in line with the hypothesis. However, the evidence shows mixed results on the 
impact of short selling bans on stock market realised volatility. This suggests that 
short selling restrictions do not reduce volatility as their designed purpose. When 
short selling was banned, the banned banking stocks suffered a significant 
degradation in market liquidity. The panel analysis indicates significant evidence 
that when share markets banned short selling, the bid-ask spread widened 
significantly, as hypothesised. Regression results also show that the trading volume 
and turnover of banned stocks were significantly lower when bans were imposed, 
which is clearly in line with previous studies, confirming that market participants do 
not trade actively after shorting was restricted. The findings are general for the 
countries under study. Some inconsistencies exist due to possible culture issues, 
emerging market features and behavioural finance characteristics. A detailed survey 
of the impact of these characteristics would be worthwhile for future study. 
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1.5. Contributions of Thesis 
This study contributes to the existing research on short selling bans. A large amount 
of evidence from the 2008 financial crisis is examined to determine if short selling 
constraints have an impact on banking share price return and volatility before, during 
and after shorting bans were imposed. The impact of the restrictions on spread and 
trading volume is examined to indicate market liquidity effects during the three 
periods. Furthermore, the impacts of short selling ban on the Western market and the 
Asian market are compared. Banned stocks are also compared to the control 
non-banned stocks so that ban impacts are identified. Other things being equal, 
Miller‘s (1977) theory suggests that the return should be higher for banned stocks, 
while Bai et al. (2006) suggest lower stock return volatility, wider spread and lower 
trading volume during a ban.  
The intention of this PhD thesis is to make four contributions to the existing finance 
literature. 
Firstly, ultra high frequency tick by tick trading data is used to examine the 
performance of stock return, volatility, spread and trading volume during short 
selling bans in different countries. The existing literature on short selling bans 
mainly uses daily data which may omit some important market signals and other 
information critical to investors (Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009). The data used in 
this thesis consists of broader coverage, higher frequency and more precise 
calculation and interpretation than in previous studies. This contribution is enhanced 
by the use of fixed effect and random effect panel regressions in the empirical study, 
the purpose of which is to eliminate omitted variable bias. It appears that this 
empirical method has not been applied to short selling bans in previous studies 
(Boehmer et al., 2008). 
Secondly, the different impacts of short selling bans in the Western market and the 
Asian market are studied. Collectively, the findings conclude that both markets‘ 
performances due to short selling bans are consistent with finance theory, even 
though some differences exist in terms of market microstructure, geographical 
boundary, stock exchange trading time, political characteristics and behavioural 
finance issues. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research to date that analyses 
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the comparison between Western and Asian market behaviour during short selling 
bans (Reed, 2007).  
Thirdly, this study provides direct empirical evidence to assist regulators, investors 
and various market participants in answering the question whether shorting on 
banking stocks should be restricted. Generally the empirical results indicate that 
short selling bans disrupt market liquidity. Banks are important because they are 
essential to the capital flow in the whole economy and the failure of banks could lead 
to drastic economic consequences for other sectors (Moosa, 2010). The banking 
sector suffered from more severe damage in the 2008 financial crisis than other 
industries (Boehmer et al., 2008a). Regulators around the world therefore introduced 
short selling bans following the first significant collapse of the Lehman Brothers – a 
major investment bank. However, despite extensive discussion on short selling bans, 
only very minimal research appears to focus on banking stocks (Boehmer et al., 
2008a). Hence, this dissertation contributes by providing direct and impartial 
evidence to market participants on the effectiveness and appropriateness of bans, 
particularly on banking shares, during financial turmoil. 
Fourthly, the empirical evidence in this thesis shows that aggregate market 
performance is affected by short selling constraints. Although short selling bans have 
been intensely studied, few of the previous studies provide explanations of 
market-wide performance (Boehmer et al., 2008a). In countries where short selling 
is banned, stock return volatility does not decrease significantly. This differs from 
the initial hypothesis. This difference may lead regulators to reconsider whether 
short selling constraints can resolve the problem of high market volatility during a 
financial crisis. 
1.6. Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of 
short selling ban history, definitions, positive and negative arguments, and a 
summary of worldwide events. Previous relevant literature and the theoretical 
significance of the study are summarised in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the 
methodologies to test the hypotheses are developed, the data used in the analysis and 
the methodology are identified, particularly the tick by tick stock data and two-way 
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fixed-effect model. The descriptive statistics and regression results on banking stock 
abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume are presented and 
discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. The final chapter summarises the 
findings of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF SHORT SELLING 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses short selling activities and their application in 
financial markets worldwide. Section 2.2 presents short selling history. Section 2.3 
identifies the definition, types, practices and risks of short selling activities. Sections 
2.4 and 2.5 examine positive and negative arguments for short selling. Section 2.6 
gives an outline of short selling bans in major markets during the global financial 
crisis. 
2.2. Origin of Short Selling Bans 
Short selling of commodities has a long history in early trading history. For example, 
early Islamic business practices recognized a form of short selling known as Bai 
Salam (Lowenstein, 2000). However, it was not until 1609 that what resembles short 
selling of securities was documented. A Dutch trader, Isaac Le Maire who was a key 
shareholder in the Dutch East-India Company, was accused of causing a decline in 
the company‘s share price. His story is still being told today and is of interest to the 
modern world because of the price manipulation designed and executed by Le Maire 
(Bris et al., 2007).
2
 
In 1602, Le Maire invested a large sum of money in the company. But by 1609, the 
company had not paid any dividends. At the same time, Le Maire was struggling 
with his business. His ships were facing threats from English ships because of 
competition and conflict. So Le Maire decided to leave the company. Not only did he 
sell the shares he owned but he also sold shares forward for delivery in the next year 
or two. As the East India Company shares declined by 12%, other shareholders were 
outraged upon discovering what Le Maire had done (Bris et al., 2007). The Dutch 
Government also found the act unacceptable. They prohibited shares from being sold 
if at the time of the sale the seller did not yet own the shares. This was probably the 
                                                             
 
2
 This account is taken from the summary given by A. Bris., W. Goetzmann and N. Zhu in ‘Efficiency and the 
Bear: Short Sales and Markets around the World: Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02. p. 45 (2003). The original 
study on this Le Maire story can be found in J. G. van Dillen’s  ‘Isaac Le Maire en de handle in action der 
Oost-Indische Companie’: Economisch-historisch Jaarboek 16 (46), pp. 107–111 (1930). 
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first ban on short selling (Grossman, 1992).  
2.3. Definition, Types, Practices and Risks of Short Selling 
2.3.1. Definition 
Short selling refers to selling a security that the investor does not own. The definition 
is quite similar in many countries, for example, the US, the UK and Australia. The 
United States‘ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses the legal definition 
of short selling prescribed in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Title 17, on 
Commodity and Security Exchanges. Part 242 of CFR 17 defines short selling as: 
‗any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is 
consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the 
seller‘.  
In the UK, there is no legal definition of short selling. Nonetheless, according to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), there is a general understanding that it refers to 
investors who sell a security which they do not actually own. Short selling can take 
place in the cash market or through derivative instruments (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009).  
In Australia, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 
published a Regulatory Guide (RG) to clarify short selling regulations prescribed in 
the Corporations Act 2001 and the Corporations Regulations 2001. According to RG 
196.1, a short sale is when ‗people sometimes sell (short sell) financial products that 
they do not own with a view to repurchasing them later at a lower price‘.  
2.3.2. Types 
There are two types of short selling in the cash market: ‗naked‘ and ‗covered‘. 
Naked‘ short selling means that investors who intend to sell shares do not own the 
shares and do not borrow the shares either. Investors do not have to pay borrowing 
fees but may be required to pay brokerage fees to be able to keep the trading position 
open. In order to close the position, the investors need to buy back the shares that 
were sold earlier (Financial Services Authority, 2009). This type of short selling is 
more common in intra-day trading where the trader creates the short position and 
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offsets it on the same day. 
‗Covered‘ short selling means that an investor who intends to sell a share will ‗cover‘ 
their position by first borrowing the share from a shareholder so as to be able to 
deliver it to the new buyer on the settlement date. The investor will receive a cash 
payment from the buyer on delivering the share. The investor will then use this cash 
to purchase the share at a later date to be able to repay the loan. The short sell 
transaction is complete when the original lender is repaid the share that was lent 
earlier (Financial Services Authority, 2009). 
Usually a covered short sale involves three main parties. They are: the original 
shareholder of the company who owns the shares and becomes the lender, the trader 
or investor who places the order for the short sale and becomes the borrower, and 
thirdly, the new buyer who purchases the shares from the investor. This is different 
from the normal transaction which consists of the seller of the shares and the buyer 
of the shares (Cohen et al., 2007) 
The scope of a short selling ban can be covered financial stocks, non-financial stocks 
or all stocks. Different countries normally have different ban scopes suitable for their 
particular financial situation. 
2.3.3. Practice 
For investors to be able to short sell, they need to have a margin account, which can 
be opened through a broker or a dealer. Investors need to sign a contract with the 
broker, agreeing to maintain a certain cash amount in the margin account for the 
purpose of borrowing. The amount of cash or collateral required depends on the 
overall size and value of an investor‘s trading portfolio (Cohen et al., 2007) 
For brokers to execute an order for a short sale, they must be assured that investors 
have already borrowed the shares or have made an attempt in good faith to borrow 
the shares. If the shares are not yet owned by an investor and is not yet in his/her 
account, then the broker must be confident that the shares can and will be borrowed 
by the settlement date in order to avoid settlement risk (Culp and Heaton, 2008) 
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2.3.4. Risks 
There are a number of risks in short selling, included credit risk, market risk, interest 
rate risk and liquidity risk. However, settlement risk and price risk are considered to 
be the most critical risks associated with short selling. 
Settlement risk is higher for naked short selling than for covered short selling. For 
covered short sellers, their risk is that the lender will recall the shares that were 
borrowed. In that case, they too would need to repurchase the exact amount of shares 
borrowed earlier to repay the loan. In a naked short selling transaction, the seller 
needs to buy back the exact amount of shares that were sold earlier. However, an 
insufficient supply of the particular shares might occur if the shares are illiquid, 
when the investor finds it difficult to close his/her short position (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). 
As for price risk, both types of short sellers face the risk that the shares sold will 
increase in price rather than decrease. If they close their short position, they will do 
so at a loss. If they want to keep their position open, they will need to add more cash 
to their margin account or pledge more collateral (Financial Services Authority, 
2009). 
2.4. Positive Arguments for Short Selling 
Short selling controversy has existed since the 1600s and numerous researchers have 
discussed this issue. Proponents argue that short selling can enhance market 
efficiency, increase revenue, and facilitate merger arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, 
short synthetics and hedging. 
2.4.1. Market Efficiency 
Proponents of short selling claim that it is a legitimate technique for trade and 
investment purposes. When the market is stable, short selling benefits the market in 
many ways. For example, short selling promotes informational efficiency because it 
ensures that not only optimistic investors but also pessimistic investors are able to 
take positions to reflect their views. According to Miller (1977), if pessimists were 
constrained when optimists were not, this would lead to an upward bias in stock 
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prices. Therefore, short selling supports the price discovery process as well as 
reducing information asymmetry in the demand and supply of the stocks (Clifton and 
Michayluk, 2010). 
In addition to informational efficiency and improved price valuation, short selling 
can increase market liquidity, especially in a downturn. Short selling also allows for 
diversification of risk. Because of this, when the risk is shared, investors will not be 
so demanding for higher returns (Daouk and Charoenrook, 2004). 
2.4.2. Revenue enhancement 
Short selling is a crucial component of trading strategies for hedge funds. Taking 
short positions is also a technique applied by other market participants including 
pension funds, investment banks and insurance companies. When they do not hold 
enough shares, they also need to short sell to be able to execute orders (Financial 
Services Authority, 2009). 
If short selling is banned, hedge funds and other investors would have very limited 
trading alternatives. Such a constraint would make it very difficult for them to 
manage their clients‘ funds. They would not be able to achieve higher returns on 
investments and it would be challenging for them to outperform the market. They 
would also be very limited in the alternatives for revenue enhancement.  
2.4.3. Merger Arbitrage 
Merger arbitrage is a popular hedge fund strategy which has a short selling 
component. Hedge funds use this strategy to make a profit by taking positions in 
companies which are expected to undergo a merger or acquisition. When a merger is 
about to happen, an arbitrageur will buy the shares of the company about to be 
acquired. Simultaneously, the arbitrageur will short sell shares of the acquiring 
company and buy back these shares at a lower price afterwards. After the acquisition, 
the share price of the acquirer falls to reflect what it is paying for the deal, while the 
target price increases to reflect the agreed per-share acquisition price (Danielsen and 
Sorescu, 2001). By creating a long position on one stock at the same time as creating 
a short position on another stock, investors will have a riskless profit. If shorting was 
not permissible, then the strategy could not be applied (Beber and Pagano, 2010) 
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2.4.4. Convertible Arbitrage 
Similarly, convertible arbitrage has a short-sale component because it requires the 
sale and purchase of securities simultaneously. To apply this strategy, the hedge fund 
will take a long position on a convertible security and at the same time, also take a 
short position on the common stock that the security can be converted into (Financial 
Services Authority, 2009). The strategy is profitable if there is an error in the pricing 
of the stock during the conversion of the convertible security. It is most commonly 
executed when investors hold the view that the embedded option is under-priced.  
2.4.5. Pairs Trading 
Pairs trading is another strategy which involves short selling of a security, allowing 
investors to profit from shifts in relative prices. Investors will take a short position in 
one stock and simultaneously a long position in a different stock because investors 
have different views on the future movement of the shares. As a result, whether the 
market undergoes a general downtrend or a general uptrend, investors will make a 
profit from the price movement (Financial Services Authority, 2009).  
This strategy can be used in dual-listed corporations to explore arbitrage 
opportunities. A dual-listed company (DLC) structure involves two companies from 
two countries contractually operating business as a single entity, while retaining 
existing stock exchange listings and separate legal identities (Lowenstein, 2000). 
Efficient market theory suggests the twin stock prices should demonstrate parity and 
therefore move in lockstep, but in practice there can be a large deviation which 
enables arbitrageurs to long the relatively underpriced part of DLC and short the 
overpriced part (Jones, 2008). This makes pairs trading strategy profitable. This 
strategy involving a short selling component is only allowed in relatively mature 
markets like the US and Hong Kong, and not China (Jones, 2008). 
2.4.6. Hedging 
In addition to trading strategies, short selling is also crucial for investors to be able to 
hedge their positions. If an investor holds a long position in a security, then to hedge 
the risk, they will need to take a short position in the same or a related security to 
correspond with the long position (Reed, 2007). If the market goes down, the profit 
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made in the short position can offset the loss in the long position and vice versa. It is 
very common for short selling to be used as a hedge when investors hold portfolios 
which are long only, particularly if the market is becoming bearish. If short selling 
were not allowed, then the long position could not be covered when the market goes 
down. 
In summary, short selling is thought to be good because it can enhance market 
efficiency and investors‘ income and help many finance techniques, such as merger 
arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, short synthetics and hedging. 
2.5. Negative Arguments for Short Selling 
Despite the proponents of short selling defending its legitimacy and its importance in 
trade and investment, it is not actively practised in many markets (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). It is believed to be a costly and risky technique, and unless 
investors are confident that they can earn a large return, they will not short sell 
(Angel et al., 2003). 
Algorithmic trading is the use of computer algorithmic programs to enter trade 
orders and make decision on aspects of orders, including price, quantity and timing 
(Terrence et al., 2011). This high frequency trading technique, involving long and 
short stocks, is also subject to short selling regulations (e.g. up-tick rule and short 
selling bans), which makes shorting orders limited and constrained (Terrence et al., 
2011). 
Short selling is still not allowed in more than half of the stock exchanges across the 
world, indicating that there is no consensus among state regulators that short selling 
is necessary for improving market efficiency and transparency. Short selling has 
been accused as the cause of panic and disorder in the market. It has also been 
blamed for causing increased volatility, instability and market crashes (Charoenrook 
and Daouk, 2004). 
The opponents of short selling claim that restricting short selling is necessary during 
times of uncertainty and heightened volatility because the restriction will help to 
suppress excessive speculation in the market (Clifton and Michayluk, 2010). If the 
market is facing uncertainty and declining, short sellers are expected to speculate 
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against the stocks, further pushing down stocks‘ value, which leads to panic selling, 
and ultimately the market will decline and deteriorate even further (Charoenrook and 
Daouk, 2004). 
Although there has been much debate among speculators, regulators and academics 
on the costs and benefits of short selling, Bris et al. (2007) argue that no consensus 
has been reached on whether it is good or bad for the market and whether it should be 
permitted or not. This study attempts to investigate the impact of short selling 
restrictions in 2008 on various markets across the globe. The study covers the 
following countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, the UK and the US. 
2.6. Short Selling Bans in Global Markets during the Global 
Financial Crisis 
2.6.1. Short Selling in Europe 
On 19 September 2008, the Supervisory Authority for Financial Services in 
Germany (BaFin) issued an emergency order banning naked short selling. This 
emergency order was implemented by the United States‘ Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the UK‘s Financial Services Authority (FSA), which also 
sought to restrict short selling activity (Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
The order from BaFin was to ban short selling for a list of 11 issuers, which consisted 
of banks, insurance providers, stock exchanges and other financial services. Four of 
the 11 issuers were banks. The ban only applied to naked short selling, therefore 
short selling activity could still take place if the shares were borrowed prior to the 
order for the short sale being executed (Boehmer et al., 2008b).  
Furthermore, because the ban applied only to shares, other transactions, for example 
the sale of futures or options, were still allowed. Another exception to the rule was 
market-making activities. For example, a broker could still hold a short position if 
the transaction was for the purpose of carrying out a market-making duty (Boehmer 
et al., 2008b). On 1 February 2010, the ban was rescinded. But on 19 May 2010, 
BaFin announced that it would enforce the ban on the same stocks again and this 
time, the ban would be prolonged until 31 March 2011(Beber and Pagano, 2010).  
  18 
The Financial Markets Authority in France (AMF) implemented new provisions on 
22 September 2008, two days after Germany‘s BaFin had issued its emergency order 
against short selling. The AMF ban aimed at 15 issuers including seven major banks, 
with the effect lasting to date. The new provisions were introduced to combat market 
abuse and extreme volatility. At the same time, the AMF wanted to ensure 
consistency with the measures introduced by other European countries to avoid 
regulatory manipulation by market players (Boehmer et al., 2008b).  
For short selling activity, the AMF General Regulation clearly stipulates that for 
investors to be able to place an order to sell any security, they must have 100% 
ownership. Companies servicing the transaction must ensure that the security is 
already in an investor‘s account before they proceed. Ownership of the security can 
also be obtained from borrowing, therefore making covered short selling permissible 
but naked short selling prohibited (Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
In September 2010, the European Commission proposed new laws aimed to address 
the damage caused by the financial crisis and to try to avoid the occurrence of 
another such crisis. The laws added scrutiny to the existing regulatory framework 
relevant to short selling. The new laws are also expected to control the excessive risk 
which has occurred in the European financial market. In order to improve the market 
conditions, it is necessary to increase the level of market transparency and 
accountability (Beber and Pagano, 2010). 
The proposed new laws are expected to be discussed and approved by the European 
Parliament and Council of Ministers, and the entire process is expected to last more 
than a year. The earliest date that it could become effective will be 1 July 2012 
(Mitzlaff and Schwarze, 2010). There has not been much opposition to the proposals 
particularly because they bear close resemblance to the new legislation passed in the 
US (Beber and Pagano, 2010). 
The European Commission does not feel that there are adequate means for obtaining 
and monitoring information related to short sale positions. This lack of transparency 
has caused the market to be exposed to uncertainty and turbulence. As 12 of the EU 
states, including Germany and France, have already begun to introduce their own 
new regulations for short selling activity, the EU‘s proposal comes in the form of 
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legislative change (Mitzlaff and Schwarze, 2010). 
The member states will still have to comply with any national laws because the new 
legislation will not rescind existing laws (Mitzlaff and Schwarze, 2010). Nonetheless, 
the new laws are expected to create uniformity and to synchronise the restrictions 
introduced by the different member states to avoid the need to ban short selling 
completely (Beber and Pagano, 2010). 
The new laws will restrict uncovered short selling, introduce additional reporting 
requirements and make it obligatory for trades to be settled within a specific 
timeframe to minimise settlement risk. Most significantly, the laws give the national 
financial regulatory authorities the power to intervene in the financial market, even 
to the extent of banning short selling completely if deemed necessary (Mitzlaff and 
Schwarze, 2010) 
There are exemptions to the new regulations. If the shares are traded in a principal 
venue which is outside the EU, then short selling restrictions would not apply and the 
transactions would not be subject to the new transparency requirements. If market 
makers from a third country engage in market making activities in the EU, they too 
are exempted from the new regulations, as long as their country is recognised by the 
EU as having a regulatory framework similar to its own and meeting its standards 
(Mitzlaff and Schwarze, 2010). 
The European Commission did acknowledge the important role of short sales, 
particularly in regard to market liquidity and accuracy of pricing. Because of this, the 
new laws are expected to regulate short sales so as to avoid another situation where 
the authorities would deem that short selling should be banned altogether (Beber and 
Pagano, 2010). 
Short selling will still be allowed by the European Commission, which will introduce 
a monitoring system to keep track of all short selling trades. The information will be 
stored in a centralised database to enable proper scrutiny and effective regulation. 
Depending on the size of the trade, investors might be required to disclose the details 
of a transaction to the regulators or possibly even to the rest of the market (Khanna et 
al., 2009).  
A new European Union supervisory agency is expected to be established, focusing 
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on regulating short selling activity. This agency, the European Securities and Market 
Authority, is expected to begin operation in 2011 and will have the authority to ban 
short selling whenever it deems fit. Additional reporting requirements will also be 
imposed on short selling contracts and trades which meet prescribed thresholds 
(Beber and Pagano, 2010). 
The intervention powers granted by the new legislation to the national financial 
regulatory authorities are to undertake measures to protect the market during 
exceptional circumstances – for example, if a member state is facing financial 
instability or uncertainty. The national financial regulatory authority can introduce 
measures of intervention to overcome instability, but such measures are limited to a 
three-month period. These measures must be published on their websites to ensure 
that market participants and financial institutions are well informed of any changes 
(Khanna et al., 2009). 
2.6.2. Short Selling in North America 
On 19 September 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an 
Emergency Order which prohibited 799 financial companies from engaging in short 
selling activity. Four days later, another 30 stocks were added to the ban list. Of the 
829 banned stocks, 46 were banking stocks subject to the ban from the beginning. 
The ban was subsequently lifted on 9 October 2008. Earlier that year the SEC had 
already issued an Emergency Order to prohibit naked short selling for 19 financial 
companies. This order was only in place until 12 August 2008 (Boulton and 
Braga-Alves, 2009). 
The September 2008 Emergency Order was issued to restore stability in the United 
States‘ financial market following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and increased 
volatility in the stock exchanges. It also sought to protect investors and combat 
market abuse, manipulation and excessive speculation.  
Canada‘s securities regulatory authorities extended the SEC‘s Emergency Order to 
ban short selling to include Canadian financial institutions, particularly banks and 
insurance companies. This included Canadian companies which were inter-listed in 
a US stock exchange. The temporary order was issued by the Ontario Securities 
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Commission (OSC) on 19 September 2008 (Michayluk and Fernandez, 2009). This 
ban was lifted on 8 October 2008. 
The temporary ban on short selling applied to 13 issuers which were finance 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, including Canada‘s five major 
banks. The OSC‘s Temporary Order was issued after the SEC‘s Emergency Order, to 
avoid arbitrage opportunities arising from inconsistent regulations between the two 
countries. The OSC‘s order was also intended to stabilise the market which had 
become very volatile and disorderly. Upon the issuance of the order, all short sale 
orders pending at the time had to be cancelled but short positions created prior to the 
order did not have to be closed (Michayluk and Fernandez, 2009). 
The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) also published 
some notes to address problems related to short selling and failed trades. The 15 
October 2008 Rules Notice, for example, gave notice of approval for market 
regulators to assign any securities as being ineligible for short selling activity.  
The Rules Notice made it a requirement that an investor who modified a trade after 
execution would have to inform the market regulators. It also sought to clarify the 
requirements that must be fulfilled by a seller before they are able to claim 
ownership of a share that they intend to sell.  
2.6.3. Short Selling in Asia 
Asian regulators kept up to speed with the developments in the United States, the UK 
and other major economies. South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan 
implemented provisions to ban short selling in 2008, following declines and 
instability in their stock markets (Boehmer et al., 2008a).  
Hong Kong, despite having one of Asia‘s largest financial markets, was an exception. 
The regulatory authority did not ban short selling although it did threaten to take 
action against investors abusing short selling. Hong Kong‘s Securities and Future 
Commission was willing to be aggressive against companies, entities or even 
individuals who were suspected of violating short selling rules (Boehmer et al., 
2008a). 
In this study, the Asian countries which I focus on are South Korea, Japan and 
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Taiwan (Australia will be discussed in the next subsection). These three countries 
all banned short selling in 2008. South Korea‘s decision to ban short selling came 
after stock markets continued to decline as the United States‘ House of 
Representatives rejected a USD700 billion proposal aimed at saving the United 
States‘ financial system (Gruenewald et al., 2009).  
Following the announcement of this rejection, on 30 September 2008, South Korea‘s 
financial regulatory authority, the Financial Services Commission, announced that 
they would ban short selling on all stocks, including 13 banking stocks, until the end 
of 2008. This added to the existing restrictions on naked short selling which were 
already in force (Boehmer et al., 2008a). However, the lifting of the ban on 
non-financial stocks 1 June 2009 is still effective to date. 
By March 2009, South Korea‘s government was citing concern that short selling ban 
was curbing the foreign investment which was much needed to help boost the 
economy (Boehmer et al., 2008a). The country‘s financial officials had discussions 
with experts and analysts from the United States to understand better the impact of 
the credit crunch on the global markets and the implications of banning short selling 
(Boehmer et al., 2008a).  
As for the Japanese Government, the Finance Minister announced the decision to 
ban naked short selling. Japan had been controlling short selling activity since 2002, 
when the Japanese Financial Services Agency introduced the up-tick rule (Rhee, 
2003). Prior to the rule being introduced, the Agency investigated and punished 12 
brokerage firms which were found guilty of non-disclosure and abuse of short selling 
trading provisions (Rhee, 2003). The 2008 short-selling ban was supposed to begin 
on 4 November 2008 but it was advanced following a plunge in the stock market on 
30 October 2008 on all stocks, including 73 major banking stocks (Michayluk and 
Fernandez, 2009). The government also expressed its intention to conduct further 
investigations on previous misconduct related to short selling activity (Michayluk 
and Fernandez, 2009). Short selling ban was extended six times in efforts to bring 
back stability into the stock markets.  
Although Japan and South Korea imposed short selling bans on all stocks, Taiwan‘s ban only 
applied to 150 stocks, including 10 banking stocks. The stocks belonged to the companies 
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listed on the Taiwan 50 Index, the Taiwan Mid-Cap 100 Index and the Taiwan Information 
Index (Hung, 2008).  
The ban was imposed from 1 October 2008 by the Financial Supervisory Commission, 
Taiwan‘s peak financial regulatory body. The ban was enforced as a policy measure to 
complement other government initiatives aimed at supporting the financial market, 
including bail-out of companies, stimulating spending and consumption, and increasing 
investments (Khanna et al., 2009). Although the ban helped to boost the stock market, it was 
short-lived. On 31 December 2008, the ban was lifted (Hamson et al., 2008).  
2.6.4. Short Selling in the UK  
The UK‘s Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduced similar provisions to the 
SEC. The new Market Abuse Rules, from the FSA‘s Handbook of Rules and 
Guidance, states that: ‗A person who enters into a transaction that (whether by itself 
or in conjunction with other transactions) has the effect of: (a) creating a ―net short 
position‖ in a UK financial sector company; or (b) increasing any net short position 
in a ―UK financial sector company‖ that the person had immediately before 19 
September 2008; is, in the opinion of the FSA, engaging in behaviour that is ―market 
abuse‖ (misleading behaviour).‘ The ban on the UK market, which started on 19 
September 2008, was rescinded on 16 January 2009 (Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009). 
This ban covered 35 issuers, of which seven were in the banking sector. 
The financial companies covered were the banks and insurance providers under the 
purview of the FSA. The prohibition on short selling these companies‘ shares applied 
to trades which would create or increase the aggregate of a net short position 
(Boehmer et al., 2008b). The net short position depends on the economic exposure 
that an investor has in the share capital of a covered UK company and the 
calculations should include all forms of economic interest that investors have in the 
company‘s shares (Michayluk and Fernandez, 2009). 
There were a few exceptions to the new FSA rules. Short selling was permissible if it 
was part of the ordinary activity of a market maker. Also, the ban on short selling 
only took effect from 19 September 2008, therefore any orders placed prior to that 
date could still be executed, and existing net short positions did not have to be 
unwound. However, these trades had to be reported to the authorities accordingly 
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(Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
The FSA viewed short selling activity as a form of market abuse and viewed any 
breach of the new provisions as a very serious offence. If a person was found guilty 
of market abuse, the FSA had the power to make a public statement to expose the 
person‘s misconduct or breach, impose an unlimited civil fine, require the person to 
remedy the breach, and pay compensation if another person had suffered a loss as a 
result of the breach (Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
2.6.5. Short Selling in Australia 
Unlike countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and the United States, when 
Australia imposed a ban on short selling, it was not limited to a selected group of 
stocks. The ban applied to all listed stocks, from both financial and non-financial 
sectors, including 10 banking stocks (Hamson et al., 2008). On 19 September 2008, 
ASIC announced that the ban applied to naked short selling. A few days later, on 21 
September 2008, the ban was extended to covered short selling too (Hamson et al., 
2008).  
On 13 November 2008, ASIC announced that it would lift the ban on stocks for 
non-financial companies, effective on 18 November 2008. However, new provisions 
were enforced to regulate the reporting and disclosure of short sales. ASIC, in 
collaboration with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), made it compulsory 
for market participants to report their short sales daily. They were required to inform 
ASX if they had also advised their clients to report their short selling trades. ASX 
would subsequently have to report to the market all the short sales which had been 
executed, including the total volume and covering short sale transactions (Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission, 2008).  
Although the ban was partially lifted, the ban on short selling for securities in the 
financial sector continued (Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 2008). 
It was not until 25 May 2009 that the ban on covered and naked short selling for 
finance companies was lifted (Hamson et al., 2008).  
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2.7. Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of short selling. First presented was short 
selling history and definition. This was followed by outlining positive and negative 
arguments with respect to short selling. This chapter concluded by summarising 
short selling events globally during the 2008 financial crisis. 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Introduction 
The issue of short selling bans is considerably contentious among market 
participants. Numerous attempts have been made to explain the influence of short 
selling bans on the performance of stock markets. These empirical studies employ 
different methodologies and use a wide variety of samples spanning a number of 
time periods from different markets (Miller, 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; 
Bris, 2008; Hamson et al, 2008; Gruenewald et al., 2009; Boulton and Braga-Alves, 
2009; Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009; Clifton and Michayluk, 2010). This chapter 
presents a survey of the existing literature on short selling bans which provides the 
justification for undertaking this study.  
The literature review contains two sections. Section 3.2 explains the reasons for 
short selling bans and the underlying relation between short selling bans and stock 
performance from a theoretical perspective. In Section 3.2 justification is provided 
regarding market abuse, manipulation, rumourtrage and loss due to short selling. 
Section 3.3 reviews the impact from an empirical perspective of short selling bans on 
stock performance, including stock return, pricing, bid-ask spread, liquidity and 
trading volume. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the literature on 
costs of short selling bans and Section 3.4 summaries the chapter. 
3.2. Why Ban Short Selling?  
In discussions on whether or not there should be restrictions on short selling, the 
restrictions have been referred to a broader issue of the regulation of financial 
markets. Gruenewald et al. (2009) argue that regulations and constraints on the 
financial market are often implemented with the main goal being to maximise the 
efficiency of the system. To achieve this goal, shortcomings and failures of the 
market must be addressed. 
Although the principles of a free market do not prefer a heavily regulated market, 
regulation has been justified to serve the greater purpose of ensuring that market 
activities are based on the principle of what is best for the general public. Regulating 
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the market therefore usually emphasises promoting real competition, avoiding 
externalities, and safeguarding investors and market players from being victims of 
criminal activities (Gruenewald et al., 2009). 
Stulz (1999) claims that it is very important to compare the costs of regulation with 
its benefits because excessive costs associated with regulation may have direct and 
indirect impact on investors. Direct costs include transactions costs, lending fees and 
costs incurred in complying with new regulations. Indirect costs include the potential 
widening of the bid-ask spread of stocks and a reduction in limit orders (Gruenewald 
et al., 2009). Gruenewald et al. argue that any form of restriction implemented in the 
market, targeted towards short selling or otherwise, is considered effective only if it 
leads to a more efficient market and reduces market failures. 
Government intervention will be welcomed if the market believes that regulations 
promote market efficiency. Thus, the implementation of a short selling restriction 
has to be consistent with the general expectations of the financial market. 
Expectations include that restrictions will enable market failures to be avoided and 
that this will be done effectively and efficiently (Stulz, 1999). Furthermore, 
regulation costs must not exceed the associated benefits.  
3.2.1. Effects on Stock Prices 
The discussion on the effects of short selling restrictions on stock prices has been 
ongoing since the 1970s. As early as 1977, Miller (1977) conducted a study and 
demonstrated that without short selling, only bullish investors are willing to trade 
and they could push stock prices above the fair value. Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
confirmed that implementing short selling restrictions can result in overpriced stocks 
even beyond the prediction of optimistic traders. 
However, Bai et al. (2006) state that short selling restrictions will not increase stock 
prices but instead may actually reduce stock prices. Restrictions will cause shifts in 
demand, which will then change the risk profile of the trade, lifting investors‘ 
premium expectation for taking a higher risk (Bai et al., 2006). Clifton and 
Michayluk (2010) share this view and further suggest that when short selling is 
banned, trading becomes riskier. 
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Miller (1977) argues that the priority of short selling restrictions is to protect 
stockholders and ensure that prices will not suffer from downward pressure. 
However, Senchack and Starks (1993) state that empirically a short selling ban 
announcement does appear to have a negative impact on share price, suggesting that 
the constraints will not cause an upward bias. Instead, the constraints will eventually 
push down the price of the stocks.  
Diamond and Verracchia (1987) believe that short selling restrictions cannot cause 
an upward bias in stock prices either. In their view, the market is made up of 
participants who could be sensitive to market changes and therefore will take the 
restrictions into consideration. Restrictions can affect the market liquidity of banned 
stocks. 
Short selling is generally perceived to be a speculative activity which can put stocks 
under immense downward pressure (Reed, 2007). As a result, Clifton and Michayluk 
(2010) argue that restricting such activity would be expected to stabilise stock prices 
because fluctuations in stock prices largely depend on investor confidence, and short 
selling practices could make the stock price more vulnerable (Gruenewald et al., 
2009).  
Under extreme pressure, investors in companies in the finance sector could 
potentially be fearful about the consequences of a financial crisis. This could be the 
result of concerted efforts by certain players. Even if not, the outcome could still be a 
forced decline in their stock prices (Financial Services Authority, 2009). The SEC 
also suggests that some restrictions are necessary to ensure that stocks are supported 
and their value protected (Gruenewald et al., 2009). 
ASIC implemented short selling restrictions in the Australian market during the 
financial crisis of 2008 because short selling was causing turbulence in the market. 
According to Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2008), these 
fluctuations were unwelcome for causing a negative impact on the market‘s 
operations and fair dealings. 
Stock prices are also influenced by the lending fees imposed on a short sale. 
According to Duffie et al. (2002), those who lend stocks to short sellers possess a 
greater bargaining position because the short sellers rely on them to conduct the 
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trading. Senchack and Starks (1993) have the similar view that market players are 
aware that short sellers are willing to pay the additional fees if they are pessimistic 
about the future value of the stock and will short sell the stock. 
An increase in lending fees effectively pushes up stock prices. However, as lending 
fees become higher on a stock, the average return from that stock is most likely to 
decrease (Duffie et al., 2002). Saffi et al. (2007) conclude that implementing 
restrictions will cause additional friction and make it more difficult for lending to 
take place; therefore, it is difficult for short sellers to push prices towards a level 
which is consistent with the fundamentals. 
When the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK decided to impose short 
selling restrictions, the market was extremely unstable in terms of share price 
fluctuation and volatility, particularly in the financial sector. Financial Services 
Authority (2009) clearly states that specific banks were facing immense pressure in 
their capital base and funding structure because of the decline in their share prices. 
Gruenewald et al. (2009) claim that, prior to the financial crisis, the market was 
relatively stable and therefore short selling was welcomed for its ability to enhance 
the pricing efficiency and liquidity of the market. However, during the crisis, short 
selling became a threat to the market because it caused price reduction irrespective of 
actual price valuation (Gruenewald et al., 2009). Bris et al. (2007) confirm that short 
selling caused negative skewness for individual firms as their share prices faced 
sharp declines. 
Ross (1976) argues that if there is an increased supply of stocks and the demand 
remains unchanged, stock prices can fall. This scenario incites fear of the future of 
companies and industries whose stocks are being shorted in the market. Financial 
Services Authority (2009) states that short selling is often blamed when a company is 
forced to suspend due to stock price decline which is attributed to short seller 
pessimism and purported malice. 
Rhee (2003) holds the view that if stock prices continue to deteriorate, banks and 
other financial institutions will be severely affected. They are concerned that stock 
value influences their credit ratings and capital position; therefore, a slump in stock 
prices will have immediate consequences for both. Clifton and Michayluk (2010) 
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investigate further and suggest that, when banks face a crisis, they welcome short 
selling restrictions for stabilising their stock prices, and speculation on their stocks 
will be ceased. 
Short selling can also have a negative impact on stock prices which are undergoing a 
secondary offering process. Skinner (1989) argues that publicly listed companies 
sometimes need to raise capital to maintain consistent growth. One alternative is 
through a secondary offering whereby the company can offer new stocks to the 
public (Skinner, 1989). 
The stock prices for the secondary offering are usually benchmarked against the 
stock‘s previous day‘s closing price, and the secondary offering will be fixed at a 
lower price (Gruenewald et al., 2009). This is to encourage investors to participate in 
the offering. However, Pontiff (1996) claims that the discount also drives investors 
to short sell the stocks prior to the secondary offering because they expect to receive 
the offering shares at a lower price. Investors will short sell the offering shares and 
then enjoy a guaranteed profit when they buy back the stocks. In this situation, short 
selling activity would not benefit the price discovery process. Instead, it could 
damage a secondary offering because its prices will be significantly pushed down 
(Gruenewald et al., 2009). Short selling in this context, compared to normal 
circumstances, does not provide any additional value to the market, either economic 
or social perspectives. As a result, the permissibility of short selling in this context is 
highly questionable, particularly because of the vulnerable position it creates for the 
prices of the stocks under offer (Sefieddine and Wilhelm, 1996). 
3.2.2. To Calm the Market 
When a crisis occurs and it is widely believed that stock markets are struggling, short 
selling is prevented because short sellers do not consider the actual value of the 
companies whose stocks they are short sold (Ranaldo, 2004). Clifton and Michayluk 
(2010) agree with this. 
Generally speaking, active short sale rallies signal that a company is overvalued 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009). If other investors respond to the signal, the 
stock price will be adjusted accordingly. Thus, the short sale could improve the 
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accuracy of the stock‘s value. However, the market might exploit the situation and 
overreact towards the signal, which might lead to further stock price deterioration. 
As a result, Hansson and Rudowfors (2009) believe that short selling bans need to be 
implemented to bring calm to a very turbulent market. Reed (2007) states that global 
markets have become more integrated and dependent on each other, which is why the 
level of turbulence and volatility triggered by the current financial crisis has never 
been experienced before. Hence short selling bans protect the fundamental integrity 
of the market and calm the volatile market during financial turmoil. 
3.2.3. Market Volatility and Instability 
Gruenewald et al. (2009) claim that short selling restrictions are necessary when a 
financial crisis causes the market to be manipulated at a dangerous level that 
threatens investors and capital markets. The market then cannot operate efficiently 
and is in constant disequilibrium.  A short selling ban as a short term policy could 
therefore restore equilibrium to the market.  
Financial Services Authority (2009) shares these views and concerns about the 
instability of the market and the effects on the stocks of financial institutions in 
particular, which are subject to extreme short selling pressures. Depositors would 
face uncertainty in the share price with consequent financial stability issues 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009).  
Financial Services Authority (2009) emphasises deposits because the delicate 
situation became a challenging task facing banks and financial institutions during the 
financial crisis. This deterioration has a severe impact on a firm‘s operating activities 
in terms of capital acquisition, obtaining loans or raising equity. This is because, for 
banks especially, any excessive devaluation makes it difficult for them to attract 
deposits from customers. If depositors lose confidence, they might decide to 
withdraw their funds, partially or completely (Financial Services Authority, 2009).  
Ranaldo (2004) argues that lack of confidence in the market triggers panic selling 
and financial institutions will suffer the most. Gruenewald et al. (2009) also state that 
financial institutions are unable to perform their daily business effectively if their 
trading partners and other related counterparties do not have confidence in them. 
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Australia‘s regulatory body, ASIC, has taken more determined measures than the 
US‘s SEC and the UK‘s FSA. Michayluk and Fernandez (2009) argue that the 
restrictions imposed by ASIC are not limited to a list of specific banking and 
financial stocks. Instead, all forms of short selling activity for all the stocks in the 
Australian market are subject to this ban. 
This ban was seen as necessary because the market was particularly fragile. Hamson 
et al. (2008) argue that this interim measure maintains market confidence and 
restores market stability. 
Michayluk and Fernandez (2009) comment that Hamson et al. (2008) precisely 
address the need to have strong confidence levels for the market to remain stable. If 
one relies on behavioural finance to explain short selling restrictions, the focus 
would be on how investors overreact and tend to extrapolate and trail other players. 
Boehmer et al. (2009) claim that these trends create instability in the market because 
balance between supply and demand will be thrown out of proportion and biases will 
cause systemic asymmetry. Hamson et al. (2008) agree that, as a result, the 
restriction becomes necessary to ensure that these instabilities do not happen, and 
serves as a means to improve the confidence level in the market. 
If short selling is allowed to prevail and causes a company to close, then news of the 
occurrence will spread throughout the market and immediately affect investor 
confidence. This will subsequently lead to negative sentiments and downgraded 
forecasts towards other stocks and securities within sectors similar to that of the 
failed company (Financial Services Authority, 2009). Boehmer et al. (2009) 
conclude that short selling restrictions are introduced as an artificial way for 
regulatory authorities to provide safeguards against potential threats and excessive 
risk taking. 
3.2.4. Market Abuse, Manipulation and ‘Rumourtrage’ 
Although short selling benefits the financial market in many ways, it can also have 
harmful effects. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) believe that as a trading strategy, short 
selling can be abused and manipulated to gain profit through wrongful means, 
referred to as ‗rumourtrage‘. The view is shared by Reed (2007) and Kolasinksi et al. 
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(2009) that traders who have bought stocks could spread rumours which are untrue 
but positive to push up the prices of stocks in their hand. The rumours might be about 
an improvement in the financial performance of a company which is actually 
struggling or an engagement in large deals which do not actually exist. 
Parlour (1998) states that short sellers could also spread such rumours but with the 
aim of creating negative perceptions. Rumour can be used to mislead the market by 
triggering false signals about the demand and supply of a particular stock. Financial 
Services Authority (2009) cites ‗scaremongering‘ tactics, where some market 
players purposely spread rumours to create fear and negative sentiments towards a 
firm, which will lead the firm‘s stock price to decrease, resulting in those market 
players profiting from the initial short sale. 
Marsh et al. (2008) state that short sellers have a greater incentive to spread negative 
rumours than positive ones because short selling can cause greater price swings, 
fluctuations and volatility, compared to non-short sellers. Because negative rumours 
lead to immediate market reaction, the desired increase in volatility is easier to 
achieve through spreading such rumours than using other trading strategies. 
Similarly, Gruenewald et al. (2009) indicate that the market manipulation which 
occurs in pursuit of short selling related goals can cause greater harm to the market 
than other forms of wrongful tactics. And in times of crisis, abuse of market practice 
causes disorder in market operations.  
Manipulation in the market is not a new concept, however. Prior to short selling ban 
in 2008, the President of Rhino Advisors, managing the company‘s trading activities, 
faced legal action because he forced a decline in the price of Sedona Corporation‘s 
stocks which had been issued in November 2000 (Lamont and Stein, 2004). This had 
been observed through a large short selling exercise aiming to increase the supply 
and resulting in a decline in the share price. Rhino‘s client had a $3 million 
investment in Sedona and the decline in the price allowed the client to obtain more 
shares on exercising the conversion rights (Rhee, 2003). This case is an example of 
how short sales practices can be exploited. Rhee (2003) suggests that it also 
demonstrates how in the real market, players do purposely collaborate to force stock 
prices to decline regardless of their actual value. 
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Regulatory authorities have begun to consider ‗rumourtrage‘ a very serious matter. 
ASIC in Australia, for example, commenced investigations in 2008 on ‗rumourtrage‘ 
which was allegedly being concerted between hedge funds and other market makers 
(Khanna et al., 2009). In 2009, ASIC even banned a trader from providing any 
financial consulting or advisory services for 18 months and suspended his licence 
because he had spread rumours on purpose and tried to mislead the market with false 
information (Allens et al., 2009). 
Khanna et al. (2009) argue that since rumours are usually baseless, the 
rumour-influenced stock price is not consistent with actual market value. This causes 
more volatile price fluctuations as market participants react to the negative 
sentiments. Hamson et al. (2008) believe that this subsequently leads to disorder in 
the market. ‗Rumourtrage‘ has been said to have become a more common market 
practice because regulatory authorities have failed to implement adequate policies 
for ensuring transparency in trading activities (Khanna et al., 2009). 
3.2.5. Increases in Loss 
Bris et al. (2007) argue that short selling activities can also result in heavy losses for 
publicly listed companies and financial institutions. According to Richard Fuld, 
former Chief Executive Officer of Lehman Brothers, short selling was a major factor 
which led to the demise of Lehman Brothers as well as Bear Stearns, two giant 
investment banks in the United States (Kolasinksi et al., 2009). The SEC has a 
similar view (Kolasinksi et al., 2009). 
Short selling is regarded as a dangerous activity when the market is unstable. Naes 
and Skjeltorp (2006) state that short selling has been banned in many countries 
because it is associated with a very high price risk whereby short sellers may 
deliberately push down the price. Financial Services Authority (2009) confirms that 
short selling has multiple effects on the market because it leads to sub-optimal trades 
and higher transaction costs, and creates opportunities for market abuse.  
Short selling restrictions become necessary to protect the interest of security owners. 
Culp and Heaton (2008) claim that investors cannot prevent a decline in their stock 
prices when short sellers decide to speculate against them. Similarly, Kolasinksi et al. 
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(2009) agree that short selling distorts a stock‘s demand curve and causes stock 
prices to fall to undesirably low levels which drive away the market price from the 
intrinsic value of stocks. 
Any price decline will be a disadvantage for stock owners if they want to sell their 
stocks later. Culp and Heaton (2008) state the reason is that owners plan to sell their 
stocks at a certain level, but short sellers will, innocently or otherwise, try to bring 
this level down. If the level does not go down, short selling will not be profitable 
(Kolasinksi et al., 2009). Therefore, as short sellers try to push down the price, stock 
owners will not be able to sell their shares at a fair value (Saffi, 2007).  
In conclusion, numerous attempts have been made to explain the reasons for short 
selling bans. From the theoretical perspective, the influence of a short selling ban on 
stock prices is found to be one of the major reasons (Diamond and Verracchia, 1987). 
Researchers also argue that one of the reasons for banning short selling is to calm the 
market and smooth market volatility (Miller, 1977). Other purposes of short selling 
restrictions relate to market manipulation and increased losses. 
3.3. Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Short Selling Bans on 
Stock Performance  
The five main aspects influenced by short selling bans are stock return and volatility, 
pricing, bid-ask spread and liquidity, trading volume and costs of short selling. 
3.3.1. Stock Abnormal Return and Volatility 
There are different views on the expected impact of the ban on return. Miller‘s (1977) 
theory suggests that short selling restrictions cause abnormal return of banned stock 
to increase because investors with negative views are unable to trade. However, a 
study conducted by Senchack and Starks (1993) examined the stock price reaction to 
the short interest announcement made by The Wall Street Journal and found that the 
reaction suggested that an abnormal return decrease followed the ban. This view is 
supported by Ho (1996) in regard to the Singapore market. Bai et al. (2006) also 
argue that the mean abnormal return should become lower during a ban. However, 
this would only be a short-term effect, as suggested by Marsh and Niemer (2008). 
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Turning to volatility, evidence shows volatility increases during a ban (Kraus et al., 
2002). 
Marsh and Niemer (2008) examined the impact of shorting bans on stock return by 
assessing abnormal return and volatility of stocks and by using a sample of 213 firms 
in the UK, the US, France, Germany, Sweden and Japan from January to October 
2008. They found that shorting bans did not cause a change in stock performance 
(Marsh and Niemer, 2008). Instead, stock abnormal return and volatility were similar 
prior to the ban and during the ban. In addition, the behaviour of the banned stocks 
was similar to that of the control stocks (Marsh and Niemer, 2008). 
Furthermore, Marsh and Niemer (2008) did not find evidence of any detrimental 
impacts resulting from a ban. The autocorrelation coefficient and the goodness of fit 
results were lower for the banned period than for the post-ban period. The findings 
further suggest that changes are not the result of short selling restrictions but rather 
result from sector-wide factors and external influences. 
Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009) extended Marsh and Niemer‘s (2008) study to 
assess the impact of short selling restrictions on stock abnormal return and volatility 
by conducting an event study on the ban imposed in the US market. Also known as 
Emergency Order (EO), the ban prohibited short selling for approximately 1,000 
banking and financial institutions stocks. The event study compared stock abnormal 
return during three periods: the ‗restricted period‘ for the 17 days when the ban was 
imposed, the ‗pre-period‘ for the 17 days before the ban and the ‗post-period‘ for the 
17 days after the ban. The sample consisted of 925 US firms from January 2005 to 
December 2008. 
The results of this study indicate that positive effects of the ban were experienced by 
both banned and non-banned stocks. Both banned and non-banned stocks enjoyed 
positive abnormal return following the announcement of the ban. However, the 
opposite result occurred when the SEC announced the end of the ban, and abnormal 
return became negative instead. When the ban was first announced, the mean 
abnormal return was 11.2% but when the ban was ending, the mean abnormal return 
dropped to -5.2% for banned stocks and -0.7% for non-banned stocks. The -4.5% 
difference between the means of these two samples is statistically significant 
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(Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2009).The possible explanation is that when short selling 
restrictions are lifted, pessimistic investors are able to participate in trading and to 
establish positions based on their bearish views, and these actions could force stock 
prices to decline (Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2009). 
As for the volatility of stock return, short selling restrictions would be expected to 
reduce it because trading activity has become limited for some stocks (Khanna et al., 
2009). However, Ho (1996), Boehmer et al. (2008c) and Boulton and Braga-Alves 
(2009) found that when short selling restrictions are introduced, the volatility of 
banned stocks increases. Bris et al. (2007) and Chang et al. (2007) confirmed this 
finding in the Singapore market and Hong Kong market respectively. 
Hansson and Rudowfors‘ (2009) study confirms the studies of Boehmer et al. (2008a) 
and Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009). Hansson and Rudowfors‘ (2009) study was on 
the 23 banned stocks and 321 control stocks in the UK from 10 July 2008 to 27 
March 2009. This period was analysed based on four segments: pre-ban, post-ban, 
ban 1 and ban 2. The pre-ban and post-ban periods were 50-day windows of trading 
days before and after the ban. Ban 1 covered the first 41 days of the ban period and 
ban 2 covered the last 42 days. Preliminary estimations are calculated as the 
expected return, so abnormal return is any deviation from the expected return. In this 
study, Hansson and Rudowfors conclude that banned stocks have reduced abnormal 
return when a short selling ban is imposed. As for volatility, their results indicate that 
the high intra-day volatility in banned stocks continued even after the ban was lifted. 
This suggests that volatility is not necessarily due to the ban. Instead, there are other 
events and incidents which could have caused the increase in the volatility of banned 
stocks and control stocks. An example is the announcement of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland‘s results one day after the ban was lifted (Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009). 
The initial Miller (1977) theory suggests that abnormal return will increase and 
volatility will decrease when short selling is banned. However, recent studies have 
found increased volatility during the ban and mixed evidence for abnormal return. 
3.3.2. Pricing 
A main argument in support of unrestricted short selling is based on the premise that 
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if it is restricted, then stocks prices are unable to capture and reflect all information 
(Gruenewald et al., 2009). Ferson and Harvey (1993) and Erb et al. (1996) propose 
that this will have an impact on the process of price discovery, which will 
subsequently lead to inefficient allocation of capital. 
It is inevitable that imposing short selling restrictions will have an impact on prices. 
Various studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between short 
selling bans and stock prices. 
When there is a ban on short selling, traders with a bearish view of the market will be 
prevented from trading. Limiting short selling activity suppresses the amount of 
information that can be captured in the demand for a stock and subsequently its price. 
Although the decreased informational content is asymmetrical between positive and 
negative news, this does not lead to any bias. Less informed investors would have 
managed their expectations by taking the asymmetry into consideration. This theory 
has been established and modelled by Diamond and Verracchia (1987) and further 
confirmed by Hong and Stein (2003), Chang et al. (2007), Bai et al. (2006), Cohen et 
al. (2007), Au et al. (2009) and Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009). 
Beber and Pagano (2010) found that a ban had effects on price discovery and on 
changes in stock prices. Their sample was more than 16,000 stocks from 30 
countries from January 2008 to June 2009. 
Price discovery is measured based on the extent that a specific stock‘s return is 
correlated with returns in previous periods. Beber and Pagano (2010) argue that 
effects on stock prices are observable by comparing the market performance 
between banned and non-banned stocks. 
Contrary to the regulators‘ assumptions, the evidence shows that bans caused stock 
prices to decline. Overall, Beber and Pagano (2010) found that short selling bans 
caused the process of price discovery to slow down. This occurs more obviously 
when there is negative news. Furthermore, bans do not improve stock performance 
in terms of price except in the US. 
3.3.3. Bid-Ask Spread 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) developed a model which demonstrated that 
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restrictions would widen the bid-ask spread and decrease the stock liquidity when 
short selling was banned. The reason was that traders were unable to take short 
positions despite having negative views about the stock‘s value and performance. 
Many empirical studies have been conducted to test this proposition. 
Following the 2008 ban imposed by ASIC, Hamson et al. (2008) investigated the 
impact of a short selling ban on the market liquidity in the Australian stock market. 
The dataset captured all stocks on the S&P/ASX 300, with a total of 283 stocks. The 
ban was effective from 22 September 2008. It is worth noting that ASIC‘s ban was 
applicable to all stocks listed on the Australian stock exchange. 
The results show that the bid-ask spread statistically increased when short selling 
ban was implemented. The overall liquidity for Australia‘s listed equity declined 
significantly. In addition, the decline affected the speed of price discovery and 
created additional costs for trading, both of which are unfavourable circumstances 
for all investors.  
Hansson and Rudowfors (2009) addressed the effects of the UK short selling ban on 
bid-ask spread. Their study covered 23 banned stocks and 321 control stocks in the 
UK from 10 July 2008 to 27 March 2009.  
The results of this study indicate that the bid-ask spread increased when a short 
selling ban was imposed. The impact was observed for both the ban group and the 
control group, and the increase was more significant for the banned stocks. The 
result of the RES, applied to quotes valid one second before the trade was done, 
showed that the bid-ask spread of banned stocks increased by 131% and the control 
stocks increased by 55% when the ban was imposed. When the ban was lifted, the 
spread for both groups of stocks experienced significant decline and again, the 
impact was greater on banned stocks. Banned stocks declined by 29% while control 
stocks only declined by 9%. Overall, the results provide evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the bid-ask spread widens when short selling bans are imposed on the 
market. Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009) and Clifton and Michayluk (2010) 
confirmed Hansson and Rudowfors‘ (2009) results in the US and the UK 
respectively. 
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3.3.4. Trading Volume and Turnover 
Miller‘s (1977) theory suggests trading volume and turnover of relevant stocks will 
decrease when short selling is banned. Many researchers have carried out empirical 
studies to investigate this proposition. 
Clifton and Snape (2008) calculated the trading volume and turnover of the London 
Stock Exchange following the FSA‘s announcement of the banning of short selling in 
selected banking and financial stocks. The study sample consisted of 15 banned 
stocks and a sample of 78 control stocks which were not subject to the ban from 23 
June 2008 to 30 October 2008. Trading volume was measured as the number of 
stocks actually traded every business day. The turnover was calculated as the daily 
number of traded stocks divided by the total number of stocks (Clifton and Snape, 
2008). 
The empirical results indicate that the volume of the banned stocks consistently 
declined throughout the ban period but increased for controlled stocks, implying that 
liquidity had shifted from the stocks which could not be short sold to the stocks 
which could. Clifton and Snape (2008) claim that there was an increase in the trading 
volume for the banned stocks after the ban was lifted. 
As for the turnover, it dropped significantly for banned stocks. Prior to the ban, the 
average was 0.0068 and when the ban was imposed, it fell to 0.0054, declining by 
21%. Control stocks, on the other hand, enjoyed an increase in turnover. The average 
from ban period to post-ban period increased from 0.0057 to 0.0081, a 42% increase. 
Clifton and Snape (2008) argue that this is consistent with Miller‘s (1977) results for 
depth and trading volume, which indicate that the liquidity is shifted towards control 
stocks when banned stocks cannot be short sold. 
Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009) investigated the impact on volume in the US 
market. They also recognised volume as a key measure of liquidity, with a sample of 
925 banned stocks from January 2005 to December 2008. 
The results indicate that there was a reduction of 14.7% in trading volume for banned 
stocks from the period prior to the ban up to the period of the actual ban, and then a 
continued decline in the post-ban period. Turnover was reduced to a lesser degree. 
Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009) interpret that the ban had a negative impact on 
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trading volume and on overall liquidity. 
Chang et al. (2007), Boehmer et al. (2008b) and Hansson and Rudowfors (2009) 
confirmed a similar ban effect on trading volume in Hong Kong, the US and the UK 
respectively. 
The reduction in trading volume and turnover is due to pessimistic traders with 
bearish views being forced to stay out of the market. They are unable to go short on 
the stocks because they do not own them. The prevailing market conditions resulting 
from the announcement of the ban would also contribute to the drop in trading 
volume (Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
Overall, results indicate that short selling bans reduce trading volume. More 
importantly, this implies that trades from short sellers constitute a significant 
component of the trading volume of the stocks that are affected by short selling 
restrictions (Boehmer et al., 2008b). 
3.3.5. Costs of Short Selling and Restrictions  
Clifton and Michayluk (2010) argue that on the implementation of short selling bans, 
there is strong debate among market players, regulatory authorities and the general 
public on how the ban might affect financial market quality, including stock return, 
trading volume and stock prices. Much of the discussion focuses on the economic 
consequence after a ban is implemented (Hamson et al., 2008). 
Hamson et al. (2008) state that the economic impact is in the form of costs to various 
stakeholders when short selling is banned and alternatives in trading activity became 
extremely limited. The fewer the trades, the fewer the orders placed with stock 
brokers. A broker‘s income mainly comes from commission and a broker‘s 
commission depends on the number of trade done. Empirical evidence has 
demonstrated that short selling bans have a negative impact on a broker‘s income. 
Hamson et al. (2008) found that short selling restrictions decreased trading volume 
by 16% in Australia, implying that AUD 640 million losses occurred per day, 
assuming a daily turnover of AUD 4 billion. If a stockbroker earned 10 basis points 
as their commission, then they could have a loss of up to AUD 1.28 million on one 
single trading day, and this figure becomes AUD 320 million per annum. 
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The figure above represents only the losses for brokers. If the interests of custodians, 
fund administrators and other financial services are considered, the total figure of 
revenue and income lost would be much higher. Furthermore, Hamson et al. (2008) 
argue that bans also cause a reduction in the revenue generated from exchange fees 
and lending fees. 
Short selling activity can be very expensive for investors. Jones and Lamont (2002) 
believe that to take a short position on a stock, the trader will have to borrow the 
stock from its existing owner. The lender will, of course, charge a lending fee, which 
mainly depends on the supply and demand for that particular stock. Boulton et al. 
(2009) found that 2008 short selling bans in the US, Canada, Germany and the UK 
created a disparity between banned stocks and non-banned stocks. The explanation 
might be that as banned stocks could not be short sold, short selling demand was 
diverted to concentrate on non-banned stocks. An increase in demand for 
non-banned stocks will cause the lending fees to subsequently increase too, thus 
resulting in higher transaction costs.  
Financial Services Authority (2009) claims that a short selling ban is associated with 
direct and indirect costs. The indirect costs include the reduction in market efficiency 
and the decline in market liquidity and relevant opportunity costs. The reduction in 
market efficiency means a slower speed of price changes because overpricing would 
be prevalent. Another indirect cost is in market liquidity because the ban would force 
out potential sellers, causing a decline in trading volume as well as an increase in the 
bid-ask spread. As mentioned before, the bid-ask spread is widened when short 
selling restrictions are imposed. As the spread widens, transaction costs also increase. 
Again, in Australia, Hamson et al. (2008) found that transaction costs increase by an 
estimated total amount of AUD 3.2 million every day. Annualised, the figure is AUD 
800 million. Meanwhile, the opportunity cost is also affected by a short selling ban. 
The general reduction in trading would also cause firms to have opportunity costs 
because of being unable to profit from short selling activity or to gain from 
overpricing of stocks (Financial Services Authority, 2009). The opportunity cost is 
assessed based on the time of an order, the size of the order and participation rates. 
Boehmer et al. (2008c) argue that bans increase the market volatility and reduce the 
trading volume. However, when short selling is prohibited, the opportunity cost for 
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larger trades and orders will be increased accordingly. 
Direct costs include initial and ongoing compliance costs. These costs are incurred to 
fulfil the compliance requirements when short selling restrictions are imposed 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009). Financial Services Authority (2009) obtained 
data from several firms to gauge the compliance costs. They received feedback from 
nine companies and using the figures they provided, they estimated that the initial 
average compliance cost per company was GBP 40,000 and the ongoing compliance 
cost per company was GBP 6,500 per month. This was not viewed as a burden or a 
significant additional amount for the firms to carry because short selling bans and the 
consequent compliance costs are only temporary (Financial Services Authority, 
2009). 
Financial Services Authority (2009) argues that two other important costs attached to 
a ban are the cost of underwriters of rights issues and the cost of capital. Clifton and 
Michayluk (2010) argue that as a result of a ban, the number of underwriters willing 
to offer underwriting services to rights issuers is reduced. Fewer companies offering 
the service results in less competition, which leads to less innovation, fewer 
alternatives and even an increase in the fees charged for the service. All these factors 
jointly push up the cost of capital for the rights issuers. 
Furthermore, short selling restrictions mean fewer hedging options, which increase 
the risk exposure for underwriters (Financial Services Authority, 2009). Consistent 
with Clifton and Michayluk (2010), Christie et al. (2002) suggest that the increase in 
risk would result in an increase in the fees charged and subsequently increased cost 
of capital for the rights issuers.  
Legal costs need to be considered when a short selling ban is imposed. Bris (2008) 
states that when short selling regulations were implemented in 2008, many banks 
had to make adjustments to their internal systems to fulfil the new requirements. 
Unfortunately, there was an oversight by Goldman Sachs, an investment bank in the 
US. Goldman‘s Execution and Clearing Unit was investigated by the SEC for 
violating the SEC‘s rules in regard to naked short selling. Gruenewald et al. (2009) 
state that Goldman was accused of not complying with the rule that stocks had to be 
delivered on certain dates to avoid failure-to-deliver positions. The delivery required 
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Goldman either to make an immediate purchase of the stocks which had been short 
sold or to borrow them. Goldman did not deny the accusation, nor did it admit guilt. 
However, it did agree to pay the SEC and NYSE‘s regulatory arm USD 450,000 as a 
civil penalty to settle the matter out of court. In addition to this fine, Goldman‘s 
Market Making Department was also censured (Boehmer et al., 2009). 
For this particular case, Goldman Sachs pledged to refrain from breaching any more 
short selling regulations (Gruenewald et al., 2009). However, Battalio et al. (2009) 
state that Goldman Sachs is facing another case from the SEC due to allegations of 
civil fraud related to mortgage securities. This could lead to further legal costs and 
fees for the company. 
Cohen et al. (2007) and Boulton et al. (2009) conclude that trading strategies will 
ultimately depend on lending fees and transactions costs. Traders will make their 
decisions on whether or not the returns are enough to cover their direct and indirect 
costs as well as earn a profit margin. 
In conclusion, short selling bans play a very important role in affecting stock 
performance; there are different impacts in terms of stock return, pricing, bid-ask 
spread, liquidity, trading volume and costs of short selling (Hamson et al., 2008).  
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a thorough review of the literature on short selling bans, 
with the purpose of building the theoretical and empirical foundation of this thesis. 
To assist this process, reasons for short selling bans have been reviewed and several 
theories have been offered to explain the operation of short selling bans, such as 
price effect, calming the market, smoothing volatility, rumourtrage issue, increases 
in loss and the impact of short selling bans on stock return, pricing aspects, bid-ask 
spread, liquidity, trading volume and costs. 
A number of studies on short selling bans provide some empirical evidence on the 
impact of the bans on different market features by using methodologies such as daily 
data and fixed effect regression method. These methodologies may result in findings 
that are imprecise and subject to significant econometric bias. However, mixed 
empirical findings can be enhanced by the use of ultra high frequency tick by tick 
  45 
data and the mix of fixed effect and random effect panel regression methods to 
comprehensively investigate the true influence of short selling bans on banking 
stocks. 
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of short selling bans on 
particular markets. However, there appears to be no comparative analysis of the 
performance in Western markets and Asian markets. This information is important as 
it assists investors in making investment decisions in different geographic areas with 
different market microstructure characteristics, culture and behavioural finance 
characteristics. This thesis thus thoroughly explores the comparison between 
Western and Asian markets. 
Although the general comments on short selling bans in the literature support the 
theory proposed by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Miller (1977), the literature 
on banking sectors and aggregate market-wide performance is insufficient. Hence 
the purpose of this thesis is to explore these avenues. Specifically, this thesis studies 
the impact of short selling bans on banking share performance, including abnormal 
return, volatility, spread and trading volume. The impact on market-wide 
performance is also a focus.  
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the data and methodology used in the thesis. 
Section 4.2 outlines the data obtained from the Reuters Thomson database and 
Datastream. Sample construction and sample periods are detailed in this section. 
Section 4.3 explains the measures used in this thesis, including abnormal return, 
volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume. Their definition, calculation methods 
and proxies are presented. Section 4.4 provides the methodology for estimating 
descriptive statistics and developing regression models. 
4.2. Data Preparation  
The raw dataset includes best bid and ask quote from each country‘s main share 
market index, which is the most liquid and the most well-known index in each 
country. Ultra high frequency data is used, specifically, tick by tick data for all trades. 
The raw data is provided by Reuters Thomson through its Tick History database. 
Reuters Thomson‘s database provides the trading tick price, ask price, bid price and 
trading volume. 
The raw data from Reuters Thomson‘s database is filtered to segregate bid and ask 
quotes. Trades that are cancelled or incorrect are excluded. Then, trades with zero or 
missing prices or volume are filtered out. Trades are also excluded if both the bid 
price and the ask price are quoted at 0. Lastly, trades are filtered out if the ask price is 
less than or equal to the bid price. To calculate the effective spread, each trade in the 
tick by tick dataset is then matched to its prevailing bid-ask quote. 
The daily trading data, price, market capitalisation, turnover and number of trade are 
from the Datastream database. Data is merged from the two datasets and then used to 
calculate the four measures. 
There are some outliers and extraordinary values in the raw dataset. For example, the 
market-adjusted return may have values near hundreds or thousands percent. So 
outliers are excluded after the four measures are calculated which is consistent with 
the literature (Boehmer et al., 2009). Market Adjusted Return (MAR) with a range 
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outside [-0.3, 0.3] are excluded which is the normal practice (Boehmer et al., 2009). 
After this process, other measures are within the reasonable range. 
Two groups of stocks are created for comparison. ‗Banned stocks‘ are the banking 
stocks which are banned from short selling activity. The banking stock list is 
obtained from each country‘s stock exchange‘s banking sector list. The classification 
of banking sector is according to each country‘s stock exchange‘s official 
classification. Therefore, banned stocks are banking stocks which are also on short 
selling ban list in that country. 
The other group is ‗control stocks‘. The first type of control stocks is index stocks 
excluding banned banking stocks. The second type of control stocks is index minus 
all banned stocks. The way to use these two types depends on the scope of the ban. 
For countries banning all stocks, specifically Japan and Taiwan, banned stocks are 
identified as all banking stocks and control stocks are index stocks without banned 
banking stocks (Type 1). For countries banning all stocks first then reducing the 
scope to financial stocks, namely, Australia and Korea, banned stocks are banned 
banking stocks and control stocks are index stocks after taking out banned banking 
stocks (this is also Type 1). For countries banning only financial stocks, namely, 
Canada, France, Germany I [2008 ban], Germany II [2010 ban], the UK and the US, 
banned stock group includes all banking stocks which is obtained in the same way as 
Type 1 banned stocks and control stocks are the country‘s index minus all stocks in 
the ban list (Type 2). Since financial stocks do not only include banking stocks, but 
others, e.g. insurance company stocks, as such Type 1 and Type 2 control stocks are 
obtained through different ways. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 illustrate the ban scope, 
banned stocks and control stocks in detail. 
As seen from Table 4.1, Australia, Japan, Korea and Taiwan banned all stocks during 
2008 financial crisis, with different lifting dates. In Australia and Korea, bans for 
financial stocks had been lasting longer than that for non-financial stocks. Western 
markets banned selected stocks, for example Canada, France, Germany, the UK and 
the US. Notably, the US banned 829 stocks which is the largest number, but in which 
was only 46 banking stocks. Bans are still ongoing in Germany, Japan and Korea (at 
the time of the study). 
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Table 4.1 Stock and Trading Days 
The table reports the detail of the number of banned stocks and control stocks, the ban imposing 
and lifting dates, the ban duration, the ban scope and the related index in each country. 
C ountry S c ope
B an
Impos ing
Date
B an
L ifting
Date
B an
Duration
(days ) Index
B anned
B anking
S toc ks
C ontrol
s toc k
F inancials 22-S ep-08 24-May-09 169 AS X /S &P 200 10 171
Non-financials 22-S ep-08 17-Nov-08
C anada 13 19-S ep-08 7-O ct-08 13 S &P /T S X  C ompos ite 5 155
F rance 15 22-S ep-08 ongoing 65 C AC  40 Index 7 34
G ermany I (2008) 11 20-S ep-08 31-J an-10 342 DAX  Index 4 28
G ermany II (2010) 10 19-May-10 ongoing 64 DAX  Index 4 28
J apan All 30-O ct-08 ongoing 57 T OPIX 73 30
F inancials 1-O ct-08 ongoing 62 K OS PI 50 13 48
Non-financials 1-O ct-08 31-May-09
Taiwan All 1-O ct-08 30-Dec-08 64 T AIE X  Index 10 49
United K ingdom 35 19-S ep-08 15-J an-09 81 F T S E  100 7 104
United S tates 829 18-S ep-08 8-O ct-08 15 S &P 100 46 75
K orea
Australia
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, Japan banned most of its listed stocks, roughly 70%, 
followed by the US around 40%.This banning percentage is computed based on the 
banned banking stocks and index selection shown in Table 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Percentages of Banking Stocks Affected by Ban 
 
The sample timeframe for each country covers periods of pre-ban, ban and post-ban. 
Short selling ban list and dates are obtained from each country‘s security 
commission‘s official press releases. Starting and finishing dates are inclusive for 
each sample period. 
Fixed day estimation windows prior to and subsequent to the bans are used to 
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compare the change in performance in the lead-up to the ban, during the actual ban 
and any subsequent changes resulting from the ban being lifted. 
The first set of windows captures 90 days before the ban period and 90 days after the 
ban was lifted. The second set of windows captures 60 days before and after, the 
third set captures 30 days before and after and the fourth set captures 15 days before 
and after. The different window periods allow us to compare the performance 
depending on the proximity of the window period to the actual ban period. For 
countries with ongoing bans, namely, France, Germany II [2010 ban], Japan and 
Korea, there are no post-ban periods (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Sample Period Illustration  
 
Market value weighted average and equal weighted average are used to investigate 
the different weighting impacts in combination with the different timeframes of 
pre-ban period, ban period and post-ban period. For the market value weighted 
average (MW) method, the weight is obtained by dividing each stock‘s daily market 
capitalisation value by the daily sum of that of its stock group. For the equal 
weighted average (EW) method, the weight of every observation is 1. 
We found the market value weighted average computation provides very similar 
results to the equal weighted average. This prompts us to use the equal weighted 
average method with the 90-day pre- and post-ban windows and 250-day pre-event 
for the estimation of CAR. 
Stocks with a changed symbol/code are acknowledged as single stocks to provide a 
continuous return history. Delisting stocks are only included with an official listing 
period of at least from 340-day pre-ban to 90-day post-ban. Thus any stocks delisted 
340 days before the ban started are excluded (Figure 4.2). In all countries except the 
US, banned stocks are all subject to the ban from the initial ban starting date. For the 
Pre-Ban Post-Ban Ban 
Pre-Event Period 
(for α andβ  estimations in CAR) 
90/60/30/15-day 90/60/30/15-day 250/180/120/90-day 
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US, eight partially banned stocks are excluded (stocks which joined short selling ban 
list at some time after the initial ban starting date) to maintain consistency with other 
countries.  
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4.3. Measures 
4.1.1. Abnormal Return 
The first measure of the impact of short selling bans is on the stock return. Abnormal 
return is calculated to identify the ex-post deviation in the return when compared to 
an expected return which has been estimated earlier (MacKinlay, 1997). There are 
many different methods for calculating abnormal return. The Market Adjusted 
model has been chosen, as applied by Chang et al. (2007) for short selling in the 
Hong Kong market and more recently by Hansson and Rudowfors (2009) for 
shorting in the UK market.  
Market Adjusted Return (MAR) appears to be a straightforward way to calculate 
share return in comparison with market return. No parameter estimation is necessary 
for the calculation (Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009).  
(4.1) 
  
Calculations are further expanded to Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) by 
applying an OLS market model with the assumption that the expected return on a 
stock depends linearly on the market return during the same timeframe. According to 
Hansson and Rudowfors (2009), this model accommodates variations in levels of 
risk of individual stocks. However, it also changes depending on the historical period 
applied in the estimation of parameters.  
(4.2) 
 
As for α and β coefficients for the individual stocks, estimations are made through an 
OLS estimation period prior to the event. 
(4.3) 
Several date ranges are used: 250-, 180-, 120-, 90-days to calculate α and β that are 
used to calculate AR and CAR. For example, AR-250 means that, in order to find α 
and β, OLS is done by using 250 days prior to 90 days before the ban imposed (thus 
the range is from 340 days in total before the ban started to 90 days before the ban 
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started). These α and β are then submitted to CAR according to the sample period. 
(See Figure 4.2, Sample Period Illustration, in 4.2 Data Preparation.) 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and Market Adjusted Return (MAR) are 
therefore calculated over the sample period starting from t1 and ending at t2. Sample 
periods are 15-, 30-, 60-, 90-day pre/post ban and the ban. Tick by tick data is used 
for the daily return Rit (MAR and CAR) of banned stocks and control stocks. For the 
index daily return RMT, daily last price data (end of the day) is used for each index. 
Daily data is used to find CAR parameters α and β and pre-event‘s RMT and RIT. 
These returns (index pre-event return and stock pre-event return) are obtained by 
using the formula of 
0
1
Pr
Pr
ln
ice
ice  with the last price. Thus return on day1 is the logarithm 
of the last price on day1 over last price on day 0. 
4.1.2. Volatility 
Following Hansson and Rudowfors (2009), tick by tick observations are used for 
both banned stocks and control stocks to measure the impact of shorting bans on 
volatility. The realised volatility equation applied is as follows: 
(4.4) 
 
 
4.1.3. Spread 
In the measure for bid-ask spread, the equation used is the Trade-Weighted Relative 
Effective Spread (TRES) as applied by Huang and Stoll (2001). Compared to the 
equal weighted Relative Effective Spread (RES), the TRES also captures the size of 
the transaction. Tick by tick observations are used here. The equation is as follows: 
(4.5) 
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Midquote
 = Average of the best ask and the best bid quote 
Nit = Number of transaction on trading t in stock i 
Tit = Number of shares transacted in trade j 
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4.1.4. Volume 
The impact of short selling bans on volume is measured by examining two 
components: turnover and number of trades. The turnover for banned stocks and 
control stocks is calculated by dividing the daily traded volume by the number of 
stocks outstanding. The number of trade is in (/1,000) measurement unit. 
4.4. Methodology 
Two types of tests are applied in the methodology. The first is a descriptive test that 
examines the impact that a ban has on banned stocks compared to the rest of the 
market by comparing the performance before and after the ban was imposed.  
Two independent sample groups are applied to conduct a t-test to measure any 
significant change from pre-ban to ban period and to measure ban period against 
post-ban period. The difference between the two groups of banned stocks and control 
stocks is tested for statistical significance in the three periods. Thus averages are 
compared across groups and time. 
The tests are repeated for different time periods: pre-ban, ban and post-ban. The 
difference between the two groups is measured for three different periods and 
repeated for four different sets of pre- and post-ban windows (90 days, 60 days, 30 
days and 15 days). Here the t-test standard deviation is used to control for the time 
series effect, cross sectional effect and heteroskedasticity. 
Different countries have different numbers of banned stocks, control stocks and 
practical ban duration, shown in Table 4.1.The descriptive average and t-test results 
are in different tables: general statistics of each country in Table 5.1—5.6 (see the 
next chapter), result summary in Table 5.7 (see the next chapter), stock list in Table I 
and each banned stock statistic in Table II in the Appendix.  
The percentage of stocks affected by the ban in each country is shown in graph in 
Figure 4.1. The sample period illustration is shown in Figure 4.2. Graphs are also 
drawn to describe four measures. The first type is the graph of 10-day around event 
dates graph (Figure 5, Panel 1, see the next chapter). The second type is the graph for 
four measures of banned and controlled stocks over the entire sample period (90-day 
pre/post) for each country (Figure 5, Panel 2, see the next chapter).  
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The second test requires an application of the fixed effect panel regression model 
(Table 6, see Chapter 6) and the random effect panel regression model.  
The Hausman test is applied to identify if the fixed effect or the random effect is 
more suitable (Table III in the Appendix). An unbalanced panel is used and includes 
all banned and control stocks. Control measures are introduced for the effects of time, 
market and company-specific characteristics. A robustness check is conducted by 
adding independent variables and then adding interaction variables one by one to the 
model, to examine for any differences in the outcome. 
The regression model used for abnormal return, volatility, spread and trading volume 
is shown below. These four measures (Daily figure calculated from tick by tick data) 
are the dependent variable Yit in the regression.  
 
(4.6) 
The dependent variable represents four measures (abnormal return, volatility, 
bid-ask spread and trading volume), proxy for MAR, CAR, realised volatility, spread, 
turnover and the number of trade.  
However, when turnover and the number of trade are the dependent variables, it is 
not appropriate to use daily trading volume as the independent variable, so volume is 
excluded from the independent variables. 
itV  shows how independent variables change with different daily trading volume. 
itC  presents how independent variables change with different market capitalisation 
levels. Market capitalisation data is from Datastream in the measurement unit of 
(/1,000,000). itV and itC  are selected because they normally have significant 
influence on dependent variables in short selling studies (Bris et al., 2007; Chang et 
al., 2007 and Boehmer et al., 2009). The most important ban dummy of BANitI  
Dummy=1 if a stock is on the ban list and it is in the ban period, meaning if and when 
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a stock is banned and how dependent variable value changes, compared with the 
control period and control stocks. it
BAN
it VI could tell if and when a stock is banned, 
and how they have different responses to control stocks for volume. While it
BAN
it CI  
may suggest if and when a stock is banned, and how banned stocks have different 
responses to control stocks for market capitalisation. 
The results of the Hausman test for regressions show us that fixed effect panel 
models should be used, as the probability is less than 0.05 (Table III in Appendix). 
So the null hypothesis that random effect panel models are appropriate is rejected. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has presented a review of the data and methodology used to explore the impact of 
short selling bans on banking stocks in nine countries. To assist this process, data was 
collected from Thomson Reuter Tick database and Datastream. Section 4.2 detailed the data 
description. Section 4.3 provided proxies and calculation methods of four measures: 
abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume. This was followed by 
detailing the methodology of estimating descriptive statistics and building regression 
models.
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents the descriptive findings and their implications. This chapter is 
organised in several sections. It analyses abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread and 
trading volume separately, based on the descriptive statistics for both banned stocks and 
control stocks.. This chapter ends with the descriptive result summary and a brief 
conclusion. 
5.2. Abnormal Return 
Market Adjusted Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return were applied to identify 
abnormal return.  
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show a visual inspection of the abnormal return  
Figure 5.1 shows the performance of the market adjusted return (MAR) for each country, 
both around the time of the introduction of the ban (Panel 1) and for the whole sample 
period (Panel 2).The final two Panels show the overall results for Western and Asian 
markets. Negative abnormal return was observed around the introduction and lifting of 
the restriction. In both markets, abnormal return increased on the imposition of the ban 
and went down when it was lifted, as seen from the graph. 
Figure 5.1. Market Adjusted Return: Around Event Date and All Sample Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks and 
control stocks and Panel 2 presents measures over the whole sample period of both stock groups. Market 
Adjusted Return (MAR) is the difference between the actual return and the market index return on any 
given day calculated from tick data. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the movement of cumulative abnormal return (CAR). In each country, 
the trend has been consistent with that of MAR. As seen from the graph of the US in 
Figure 5.2, there is an instantaneous increase in CAR around the ban introduction date on 
a cumulative basis. This ‗jump‘ also appears in Figure 5.1 (MAR). 
Figure 5.2. Cumulative Abnormal Return: Around Event Date and All Sample 
Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks and 
control stocks and Panel 2 presents measures over the whole sample period of both stock groups. 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is the difference between the stock actual return and the expected 
return calculated from tick data on any given day by applying OLS parameters estimated from the pre-event 
period window of 250-day and the index return. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of 
any outliers. 
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Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics of market adjusted return (MAR) in the different 
period for each country. Equally weighted average, standard deviation, the percentage 
changes and their t-statistics are reported. For instance, seen from the bottom section of 
Table 5.1, Asian market experienced negative abnormal return before, during and after 
shorting bans, but it increased significantly upon the introduction of the ban and reduced 
thereafter, while the opposite trend happened to control stocks. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics: Market Adjusted Return  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of daily market adjusted return. Market Adjusted Return (MAR) is the difference 
between the actual return and the market index return on any given day calculated from tick data. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal 
of any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 90-day prior to the ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the 
‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics represent percentage change and paired t-statistics respectively between periods in the adjacent 
columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent difference between banned stocks and control stocks and related t-statistics are presented below them. 
T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
-0.313 0.297 -0.220 -0.441 -0.317 -0.424 -0.340 -0.568 0.261 -0.420 0.262 0.613 0.325
(3.893) t=0.49 (3.973) t=-1.36 (2.344) (4.631) t=-7.25*** (5.581) t=7.59*** (3.548) t=0.57 t=4.58*** t=2.95***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
-0.477 0.302 -0.333 -0.162 -0.387 -0.529 -0.013 -0.536 0.216 -0.420 0.098 0.379 0.085
(2.529) t=0.16 (2.301) t=-2.17** (2.777) (3.597) t=-4.51*** (5.401) t=0.29 (6.211) t=2.80*** t=1.61 t=0.91
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
-0.164 0.329 -0.110 . -0.197 -0.178 -0.232 . 0.168 0.526
(3.396) t=3.11*** (4.989) (2.233) t=-1.49 (3.285) t=0.48 t=4.69***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
-0.229 0.031 -0.222 -0.216 -0.270 -0.274 -0.124 -0.308 0.091 -0.280 0.164 0.279 0.037
(3.149) t=0.02 (4.175) t=-1.10 (1.709) (2.354) t=-0.44 (3.054) t=1.60 (1.416) t=0.92 t=1.23 t=0.61
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
-0.221 0.063 -0.207 . -0.256 -0.090 -0.279 . 0.137 0.258
(1.806) t=0.54 (1.469) (1.409) t=-0.46 (1.325) t=0.16 t=0.47
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
-0.251 0.020 -0.246 . -0.348 -0.069 -0.372 . 0.279 0.339
(3.261) t=1.12 (2.797) (3.190) t=-0.21 (3.358) t=4.25*** t=4.05***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
-0.289 0.356 -0.186 . -0.351 -0.148 -0.403 . 0.177 0.538
(3.301) t=2.12** (5.584) (2.743) t=-4.69*** (4.328) t=2.86*** t=2.08**
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
-0.323 0.235 -0.247 -0.178 -0.291 -0.333 -0.027 -0.342 0.111 -0.304 0.030 0.278 0.045
(2.730) t=1.63 (3.023) t=-2.36** (2.643) (2.708) t=-1.49 (3.040) t=1.60 (2.321) t=0.71 t=0.55 t=3.88***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
-0.268 -0.041 -0.279 -0.118 -0.312 -0.293 -0.266 -0.371 0.142 -0.3183 0.085 0.248 0.020
(5.006) t=-1.66 (7.850) t=-0.28 (9.137) (3.261) t=-8.03*** (4.791) t=8.82*** (3.741) t=7.79*** t=7.04*** t=9.17***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
0.281 0.117 0.314 -0.178 0.258 0.215 -0.019 0.211 0.142 0.241 0.307 0.488 0.066
(4.176) t=1.87* (6.876) t=-1.81* (5.428) (2.137) t=-6.31*** (3.042) t=3.48*** (3.598) t=3.60*** t=1.64 t=4.36***
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
-0.239 0.167 -0.199 -0.638 -0.326 -0.341 -0.041 -0.355 0.020 -0.348 0.299 0.439 0.067
(3.965) t=4.97*** (5.064) t=-0.76 (5.268) (3.574) t=-13.61*** (4.864) t=7.96*** (4.442) t=3.82*** t=2.27** t=2.46**
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
-0.249 0.133 -0.216 -0.088 -0.235 -0.259 -0.135 -0.294 0.160 -0.247 0.039 0.265 0.051
(3.234) t=1.68* (3.400) t=-2.61*** (2.643) (2.840) t=-2.51** (3.666) t=5.13*** (2.321) t=5.89*** t=5.56*** t=3.88***
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As indicated in Table 5.2, the CAR of banned stocks followed very similar trend as 
MAR. It increased and for control stocks decreased when a ban was introduced in all 
countries except the UK. The comparative percentage from pre-ban to ban period of 
banned stocks and control stocks is given as follows: Australia 41% vs. -11.2%, 
Canada 46.7% vs. -59.6%, France 12.1% vs. -16.6%, Germany I [2008 ban] 15.9% 
vs. -12.1%, Germany II [2010 ban] 12.7% vs. -19.4%, Japan 16.4% vs. -24.7%, 
Korea 11.5% vs. -11.9%, Taiwan 35.1% vs. -24.6%, the US 8.6% vs. -19.9%, 
Western markets 10.8% vs. -11.7% and Asian market 14.5% vs. -28.9%, whereas 
CAR of both banned and control stocks in the UK decreased by 31.7% and 32.5% 
respectively, on the imposition of the ban but this was insignificant. 
After short selling ban was lifted, decreased CAR of banned stocks and increased 
CAR of control stocks were found (changed by: Australia -45.8% vs 18%, Canada 
-77.3% vs 38.7%, Germany I [2008 ban] -36.4% vs 17.5%, Taiwan -55.5% vs 14.1%, 
the UK -2.4% vs 16.8%, the US -15.9% vs 10%, Western markets -12.3% vs 21.8% 
and Asian markets -26.2% vs 13.8%. Bans in other countries are still ongoing.). 
The difference in averages of banned and control stocks was significantly positive 
during pre-ban, ban and post-ban periods (see Table 5.2). Even though the difference 
may be caused by the differential impact of the restriction on banking shares, 
ban-to-control ratio of CAR was positive all the time. Notably, this ratio was not only 
positive but also increased during the ban and decreased after the ban, indicating that 
the largest difference of abnormal return between the two groups happened when 
short selling was banned. The gap was smaller thereafter. 
In conclusion, the descriptive evidence supports Hypothesis 1 that banned stocks 
have greater abnormal return when a ban is imposed compared to control stocks.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics: Cumulative Abnormal Return  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of daily cumulative abnormal return (using 250-day pre-event beta). Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is the difference between the stock actual return and the expected return calculated from tick data on any given day by applying 
OLS parameters estimated from the 250-day pre-event period window and the index return. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of 
any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 90-day prior to the ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the 
‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics represent percentage change and paired t-statistics respectively between periods in the adjacent 
columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent difference between banned stocks and control stocks and related t-statistics are presented below them. 
T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
-0.363 0.410 -0.214 -0.458 -0.312 -0.430 -0.112 -0.478 0.180 -0.392 0.156 0.552 0.256
(3.859) t=0.47 (3.982) t=-1.58 (2.384) (4.617) t=-7.35*** (5.542) t=8.28*** (3.541) t=1.69* t=6.14*** t=4.43***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
-0.165 0.467 -0.088 -0.773 -0.156 -0.228 -0.596 -0.364 0.387 -0.223 0.276 0.758 0.429
(2.500) t=0.22 (2.295) t=-1.73* (2.723) (3.520) t=-4.49*** (5.267) t=0.40 (6.097) t=2.80*** t=1.42 t=1.02
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
-0.124 0.121 -0.109 . -0.145 -0.166 -0.169 . 0.145 0.355
(3.053) t=2.91*** (5.084) (2.207) t=-1.38 (3.210) t=0.16 t=3.94***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
-0.157 0.159 -0.132 -0.364 -0.180 -0.199 -0.121 -0.223 0.175 -0.184 0.211 0.408 0.022
(2.914) t=0.00 (4.147) t=-0.88 (1.674) (2.303) t=-0.45 (2.980) t=1.89* (1.410) t=0.45 t=0.42 t=0.58
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
-0.118 0.127 -0.103 . -0.18 -0.194 -0.215 . 0.344 0.521
(1.708) t=0.98 (1.509) (1.379) t=-0.21 (1.279) t=0.96 t=0.44
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
-0.134 0.164 -0.112 . -0.146 -0.247 -0.182 . 0.082 0.385
(3.238) t=0.58 (2.592) (3.122) t=-0.41 (3.181) t=3.87*** t=4.41***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
-0.305 0.115 -0.270 . -0.327 -0.119 -0.366 . 0.067 0.262
(3.255) t=2.69*** (5.528) (2.692) t=-4.81*** (4.309) t=2.92*** t=2.75***
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
-0.239 0.351 -0.155 -0.555 -0.241 -0.244 -0.246 -0.304 0.141 -0.261 0.020 0.490 0.083
(2.681) t=1.70* (3.004) t=-1.71* (2.556) (2.703) t=-1.46 (3.046) t=1.58 (2.331) t=1.79* t=0.39 t=3.96***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
-0.186 -0.317 -0.245 -0.024 -0.251 -0.234 -0.325 -0.310 0.168 -0.258 0.205 0.210 0.028
(4.775) t=-1.04 (7.732) t=-0.38 (8.931) (3.216) t=-1.27 (4.714) t=9.43*** (3.671) t=7.94*** t=7.53*** t=9.65***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
0.290 0.086 0.315 -0.159 0.265 0.261 -0.199 0.209 0.100 0.230 0.111 0.507 0.132
(3.906) t=0.59 (6.387) t=-3.12*** (5.554) (2.076) t=-8.11*** (2.763) t=4.66*** (3.594) t=7.23*** t=4.72*** t=2.54**
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
-0.212 0.108 -0.235 -0.123 -0.264 -0.317 -0.117 -0.354 0.218 -0.277 0.331 0.336 0.049
(3.753) -0.325 (4.973) t=-1.01 (5.329) (3.535) t=-14.55*** (4.809) t=9.30*** (4.381) t=6.14*** t=4.57*** t=1.18
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
-0.214 0.145 -0.183 -0.262 -0.231 -0.253 -0.289 -0.326 0.138 -0.281 0.154 0.439 0.216
(3.202) t=0.64 (3.266) t=-2.49** (2.556) (2.801) t=-2.32** (3.623) t=5.14*** (2.331) t=4.08*** t=4.94*** t=3.96***
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5.3. Volatility 
Realised volatility used in the empirical study is the daily sum of squared tick return. 
Figure 5.3 shows the pattern of the realised volatility around the ban event dates and 
the whole sample period in Panel 1 and Panel 2 respectively. In the second last 
diagram of Western markets, increased volatility was found for both banned stocks 
and control stocks after the ban was introduced and decreased volatility was shown 
when the ban was lifted. This pattern can be seen in all other countries, except 
Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban], in which volatility decreased on the 
imposition of the ban.  
In Figure 5.3 the US graph, the volatility peak can be observed in September and 
October 2008, which is not surprising because of the extraordinary event in the 
banking sector during the 2008 financial crisis following Lehman Brothers‘ collapse 
in September. 
Figure 5.3. Realized Volatility: Around Event Date and All Sample Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks 
and control stocks and Panel 2 presents over the whole sample period of both stock groups. Realized 
volatility is the sum of squared tick return during a day. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning 
and removal of any outliers. 
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Table 5.3 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of realised volatility in each country, 
e.g. equally weighted average, standard deviation and percentage change in the 
different period (before, during and after the bans). In Table 5.3, the increase in 
realised volatility was considerable larger in banned stocks than in control stocks 
from pre-ban to ban period in all countries under study except Australia, Japan and 
Germany II [2010 ban]. Realised volatility was increased by: Canada 51.1% vs 
49.5%, France 53.4% vs 52.5%, Germany I [2008 ban] 49% vs 20.2%, Korea 8.8% 
vs 5.3%, Taiwan 49.8% vs 47.1%, the UK 30.8% vs 21.7%, the US 38.8% vs 37.6%, 
Western markets 21.1% vs 19.5% and Asian market 37.3% vs 15.5%). Much larger 
changes in the volatility of banned stocks than control stocks presented an obvious 
sector-specific reaction instead of an overall ban effect because the banned group 
consisted of banking companies only. The increase in volatility of control stocks was 
in line with the theory because as banned stocks became untradeable, the market 
turned to the remaining stocks which could be short sold. The more actively traded 
the control stocks, the higher the volatility was expected to be. 
In the case of Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban], the realised volatility of 
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banned stocks actually reduced on the ban being introduced, at a greater degree than 
control stocks (decreased by: Australia 15.9% vs 8.2%, Japan 21.7% vs 14.2% and 
Germany II [2010 ban] 27.6% vs 22.1%). 
In the post-ban period, the volatility of all countries decreased for both groups, and 
the extent was greater in banned stocks again (reduced by: Australia 13.4% vs 11.4%, 
Canada 12.3% vs 8.4%, Germany I [2008 ban] 46.4% vs 33.2%, Taiwan 49.2% vs 
45%, the UK 34.1% vs 29.7%, the US 27.5% vs 27.3%, Western markets 46.4% vs 
31.9% and Asian market 31.9% vs 27.9%. Bans in other countries are still ongoing.). 
The significant decrease in volatility could be because lifting short selling bans 
allowed the market to reconcile and to achieve stability and equilibrium, and 
therefore lower volatility in affected stocks. 
As seen in Table 5.3, the volatility of banned stocks in all countries was higher than 
that of control stocks in pre-ban, ban and post-ban periods. The ban-to-control ratio 
of volatility increased when the ban was imposed in all countries, except Australia, 
Japan and Germany II [2010 ban], and decreased thereafter, meaning that the 
volatility difference between the two groups increased during the ban, but dissipated 
after the ban. Thus the difference in volatility significantly deteriorated after the ban. 
To conclude, the results indicate that a strong ban effect caused volatility to change, 
but in either direction; therefore, Hypothesis 2 has a mixed validation.
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Realised Volatility  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of daily realised volatility. Realised volatility is the sum of the squared tick return 
during a day. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 90-day prior to the ban 
(Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the ‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics represent percentage 
change and paired t-statistics respectively between periods in the adjacent columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent difference between banned 
stocks and control stocks and related t-statistics are presented below them. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
0.391 -0.159 0.329 -0.134 0.285 0.306 -0.082 0.281 -0.114 0.249 0.278 0.171 0.126
(4.059) t=-1.04 (3.595) t=-2.54** (1.837) (2.716) t=-18.73*** (4.777) t=-14.45*** (2.501) t=0.83 t=8.36*** t=6.65***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
0.135 0.511 0.204 -0.123 0.179 0.103 0.495 0.154 -0.084 0.141 0.311 0.325 0.212
(0.114) t=6.27*** (1.669) t=-1.91* (0.774) (0.837) t=27.04*** (2.367) t=-7.77*** (3.611) t=4.10*** t=1.42 t=6.37***
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
0.238 0.534 0.365 . 0.179 0.525 0.273 . 0.330 0.337
(1.342) t=6.97*** (1.934) (0.191) t=18.96*** (0.887) t=11.12*** t=13.53***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
0.253 0.490 0.377 -0.464 0.202 0.198 0.202 0.238 -0.332 0.159 0.278 0.584 0.213
(0.423) t=5.36*** (0.936) t=-8.06*** (0.079) (0.238) t=9.18*** (0.582) t=-15.77*** (0.053) t=6.35*** t=16.80*** t=13.63***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
0.225 -0.276 0.163 . 0.195 -0.221 0.152 . 0.154 0.072
(0.115) t=-3.11*** (0.053) (0.070) t=-3.51*** (0.043) t=11.16*** t=13.81***
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
0.276 -0.217 0.216 . 0.226 -0.142 0.194 . 0.221 0.113
(0.694) t=-6.02*** (0.492) (0.572) t=-1.24 (0.460) t=7.83*** t=14.91***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
0.137 0.088 0.149 . 0.132 0.053 0.139 . 0.038 0.072
(2.255) t=6.27*** (3.754) (1.207) t=23.25*** (2.043) t=3.34*** t=1.61
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
0.323 0.498 0.484 -0.492 0.246 0.240 0.471 0.353 -0.450 0.194 0.346 0.371 0.211
(0.426) t=4.09*** (0.419) t=-8.45*** (0.250) (0.303) t=12.41*** (0.383) t=-19.90*** (0.160) t=5.45*** t=4.14*** t=6.13***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
0.383 0.308 0.501 -0.341 0.330 0.313 0.217 0.381 -0.297 0.268 0.224 0.315 0.188
(9.302) t=1.99** (7.876) t=-3.47*** (13.597) (2.895) t=15.62*** (4.177) t=-14.38*** (3.158) t=15.69*** t=15.47*** t=27.79***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
0.340 0.388 0.472 -0.275 0.342 0.335 0.376 0.461 -0.273 0.335 0.015 0.024 0.020
(0.570) t=20.06*** (2.132) t=-9.10*** (1.186) (0.151) t=25.05*** (0.618) t=-3.34*** (1.000) t=26.20*** t=13.82*** t=10.63***
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
0.285 0.211 0.345 -0.464 0.185 0.226 0.195 0.270 -0.319 0.184 0.261 0.278 0.005
(3.187) t=7.90*** (3.638) t=-0.41 (4.507) (2.001) t=36.81*** (3.947) t=-9.92*** (2.843) t=4.67*** t=2.22** t=1.72*
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
0.263 0.373 0.361 -0.319 0.246 0.233 0.155 0.269 -0.279 0.194 0.129 0.342 0.211
(1.071) t=3.73*** (1.612) t=-4.42*** (0.250) (0.859) t=21.74*** (1.489) t=-26.70*** (0.160) t=4.12*** t=15.05*** t=6.13***
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5.4. Spread 
For each stock, daily Trade Weighted Relative Effective Spread is used, which is 
twice the difference between the trading price and the midpoint prevailing at the time 
of that trade, weighted by its number of trade. Spread is actually an illiquidity proxy 
because the wider the spread, the lower liquidity is. 
In Figure 5.4, the bid-ask spread for each country is drawn around the ban 
introduction and lifting dates (Panel 1) and for the whole sample period (Panel 2). As 
shown in Figure 5.4 the US graph, the bid-ask spread of both banned stocks and 
control stocks widened when a ban was introduced and tightened upon ban lifting. 
The same trend is observed in other countries as well. The result clearly supports 
Hypothesis 3a that spread will increase when a short selling ban is imposed.  
Figure 5.4. Bid-Ask Spread: Around Event Date and All Sample Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks 
and control stocks and Panel 2 presents over the whole sample period of both stock groups. Spread is 
the daily Trade-Weighted-Relative-Effective-Spread which is twice the difference between tick 
trading price and its prevailing midpoint quote divided by the midpoint quote, weighted by its number 
of traded shares to the daily sum. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any 
outliers. 
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Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics of bid-ask spread, such as equally weighted 
average, standard deviation, percentage change of the mean and their t-statistics in 
the different period (before, during and after the bans). The Trade Weighted Relative 
Effective Spread of banned stocks and control stocks widened in all countries when 
the ban was introduced. Notably, the changes were significantly larger in banned 
stocks. (widened by: Australia 60.9% vs 33.1%, Canada 17.6% vs 15.8%, France 
19.5% vs 1.8%, Germany I [2008 ban] 46.8% vs 31.8%, Germany II [2010 ban] 
16.7% vs 1.1%, Japan 14.8% vs 10.2%, Korea 33.3% vs 11.6%, Taiwan 45.5% vs 
19.9%, the UK 62.2% vs 25.1%, the US 38.7% vs 35.6%, Western markets 25.5% vs 
20.9% and Asian market 24.1% vs 17.4%). This represented a dramatic decline in 
liquidity in the market. 
The spread dropped significantly in both groups upon the ban lifting in all countries. 
The reduction was significantly larger in banned stocks than control stocks (reduced 
by: Australia 20.9% vs 7.6%, Canada 13% vs 10.2%, Germany I [2008 ban] 33% vs 
23.2%, Taiwan 40.2% vs 21.7%, the UK 9.5% vs 20.7%, the US 64% vs 53.2%, 
Western markets 29.9% vs 26.6% and Asian market 49.6% vs 35.2%. Bans in the 
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rest of the countries are still ongoing.). This is in line with the finding of Hamson et 
al. (2008). 
Table 5.4 shows that without considering company-specific characteristics, the 
bid-ask spread of banned stocks was always wider than that of control stocks during 
pre-ban, ban and post-ban periods. After the ban ended, the two groups moved closer 
in terms of bid-ask spread, evidenced by lower ban-control ratio of spread, but the 
gap persisted. 
In summary, the results on bid-ask spread are consistent with the findings of Hansson 
and Rudowfors (2009) and Clifton and Michayluk (2010) that the spread of both 
groups increased upon ban imposition and decreased once the ban ended. The 
descriptive statistics strongly support Hypothesis 3a that spread widens during a 
short selling ban.
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics: Bid-Ask Spread  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of daily bid-ask spread. Spread is the daily Trade Weighted Relative Effective 
Spread, which is twice the difference between the tick trading price and its prevailing midpoint quote divided by the midpoint quote, weighted by its 
number of traded shares to the daily sum. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 
90-day prior to the ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the ‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics 
represent percentage change and paired t-statistics respectively between periods in the adjacent columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent 
difference between banned stocks and control stocks and related t-statistics are presented below them. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and 
*** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
0.128 0.609 0.206 -0.209 0.163 0.118 0.331 0.157 -0.076 0.145 0.085 0.312 0.110
(1.442) t=2.13** (1.833) t=-5.30*** (1.262) (0.944) t=19.80*** (1.427) t=-16.95*** (0.778) t=11.38*** t=9.36*** t=4.89***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
0.085 0.176 0.100 -0.130 0.087 0.076 0.158 0.088 -0.102 0.079 0.118 0.136 0.092
(0.080) t=9.23*** (0.121) t=-0.48 (0.203) (0.361) t=21.02*** (0.702) t=-9.81*** (1.143) t=10.20*** t=3.79*** t=9.11***
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
0.246 0.195 0.294 . 0.217 0.018 0.221 . 0.134 0.330
(0.530) t=3.89*** (0.680) (0.579) t=2.74*** (0.447) t=7.05*** t=13.88***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
0.126 0.468 0.185 -0.330 0.124 0.085 0.318 0.112 -0.232 0.086 0.482 0.652 0.306
(0.112) t=8.49*** (0.234) t=-8.82*** (0.068) (0.058) t=14.83*** (0.129) t=-14.62*** (0.067) t=8.83*** t=29.04*** t=8.33***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
0.138 0.167 0.161 . 0.093 0.011 0.094 . 0.484 0.713
(0.088) t=2.49** (0.120) (0.078) t=0.37 (0.054) t=8.34*** t=15.33***
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
0.284 0.148 0.326 . 0.205 0.102 0.226 . 0.385 0.442
(0.523) t=3.70*** (0.504) (0.079) t=1.08 (0.104) t=21.79*** t=26.28***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
0.147 0.333 0.196 . 0.146 0.116 0.163 . 0.007 0.202
(2.026) t=3.73*** (2.652) (0.347) t=9.03*** (0.596) t=32.17*** t=30.81***
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
0.224 0.455 0.326 -0.402 0.195 0.146 0.199 0.175 -0.217 0.137 0.534 0.863 0.297
(1.089) t=4.97*** (1.599) t=-3.18*** (1.460) (1.011) t=6.19*** (1.401) t=-12.96*** (0.567) t=7.95*** t=9.20*** t=17.64***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
0.288 0.622 0.467 -0.225 0.362 0.279 0.251 0.349 -0.095 0.316 0.032 0.338 0.127
(1.896) t=6.26*** (5.081) t=-3.13*** (7.658) (0.399) t=13.85*** (0.959) t=-7.74*** (0.491) t=28.48*** t=35.06*** t=39.30***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
0.186 0.387 0.258 -0.640 0.093 0.104 0.356 0.141 -0.532 0.066 0.788 0.830 0.290
(0.376) t=18.22*** (1.463) t=-7.80*** (0.760) (0.106) t=17.98*** (0.673) t=-5.02*** (0.311) t=29.23*** t=11.40*** t=25.85***
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
0.141 0.255 0.177 -0.299 0.124 0.115 0.209 0.139 -0.266 0.102 0.226 0.273 0.177
(0.886) t=15.45*** (2.149) t=-2.10** (2.554) (0.628) t=41.64*** (1.178) t=-10.16*** (0.828) t=8.64*** t=17.10*** t=15.71***
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
0.216 0.241 0.268 -0.496 0.135 0.167 0.174 0.196 -0.352 0.127 0.293 0.367 0.059
(1.049) t=6.52*** (1.366) t=-4.21*** (1.460) (0.685) t=9.20*** (0.988) t=-6.32*** (0.567) t=16.10*** t=13.34*** t=17.64***
Spread
Spread
Spread
Spread
Spread
Au
st
ra
li
a
Ca
na
da
Banned stock Control stock Difference
Spread
Fr
an
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
20
08
As
ia
n
Ma
rk
et
Ge
rm
an
y
20
10
Ja
pa
n
UK
Spread
Spread
Spread
Spread
We
st
er
n
Ma
rk
et
US
Ko
re
a
Ta
iw
an
Spread
Spread
 
  78 
5.5. Volume 
A short selling ban prevents traders from actively participating in the sale of stocks, 
thereby reducing the volume of trade of banned stocks.  
Figure 5.5 presents the performance of the daily turnover of banned stocks and 
control stocks, both around the ban introduction and lifting dates (Panel 1) and for 
the whole sample period (Panel 2). As seen from the first panel in Figure 5.5, the 
general pattern in Australia was that the daily turnover decreased when the ban was 
introduced and increased after it was lifted. 
Figure 5.5. Turnover: Around Event Date and All Sample Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks 
and control stocks and Panel 2 presents over the whole sample period of both stock groups. Turnover 
is dividing the daily traded volume over the number of stock outstanding. Statistics are calculated 
after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. 
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Figure 5.6 shows the performance of daily number of trade. In the first panel of 
Australia, the number of trade of banned stocks significantly decreased throughout 
the ban period, indicating a reduction in the overall trading activity of banned stocks, 
which was consistent with Hypothesis 3b. Number of trade performance in all 
countries follows very similar pattern of daily turnover in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.6. Number of Trade: Around Event Date and All Sample Period 
Panel 1 presents 10-day around the event day (ban imposing and lifting day) of both banned stocks 
and control stocks and Panel 2 presents over the whole sample period of both stock groups. Number 
of trade is the daily figure in 1,000 measurement unit. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and 
removal of any outliers. 
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Table 5.5 reports descriptive statistics of trading turnover. Equally weighted average, 
standard deviation, percentage changes of the mean in the different period (before, 
during and after the bans) are presented. The daily turnover of banned stocks reduced 
when the ban was imposed (reduced by: Australia 5.9%, Canada 1.5%, France 
20.8%, Germany I [2008 ban] 22.7%, Germany II [2010 ban] 18%, Japan 25.2%, 
Korea 28.4%, Taiwan 25.9%, the UK 49%, the US 3.6%, Western markets 26.4% 
and Asian market 21.1%), whereas the daily turnover increased during the ban 
period for control stocks (increased by: Australia 40.6%, Canada 29.3%, France 
16.5%, Germany I [2008 ban] 0.7%, Germany II [2010 ban] 20.3%, Japan 4.3%, 
Korea 10.4%, Taiwan 6.1%, the UK 1.4%, the US 27.9%, Western markets 20.3% 
and Asian market 14.5%). The traded volume drop in banned stocks and the increase 
in control stocks were expected because the control stocks faced no constraints. 
Some investors previously trading banned stocks had to switch to control stocks, of 
which the ban increased trading volume. This is consistent with the findings of 
Boehmer et al. (2008b). It is obvious that the market liquidity of banned stocks was 
markedly worse. 
From ban period to post-ban period, there was a significant increase in trading 
activities for banned stocks (increased by: Australia 45.7%, Canada 18.4%, 
Germany I [2008 ban] 23.5%, Taiwan 32.9%, the UK 38.2%, the US 2.6%, Western 
markets 27.1% and Asian market 45.1%. The bans in the rest of the countries are still 
ongoing.), while control stocks experienced a reduction in daily turnover (reduced 
by: Australia 11.1%, Canada 10.5%, Germany I [2008 ban] 10.7%, Taiwan 25.7%, 
the UK 14.2%, the US 5.4%, Western markets 9.4% and Asian market 17.4%). Bris 
(2008) and Financial Services Authority (2009) found similar results. 
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As shown in Table 5.5, without considering company specific characteristics, the 
daily traded volume of banned stocks was always lower than that of control stocks 
during pre-ban, ban and post-ban periods. However, the negative ban-to-control ratio 
consistently decreased during a ban and increased once the ban had been lifted in all 
countries. This indicated that the gap in terms of volume between banned and control 
stocks widened during a ban, but the banned stocks were catching up after the ban 
was lifted.
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Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics: Turnover  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of daily turnover. Turnover is dividing the daily traded volume over the number 
of stocks outstanding. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 90-day prior to the 
ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the ‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics represent 
percentage change and paired t-statistics respectively between periods in the adjacent columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent difference between 
banned stocks and control stocks and related t-statistics are presented below them. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote 
statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
0.221 -0.059 0.208 0.457 0.303 0.249 0.406 0.350 -0.111 0.311 -0.112 -0.406 -0.026
(0.350) t=-10.43*** (0.220) t=5.13*** (0.275) (0.437) t=5.72*** (0.632) t=-13.25*** (0.728) t=-3.96*** t=-10.40*** t=-6.90***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
0.452 -0.015 0.445 0.184 0.527 0.458 0.293 0.592 -0.105 0.530 -0.013 -0.248 -0.006
(0.337) t=-1.23 (0.300) t=0.45 (0.292) (0.795) t=7.04*** (0.664) t=-4.02*** (0.626) t=-0.64 t=-0.56 t=-0.07
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
0.462 -0.208 0.366 . 0.582 0.165 0.678 . -0.206 -0.460
(0.464) t=-3.20*** (0.393) (0.433) t=6.96*** (0.433) t=-4.82*** t=-14.21***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
0.352 -0.227 0.272 0.235 0.336 0.418 0.007 0.421 -0.107 0.376 -0.158 -0.354 -0.119
(1.080) t=-8.98*** (0.705) t=2.95*** (0.475) (0.675) t=13.22*** (0.547) t=-3.24*** (0.512) t=-10.67*** t=-15.26*** t=-4.69***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
0.278 -0.180 0.228 . 0.395 0.203 0.475 . -0.296 -0.520
(0.544) t=-5.94*** (0.387) (0.521) t=8.00*** (0.363) t=-5.12*** t=-2.19**
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
0.282 -0.252 0.211 . 0.648 0.043 0.676 . -0.565 -0.688
(0.332) t=-10.86*** (0.256) (0.458) t=1.54 (0.599) t=-33.81*** t=-41.46***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
0.264 -0.284 0.189 . 0.396 0.104 0.437 . -0.333 -0.568
(0.463) t=-10.24*** (1.045) (0.578) t=21.50*** (1.470) t=-23.26*** t=-13.50***
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
0.201 -0.259 0.149 0.329 0.198 0.293 0.061 0.311 -0.257 0.231 -0.314 -0.521 -0.167
(0.000) t=-0.32 (0.000) t=1.68* (0.000) (0.001) t=0.18 (0.001) t=-6.19*** (0.001) t=-13.27*** t=-14.14*** t=-14.73***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
0.673 -0.490 0.343 0.382 0.474 0.721 0.014 0.731 -0.142 0.627 -0.067 -0.531 -0.323
(0.643) t=-10.01*** (0.294) t=5.05*** (0.453) (0.845) t=3.03*** (0.758) t=-9.42*** (0.476) t=-2.18** t=-11.21*** t=-5.85***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
0.277 -0.036 0.267 0.026 0.274 0.287 0.279 0.367 -0.054 0.347 -0.035 -0.272 -0.266
(0.435) t=-5.72*** (0.471) t=2.28** (0.298) (0.205) t=11.26*** (0.233) t=-2.79*** (0.206) t=-23.99*** t=-0.02 t=-2.20**
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
0.512 -0.264 0.377 0.271 0.479 0.522 0.203 0.628 -0.094 0.569 -0.019 -0.400 -0.188
(0.547) t=-5.91*** (0.532) t=10.25*** (0.341) (0.647) t=0.93 (0.634) t=-0.33 (0.595) t=-2.01** t=-4.41*** t=-14.97***
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
0.261 -0.211 0.206 0.451 0.299 0.456 0.145 0.522 -0.174 0.431 -0.428 -0.605 -0.441
(0.347) t=-0.70 (0.492) t=11.81*** (0.000) (0.556) t=16.49*** (1.146) t=-31.40*** (0.001) t=-24.84*** t=-27.15*** t=-14.73***
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Very similar to daily turnover performance (Table 5.5), daily number of trade in each 
country performed in line with the general perception. As seen from Table 5.6, the 
final section shows daily number of trade in Asian markets decreased upon ban 
introduction and went up after lifting of the ban, while the opposite happened to 
control stocks. 
To summarise, the descriptive results of all countries strongly support Hypothesis 3b 
that the trading volume is reduced during a ban.
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Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics: Number of Trade  
The table shows equally weighted average value and standard deviation of the daily Number of trade in 1,000 measurement unit. Statistics are calculated 
after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Results are presented for three periods: 90-day prior to the ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the 
ban was lifted (Post-ban). In the ‗% Change‘ column, the average value and t-statistics represent percentage change and paired t-statistics respectively 
between periods in the adjacent columns. ‗Difference‘ columns show the percent difference between banned stocks and control stocks and related 
t-statistics are presented below them. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban %change Ban %change Post-ban Pre-ban Ban Post-ban
NO.of stock 10 10 10 171 171 171
NO. of days 62 169 63 62 169 63
4794.110 -0.269 3502.753 0.284 4498.120 5583.792 0.005 5610.006 -0.005 5583.787 -0.141 -0.376 -0.241
(5359.176) t=-6.02*** (4066.294) t=4.75*** (5034.631) (1724.839) t=8.00*** (1948.914) t=-16.06*** (2194.668) t=-34.10*** t=-34.72*** t=-24.38***
NO.of stock 5 5 5 155 155 155
NO. of days 56 13 58 56 13 58
11387.250 -0.148 9698.806 0.396 13540.503 12603.246 0.089 13719.639 -0.005 13651.344 -0.096 -0.293 -0.008
(4799.669) t=-2.45** (5337.175) t=4.59*** (6115.237) (4094.044) t=8.27*** (5825.110) t=-1.90* (5676.617) t=-35.13*** t=-8.25*** t=-30.30***
NO.of stock 7 7 34 34
NO. of days 53 65 53 65
8328.297 -0.024 8131.903 . 8640.774 0.050 9075.749 . -0.036 -0.104
(8893.816) t=-0.31 (8931.578) (4149.547) t=9.51*** (5728.815) t=-2.29** t=-3.17***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 342 63 62 342 63
6933.863 -0.183 5664.768 0.165 6600.119 7017.858 0.017 7136.968 -0.007 7085.635 -0.012 -0.206 -0.074
(6906.796) t=-2.74*** (6673.136) t=2.41** (4931.335) (3669.075) t=6.51*** (3374.219) t=-6.55*** (2440.215) t=-7.75*** t=-13.41*** t=-5.25***
NO.of stock 4 4 4 28 28 28
NO. of days 62 64 62 64
5057.012 -0.154 4280.227 . 5809.699 0.006 5847.143 . -0.130 -0.268
(6138.589) t=-1.57 (4928.805) (2907.048) t=0.67 (2669.996) t=-4.86*** t=-2.13**
NO.of stock 73 73 30 30
NO. of days 56 57 56 57
416.987 -0.151 354.016 . 1857.200 0.086 2016.421 . -0.775 -0.824
(596.187) t=-4.88*** (572.391) (807.745) t=5.71*** (811.572) t=-74.69*** t=-88.46***
NO.of stock 13 13 48 486.975
NO. of days 58 62 58 62
2955.044 -0.265 2172.455 . 5848.607 0.561 9127.967 . -0.495 -0.762
(1593.051) t=-8.85*** (3437.811) (3625.269) t=24.17*** (6238.815) t=-36.06*** t=-30.32***
NO.of stock 10 10 10 49 49 49
NO. of days 57 64 54 57 64 54
256.511 -0.114 227.177 0.080 245.421 444.006 0.097 486.975 -0.242 369.093 -0.422 -0.533 -0.504
(196.718) t=-2.50** (204.481) t=1.48 (210.443) (126.182) t=13.79*** (182.176) t=-20.84*** (95.437) t=-44.04*** t=-31.74*** t=-55.16***
NO.of stock 7 7 7 104 104 104
NO. of days 60 81 60 60 81 60
9958.926 -0.336 6613.364 0.315 8694.749 10013.438 0.065 10662.345 -0.050 10132.684 -0.005 -0.380 -0.165
(7837.194) t=-7.37*** (5380.961) t=4.72*** (7311.900) (3200.288) t=9.78*** (4423.597) t=-7.70*** (3603.907) t=-30.50*** t=-9.31*** t=-21.23***
NO.of stock 46 46 46 75 75 75
NO. of days 55 15 60 55 15 60
5392.781 -0.118 4754.303 0.442 6856.119 7635.799 0.346 10278.229 -0.015 10128.586 -0.294 -0.537 -0.477
(8422.478) t=-0.36 (10208.287) t=0.00 (9789.937) (4074.100) t=17.39*** (5861.791) t=-0.23 (6786.282) t=-14.55*** t=-13.29*** t=-25.95***
NO.of stock 79 79 72 567 567 533
NO. of days
6339.426 -0.179 5205.828 0.146 5965.235 7041.384 0.135 7988.987 -0.119 7037.893 -0.100 -0.348 -0.180
(7952.670) t=-7.48*** (6815.533) t=4.60*** (8911.141) (3873.745) t=16.86*** (3889.221) t=-26.95*** (5222.312) t=-37.88*** t=-32.05*** t=-20.31***
NO.of stock 96 96 10 127 127 49
NO. of days
2675.533 -0.188 2172.276 0.218 2645.421 3384.414 0.157 3914.641 -0.139 3369.093 -0.209 -0.445 -0.274
(816.396) t=-5.35*** (1539.489) t=5.26*** (210.443) (3305.419) t=16.71*** (5564.825) t=-33.02*** (95.437) t=-52.38*** t=-46.14*** t=-55.16***
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5.6. Results summary 
The abnormal return of banned and control stocks was mostly negative in all 
countries except the US. During short selling ban periods, market-wide banking 
stock abnormal returns were higher than in the pre-ban period in Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the US, Western markets and Asian 
markets, which was in line with Hypothesis 1. However, the UK presented lower 
abnormal returns of banned stocks in the ban period, which was inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 1. The abnormal returns of banned stocks decreased significantly and 
that of controlled stocks increased when the bans were lifted in all countries. 
Volatility in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban] reduced significantly after 
the bans were imposed, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the 
evidence showed different results on the impact of short selling bans on stock market 
realised volatility in other countries. This suggested that short selling restrictions did 
not necessarily reduce volatility. When the bans were lifted, the volatility of both 
banned stocks and control stocks decreased significantly in all countries. 
When short selling was banned, banned banking stocks suffered from a significant 
degradation in market liquidity. The results indicated strong evidence that while 
short selling was restricted, bid-ask spread of both banned stocks and control stocks 
widened statistically significantly in all countries and Western and Asian markets, as 
hypothesised. The spread tightened when the bans were lifted. 
Results from descriptive studies showed that the trading volume and turnover of 
banned stocks were significantly lower when short selling was imposed in all 
countries, which is clearly in line with previous studies. This suggests that when 
short selling is banned market participants do not trade as actively as before. After 
the ban was lifted, trading volume increased, reflecting the hypothesis. 
The results of the six measures due to short selling bans in Western and Asian 
markets were not significantly different. This could be due to the fact that the 
financial crisis was globalised and the overall world economy was affected almost in 
the same manner. 
As we found, the market value weighted average computation provides the same 
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results as the equal weighted average. This prompts us to use the equal weighted 
average method with 90-day pre/post-ban windows and 250-day pre-events for the 
estimation of CAR. 
Our overall findings are summarised in Table 5.7, which also provides an indication 
of our results against the hypothesis. 
Table 5.7 Descriptive Result Summary 
This table presents the descriptive result summary regarding abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask 
spread and trading volume in nine countries, Western markets and Asian markets. In each 
category of measures, the table clarifies whether the empirical results are consistent with the 
hypothesis. The columns headed ‗Impose‘ and ‗Lift‘ represent the time periods that short 
selling bans were imposed and lifted respectively. The ‗Up‘ and ‗Down‘ arrows show the 
general direction of the movement of each measure in the specific country during a specific 
period. The ‗Tick‘ and ‗Cross‘ mean the overall results in a specific country are consistent with 
the hypotheses or against the hypotheses respectively. The ‗Star‘ means that field is not 
applicable because specific country has not lifted the ban during the time of the study. This is 
the overall conclusion based on descriptive statistics.  
Impose Lift Impose Lift Impose Lift Impose Lift
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Control stocks ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Banned stocks ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Control stocks ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Banned stocks ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Banned stocks ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Control stocks ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
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5.7. Conclusion 
The descriptive statistics suggest higher abnormal return (except the UK), lower 
volatility (in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban]), wider spread and lower 
trading volume for banned stocks in the study, in line with general perceptions of 
previous studies. In Western and Asian markets, the results bring similar trend, hence 
supported Hypothesis 4. 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents descriptive statistics of abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread 
and trading volume, more robust fixed effect panel regression results and analysis 
are reported in this chapter. The economic interpretation and conclusion are provided 
for each measure and the final section concludes with the overall results. Regression 
has been undertaken in addition to descriptive statistics because we would want to 
explore deeper into the impact of the ban on various measures (abnormal return, 
volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume) in the study and to find out if other key 
factors affect these measures. 
6.2. Abnormal Return 
The thesis uses Market Adjusted Return (MAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) to identify abnormal return.  
Table 6.1 presents the regression results of MAR for each country. As shown in the 
first section of Table 6.1, the coefficient of the ban dummy is significantly positive, 
suggesting that when the ban was introduced in Australia, MAR of banned stocks 
increased significantly, compared to control stocks. 
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Table 6.1 Two Way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Market Adjusted Return  
The table reports fixed effect regression results on market adjusted return in each country. The 
dependent variable of Market Adjusted Return (MAR) is the difference between the actual 
return and the market index return on any given day calculated from tick data. Explanatory 
variables are ban dummy (I), volume (V), market capitalizsation (C), multivariables of ban 
dummy and trading volume (IV) and multivariables of ban dummy and market capitalisation 
(IC). Ban dummy (I) is the dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock is in the ban list and in 
the ban period, and 0 otherwise. Volume (V) is the stock daily trade volume. Market 
capitalisation (C) is the stock daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated after 
data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way fixed 
effect regression at the stock level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables are 
added one by one to the base model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.2427 param -0.000 0.387**
51504      0.2427 t (-0.00) (2.26)
51504      0.2428 param 0.006 0.386** -0.002***
51504      0.2428 t (0.01) (2.26) (-2.63)
51504      0.2430 param -0.046 0.439** -0.002*** -0.033***
51504      0.2430 t (-0.11) (2.55) (-2.58) (-3.44)
51504      0.2430 param -0.047 0.376* -0.002*** -0.034*** -0.020
51504      0.2430 t (-0.12) (1.89) (-2.58) (-3.49) (-0.63)
51504      0.2430 param -0.047** 0.388* -0.002*** -0.034*** -0.023 -0.001
51504      0.2430 t (-1.97) (1.76) (-2.59) (-3.49) (-0.60) (-0.13)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.0713 param -0.026 0.673***
20231      0.0713 t (-0.04) (3.01)
20231      0.0713 param 0.209 0.679 -0.028*
20231      0.0713 t (0.33) (1.02) (-1.75)
20231      0.0717 param -0.053 0.532 -0.018 -0.035***
20231      0.0717 t (-0.08) (0.79) (-0.68) (-2.78)
20231      0.0717 param -0.037 0.031 -0.020 -0.034*** 0.119
20231      0.0717 t (-0.06) (0.03) (-0.74) (-2.75) (0.59)
20231      0.0717 param -0.039** -0.559 -0.020 -0.034*** -0.062* -0.020*
20231      0.0717 t (-1.99) (-0.32) (-0.73) (-2.74) (1.76) (1.74)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.0740 param -0.840 0.807***
4827      0.0740 t (-1.50) (3.38)
4827      0.0798 param -0.801 0.933*** -0.079***
4827      0.0798 t (-1.43) (3.90) (-5.41)
4827      0.0849 param -0.954* 0.927*** -0.071*** -0.050***
4827      0.0849 t (-1.71) (3.89) (-4.89) (-5.13)
4827      0.0927 param -1.000* -0.000 -0.025 -0.052*** -0.173***
4827      0.0927 t (-1.79) (-0.00) (-1.53) (-5.37) (-6.32)
4827      0.0927 param -0.996* -0.063 -0.025 -0.052*** -0.172*** -0.002
4827      0.0927 t (-1.79) (-0.17) (-1.55) (-5.35) (-6.17) (0.26)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.1429 param -0.617 -0.068
14938      0.1429 t (-1.22) (-0.44)
14938      0.1429 param -0.621 -0.068 0.004
14938      0.1429 t (-1.23) (-0.44) (0.55)
14938      0.1432 param -0.693 -0.059 0.004 0.009
14938      0.1432 t (-1.37) (-0.38) (0.59) (0.13)
14938      0.1435 param -0.692 0.129*** 0.010 0.009 -0.039**
14938      0.1435 t (-1.36) (3.73) (1.25) (0.98) (-2.22)
14938      0.1435 param -0.691** 0.093*** -0.010* -0.008* -0.040** -0.004
14938      0.1435 t (-2.06) (3.46) (1.68) (-1.95) (-2.24) (-0.36)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.0653 param 0.305 0.057
4032      0.0653 t (1.12) (0.43)
4032      0.0653 param 0.305 0.057 0.000
4032      0.0653 t (1.12) (0.43) (0.01)
4032      0.0674 param -0.267 0.101 0.002 -0.050***
4032      0.0674 t (-0.80) (0.76) (0.23) (-2.94)
4032      0.0714 param -0.265 0.299* -0.000 -0.051*** 0.117
4032      0.0714 t (-0.79) (1.81) (-0.00) (-3.02) (0.09)
4032      0.0716 param -0.247** -0.228 -0.000 -0.049*** -0.127* -0.010
4032      0.0716 t (-1.96) (-1.23) (-0.05) (-2.92) (-4.11) (-0.84)
MAR
MAR
France
MAR
Germany II (2010)
Canada
Australia
MAR
MAR
Germany I (2008)
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.1258 param -0.818** -0.058
11571      0.1258 t (-2.02) (-0.48)
11571      0.1270 param -0.445 -0.056 -0.020***
11571      0.1270 t (-1.07) (-0.47) (-3.99)
11571      0.1303 param -1.014** 0.476*** -0.015*** 0.000
11571      0.1303 t (-2.39) (3.50) (-2.91) (0.53)
11571      0.1303 param -1.026** 0.473*** -0.014** 0.000 -0.002
11571      0.1303 t (-2.40) (3.46) (-2.18) (0.52) (-0.21)
11571      0.1330 param -1.193*** 0.784*** -0.011* -0.001** -0.017* -0.001***
11571      0.1330 t (-2.79) (5.36) (-1.72) (2.00) (-1.71) (-5.97)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.0967 param -0.056 -0.046
7308      0.0967 t (-0.10) (-0.21)
7308      0.1038 param -0.012 -0.142 -0.160***
7308      0.1038 t (-0.02) (-0.67) (-7.51)
7308      0.1050 param -0.636 -0.304 -0.148*** 0.000
7308      0.1050 t (-1.03) (-1.39) (-6.89) (0.18)
7308      0.1050 param -0.636 -0.300 -0.148*** 0.000 -0.003
7308      0.1050 t (-1.03) (-1.25) (-6.78) (0.16) (-0.04)
7308      0.1058 param -0.710** 0.463* -0.145*** -0.001*** -0.164 -0.001**
7308      0.1058 t (-1.99) (1.77) (-6.64) (-3.41) (-1.61) (2.46)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.0823 param -0.571 0.342**
10187      0.0823 t (-1.42) (2.33)
10187      0.0824 param -0.597 0.339** -0.857*
10187      0.0824 t (-1.48) (2.31) (1.76)
10187      0.0835 param -0.710* 0.276* 1.351 0.002
10187      0.0835 t (-1.75) (1.86) (1.03) (0.46)
10187      0.0837 param -0.706* 0.136 1.236 0.002 -0.011
10187      0.0837 t (-1.75) (0.78) (0.94) (0.47) (1.55)
10187      0.0838 param -0.705* 0.215 1.195 -0.001*** -0.011 -0.006
10187      0.0838 t (-1.74) (1.13) (0.91) (-3.46) (1.02) (-0.99)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.1363 param -1.125** 0.028
21847      0.1363 t (-2.33) (0.11)
21847      0.1414 param -0.979** -0.514 -0.020***
21847      0.1414 t (-2.03) (-0.04) (-11.39)
21847      0.1434 param -0.964** -0.502 -0.019*** -0.063***
21847      0.1434 t (-2.00) (-0.10) (-10.64) (-6.93)
21847      0.1435 param -0.964** -0.096 -0.019*** -0.064*** -0.012**
21847      0.1435 t (-2.00) (-0.31) (-10.58) (-6.97) (-2.16)
21847      0.1436 param -0.963** 0.045 -0.019*** -0.065*** -0.011* -0.008
21847      0.1436 t (-2.00) (0.13) (-10.58) (-7.03) (-1.87) (-0.95)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.0583 param 0.607 0.509**
15678      0.0583 t (1.25) (2.55)
15678      0.0583 param 0.597 0.510** -0.006*
15678      0.0583 t (1.22) (2.56) (-1.68)
15678      0.0600 param 0.466 0.466** 0.019 -0.022***
15678      0.0600 t (0.95) (2.34) (1.27) (-5.29)
15678      0.0604 param 0.497 0.317 0.008 -0.020*** 0.060
15678      0.0604 t (1.02) (1.53) (0.51) (-4.68) (0.52)
15678      0.0604 param 0.497 0.290 0.009 -0.020*** -0.053* -0.002
15678      0.0604 t (1.02) (1.31) (0.55) (-4.55) (-1.73) (-0.37)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.0672 param -0.292 0.184**
133057      0.0672 t (-0.34) (1.98)
133057      0.0677 param -0.339 0.158* -0.007***
133057      0.0677 t (-0.39) (1.70) (-8.10)
133057      0.0681 param -0.171 0.143 -0.006*** -0.023***
133057      0.0681 t (-0.20) (1.54) (-7.88) (-7.93)
133057      0.0682 param -0.163 0.256*** -0.007*** -0.023*** -0.016***
133057      0.0682 t (-0.19) (2.59) (-7.94) (-7.96) (-3.33)
133057      0.0682 param -0.168** 0.127 -0.007*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.007**
133057      0.0682 t (-1.99) (1.12) (-7.94) (-7.57) (-3.73) (-2.32)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.0657 param -0.549* 0.238***
29066     0.0657 t (-1.98) (3.22)
29066     0.0665 param -0.113 0.248*** -0.025***
29066     0.0665 t (-0.22) (3.35) (-4.93)
29066     0.0698 param -0.573 0.390*** -0.020*** 0.000
29066     0.0698 t (-1.10) (5.20) (-3.91) (0.13)
29066     0.0698 param -0.578 0.389*** -0.019*** 0.000 -0.001
29066     0.0698 t (-1.10) (5.12) (-3.11) (0.13) (-0.08)
29066     0.0702 param -0.623 0.475*** -0.018*** -0.001** -0.008 0.000
29066     0.0702 t (-1.19) (5.93) (-2.92) (-2.54) (-0.78) (0.43)
MAR
Taiwan
UK
Japan
Korea
MAR
MAR
MAR
US
MAR
MAR
Asian Market
MAR
Western Market
 
  94 
In Table 6.2, the significant positive coefficient of ban dummy in the two-way fixed 
effect panel regression shows higher and significant CAR among banned stocks 
during a ban period compared to that among control stocks by around: Australia 78%, 
Canada 60%, France 28%, Germany I [2008 ban] 12.4%, Germany II [2010 ban] 
1.4%, Japan 5.5%, Korea 37.7%, Taiwan 2.9%, the US 67.6%, Western markets 
24.3% and Asian markets 9.2%. A lower CAR was found in the UK by -33.1% but 
not significant. The pattern was consistent with descriptive statistics.  
The adjusted R square did not increase significantly along with more variables added 
to the model, indicating that added independent variables did not have a strong 
explanatory power. A relatively high adjusted R square around 50% in the CAR 
model showed that short selling ban dummy can explain the abnormal return quite 
well. Consistently, negative coefficients of daily trading volume, market 
capitalisation and their interaction variables with ban dummy indicated that stocks 
with lower trading volume and smaller market capitalisation would have a higher 
abnormal return. The result shows that the direction of reaction of abnormal return in 
Western and Asian markets behaved similarly. As expected, CAR (Table 6.2) 
presented the very similar pattern as MAR (Table 6.1) in each country. 
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Table 6.2 Two-way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
The table reports fixed effect regression results on cumulative abnormal return (by using 
250-day pre-event window) in each country. The dependent variable of Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) is the difference between the stock actual return and the expected return 
calculated from tick data on any given day by applying OLS parameters estimated from 
250-day pre-event period window and the index return. Explanatory variables are ban dummy 
(I), volume (V), market capitalisation (C), multivariables of ban dummy and trading volume 
(IV) and multivariables of ban dummy and market capitalisation (IC). Ban dummy (I) is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if a stock is in the ban list and in the ban period, and 0 
otherwise. Volume (V) is the stock daily trade volume. Market capitalisation (C) is the stock 
daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of 
any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way fixed effect regression at the stock 
level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables are added one by one to the base 
model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show coefficient estimates. T-statistics 
in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.  
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.2636 param -0.032 -0.758
51504      0.2636 t (-0.10) (-0.56)
51504      0.2655 param -0.053 -0.755 -0.008***
51504      0.2655 t (-0.16) (-0.55) (-11.51)
51504      0.2659 param -0.003 -0.811 -0.008*** -0.036***
51504      0.2659 t (-0.01) (-0.95) (-11.44) (-4.64)
51504      0.2659 param -0.003 0.822*** -0.008*** -0.036*** -0.003
51504      0.2659 t (-0.01) (5.21) (-11.44) (-4.57) (-0.14)
51504      0.2659 param -0.003* 0.779*** -0.008*** -0.036*** -0.013 -0.004
51504      0.2659 t (-1.96) (4.44) (-11.43) (-4.57) (-0.42) (-0.56)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.3813 param -0.653*** 0.372
20231      0.3813 t (-2.59) (1.29)
20231      0.3971 param -0.514*** 0.315 -0.257***
20231      0.3971 t (-5.69) (1.11) (-22.85)
20231      0.4004 param -0.934*** 0.079 -0.272*** -0.055***
20231      0.4004 t (-7.20) (0.28) (-24.08) (-10.54)
20231      0.4008 param -0.973*** 0.354*** -0.276*** -0.056*** -0.302***
20231      0.4008 t (-7.35) (2.95) (-24.32) (-10.68) (-3.53)
20231      0.4008 param -0.974*** 0.597*** -0.276*** -0.056*** -0.317*** -0.005
20231      0.4008 t (-7.35) (5.63) (-24.32) (-10.67) (-3.12) (0.27)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.4620 param -0.309** 0.417***
4827      0.4620 t (-2.32) (7.37)
4827      0.5402 param -0.264** 0.561*** -0.090***
4827      0.5402 t (-2.14) (10.67) (-28.17)
4827      0.5423 param -0.294** 0.560*** -0.089*** -0.010***
4827      0.5423 t (-2.39) (10.67) (-27.63) (-4.64)
4827      0.5655 param -0.319*** 0.062 -0.064*** -0.011*** -0.093***
4827      0.5655 t (-2.66) (1.03) (-18.19) (-5.32) (-15.79)
4827      0.5673 param -0.308** 0.281*** -0.066*** -0.011*** -0.088*** -0.007***
4827      0.5673 t (-2.57) (3.58) (-18.58) (-5.11) (-14.76) (-4.32)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.4783 param -0.190** 0.225***
14938      0.4783 t (-2.49) (9.64)
14938      0.5008 param -0.168** 0.223*** -0.028***
14938      0.5008 t (-2.25) (9.75) (-25.51)
14938      0.5028 param -0.129* 0.228*** -0.029*** -0.005***
14938      0.5028 t (-1.73) (9.98) (-25.72) (-7.73)
14938      0.5144 param -0.129* 0.001 -0.022*** 0.006 -0.048***
14938      0.5144 t (-1.75) (0.03) (-19.00) (0.99) (18.52)
14938      0.5169 param -0.126* 0.124*** -0.021*** 0.006 0.050 -0.127***
14938      0.5169 t (-1.71) (4.23) (-18.37) (0.64) (19.27) (-8.69)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.5736 param -0.070*** -0.018
4032      0.5736 t (-8.16) (-0.34)
4032      0.6301 param -0.068*** -0.012 -0.007***
4032      0.6301 t (-8.51) (-0.02) (-24.33)
4032      0.6303 param -0.059*** -0.011 -0.007*** 0.001
4032      0.6303 t (-6.06) (-0.83) (-24.38) (1.52)
4032      0.6303 param -0.059*** 0.012*** -0.007*** 0.001 0.000
4032      0.6303 t (-6.06) (2.58) (-24.31) (1.53) (0.50)
4032      0.6304 param -0.059*** 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.001 0.000 0.000
4032      0.6304 t (-6.00) (2.60) (-24.31) (-1.59) (0.22) (0.67)
CAR
Germany I (2008)
CAR
CAR
France
Australia
CAR
Canada
CAR
Germany II (2010)
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.5461 param -0.275*** 0.055***
11571      0.5461 t (-5.01) (3.38)
11571      0.6029 param -0.203*** 0.057*** 0.025
11571      0.6029 t (-3.86) (3.77) (0.30)
11571      0.6032 param -0.170*** -0.033 0.025 -0.000***
11571      0.6032 t (-3.16) (-0.91) (0.33) (-2.98)
11571      0.6087 param -0.075 -0.067 0.019 -0.000*** 0.015
11571      0.6087 t (-1.39) (-0.22) (0.63) (-2.88) (0.56)
11571      0.6096 param -0.057 -0.022 -0.019*** -0.000*** -0.016*** -0.000***
11571      0.6096 t (-1.06) (-1.20) (-3.21) (-4.26) (-13.45) (-5.07)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.4346 param -0.590** -0.043
7308      0.4346 t (-2.30) (-0.46)
7308      0.4821 param -0.528** 0.095 -0.228***
7308      0.4821 t (-2.15) (1.06) (-25.55)
7308      0.4823 param -0.384 0.057 -0.230*** -0.009*
7308      0.4823 t (-1.49) (0.62) (-25.50) (-1.75)
7308      0.4855 param -0.404 0.331*** -0.241*** 0.000 -0.218***
7308      0.4855 t (-1.57) (3.29) (-26.36) (1.03) (-6.67)
7308      0.4857 param -0.425* 0.377*** -0.240*** 0.000 -0.172*** -0.000*
7308      0.4857 t (-1.65) (3.62) (-26.23) (0.84) (-4.04) (-1.67)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.3417 param -0.365*** -0.007
10187      0.3417 t (-9.09) (-0.50)
10187      0.3454 param -0.335*** -0.010 -0.988***
10187      0.3454 t (-8.31) (-0.69) (-7.56)
10187      0.3457 param -0.329*** -0.014 1.017 0.000**
10187      0.3457 t (-8.13) (-0.94) (0.74) (2.04)
10187      0.3459 param -0.329*** 0.029* 1.005 0.000** -1.413*
10187      0.3459 t (-8.14) (1.87) (0.63) (2.05) (-1.66)
10187      0.3459 param -0.329*** 0.03 1.006 0.000** 1.283 0.000
10187      0.3459 t (-8.13) (1.59) (0.63) (2.05) (1.15) (0.18)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.2161 param -0.853*** 0.494
21847      0.2161 t (-4.05) (0.95)
21847      0.2679 param -0.395*** 0.309 -0.064***
21847      0.2679 t (-3.16) (1.34) (-39.04)
21847      0.2722 param -0.373*** 0.291 -0.062*** -0.094***
21847      0.2722 t (-3.11) (1.26) (-37.83) (-11.20)
21847      0.2736 param -0.373*** -0.241 -0.062*** -0.095*** -0.034***
21847      0.2736 t (-3.12) (-0.93) (-37.65) (-11.35) (-6.58)
21847      0.2739 param -0.370*** -0.331 -0.062*** -0.099*** -0.030*** -0.022***
21847      0.2739 t (-3.11) (-0.88) (-37.66) (-11.68) (-5.71) (-2.87)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.4033 param 0.124 0.679***
15678      0.4033 t (1.34) (17.86)
15678      0.4248 param 0.006 0.698*** 0.067
15678      0.4248 t (0.06) (18.69) (0.01)
15678      0.4249 param 0.013 0.700*** 0.067 -0.001*
15678      0.4249 t (0.15) (18.75) (0.38) (-1.68)
15678      0.4267 param 0.029 0.625*** 0.061 -0.002*** -0.031***
15678      0.4267 t (0.32) (16.06) (0.53) (-3.03) -(6.84)
15678      0.4272 param 0.029 0.676*** -0.060* -0.002** -0.044*** -0.003***
15678      0.4272 t (0.32) (16.32) (-1.92) (-2.40) (-7.58) (-3.58)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.2100 param -0.283 -0.178
133057      0.2100 t (-0.48) (-0.82)
133057      0.2186 param -0.134 -0.095 -0.021***
133057      0.2186 t (-0.23) (-1.52) (-38.12)
133057      0.2186 param -0.118 -0.097 -0.021*** 0.002
133057      0.2186 t (-0.20) (-1.54) (-38.14) (1.09)
133057      0.2189 param -0.130 0.265*** -0.021*** 0.002 -0.023***
133057      0.2189 t (-0.22) (3.97) (-38.26) (1.02) (-7.34)
133057      0.2189 param -0.129** 0.243*** -0.021*** 0.002 -0.024*** -0.001
133057      0.2189 t (-1.97) (3.17) (-38.26) (1.09) (-7.31) (-0.60)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.4483 param -0.268* 0.049**
29066     0.4483 t (-1.77) (2.21)
29066     0.4641 param -0.483*** 0.033 -0.043***
29066     0.4641 t (-3.18) (1.52) (-29.04)
29066     0.4705 param -0.236 0.044** -0.040*** -0.000***
29066     0.4705 t (-1.56) (2.00) (-27.23) (-18.68)
29066     0.4708 param -0.306** 0.057*** -0.044*** -0.000*** -0.010***
29066     0.4708 t (-2.01) (2.58) (-24.18) (-18.62) (-3.71)
29066     0.4712 param -0.287* 0.092*** -0.044*** -0.000*** -0.008*** -0.000***
29066     0.4712 t (-1.89) (3.96) (-23.89) (-19.15) (-2.63) (-4.85)
Taiwan
UK
Japan
Korea
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
Western Market
US
CAR
Asian Market
CAR
CAR
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It is obvious that short selling bans caused abnormal return to increase for banned 
stocks and to decrease for control stocks (except in the UK, with insignificant 
decreased abnormal return), whereas lifting the ban caused the opposite result in all 
countries under study. The economic explanation could be that shorting bans 
prevented pessimists from taking a bearish position in banking stocks; the 
announcement of the ban hence caused affected shares prices to increase, leading to 
overvaluation compared to the fundamentals. Following the lifting of a ban, the price 
of affected stocks should reverse because the temporary ban should cause a 
temporary price impact. This finding is in line with the Boulton and Braga-Alves 
(2009) result. 
The insignificant decrease of abnormal return in the UK may be assigned to external 
factors such as market noise and sector-wide movement. And abnormal return is 
very sensitive to the model chosen and the estimation of beta because the model is 
based on the assumption of a relatively stable market. Also the finding in the next 
section shows market liquidity degradation during the ban; this could be reflected in 
lower price and return. Another reason for the UK special case may be that adding to 
the ban was seen to be a negative sign for the corporate future. During the crisis, the 
UK companies generally requested to be on the list and therefore investors might 
wonder if those companies had anything to conceal. 
In summary, the regression results support Hypothesis 1 that banned stocks 
experience greater abnormal return when a ban is imposed compared to control 
stocks 
6.3. Volatility 
In the regression, realised volatility is used which is the daily sum of squared tick 
return.  
As shown in Table 6.3, two-way fixed effect panel regression gives significantly 
positive ban dummy coefficient in all countries except Australia, Japan and Germany 
II [2010 ban], indicating higher volatility of banned stocks in a ban period compared 
to control stocks (higher by around: Canada 21.7%, France 32%, Germany I [2008 
ban] 14%, Korea 48%, Taiwan 1%, the UK 8%, the US 35%, Western markets 18% 
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and Asian market 19%). However, the significant negative dummy coefficient was 
found in three countries which demonstrated lower banned stocks volatility (lower 
by around: Australia 5.9%, Japan 13.4% and Germany II [2010 ban] 5%), which was 
consistent with descriptive statistics in all countries.  
A relatively high adjusted R square, around 40% on average across all countries, 
shows good explanatory power of ban dummy, but did not increase much with more 
independent variables added to the model. Positive coefficients presented for daily 
trading volume, market capitalisation and their interaction variables with ban 
dummy, indicating that stocks with higher trading volume and larger market 
capitalisation would have higher volatility. Western market and Asian market 
reactions to the ban were generally the same as above. 
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Table 6.3 Two-way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Realised Volatility  
The table reports fixed effect regression results on realised volatility in each country. The 
dependent variable of realised volatility is the sum of the squared tick return during a day. 
Explanatory variables are ban dummy (I), volume (V), market capitalisation (C), multivariables 
of ban dummy and trading volume (IV) and multivariables of ban dummy and market 
capitalisation (IC). Ban dummy (I) is the dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock is on the 
ban list and in a ban period, and 0 otherwise. Volume (V) is the stock daily trade volume. 
Market capitalisation (C) is the stock daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated 
after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way 
fixed effect regression at the stock level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables 
are added one by one to the base model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.2933 param 0.362*** 0.034
51504      0.2933 t (3.60) (0.82)
51504      0.2938 param 0.359*** 0.035 0.001***
51504      0.2938 t (3.57) (0.83) (5.92)
51504      0.2938 param 0.353*** 0.041 0.001*** 0.004
51504      0.2938 t (3.51) (0.97) (5.94) (1.60)
51504      0.2941 param 0.355*** -0.013*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.033***
51504      0.2941 t (3.53) (-3.44) (5.97) (0.98) (4.20)
51504      0.2941 param 0.355*** -0.059*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.020** 0.006**
51504      0.2941 t (3.52) (-3.12) (5.93) (1.01) (2.13) (2.52)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.5761 param 0.324*** 0.075
20231      0.5761 t (4.82) (0.98)
20231      0.5771 param 0.143** 0.070 0.021***
20231      0.5771 t (1.99) (0.92) (7.06)
20231      0.5832 param 0.040 -0.032 0.028*** 0.024***
20231      0.5832 t (0.55) (-0.43) (9.25) (17.11)
20231      0.5834 param 0.048 0.217* 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.059**
20231      0.5834 t (0.66) (1.76) (9.48) (17.20) (2.57)
20231      0.5834 param 0.048 0.160 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.065** 0.002
20231      0.5834 t (0.66) (0.81) (9.48) (17.18) (2.37) (0.38)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.2044 param 0.083* 0.123***
4827      0.2044 t (1.94) (3.24)
4827      0.2139 param 0.075 0.150*** 0.017***
4827      0.2139 t (0.85) (3.98) (7.52)
4827      0.2143 param 0.082 0.150*** 0.017*** 0.002
4827      0.2143 t (0.92) (3.97) (7.34) (1.48)
4827      0.2162 param 0.078 0.230*** 0.021*** 0.002 0.015***
4827      0.2162 t (0.88) (5.18) (8.10) (1.35) (3.43)
4827      0.2172 param 0.073 0.321*** 0.022*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.003**
4827      0.2172 t (0.83) (5.53) (8.32) (1.23) (3.81) (2.43)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.4886 param 0.194*** 0.084***
14938      0.4886 t (2.68) (3.09)
14938      0.4905 param 0.193*** 0.084*** 0.002***
14938      0.4905 t (3.61) (3.09) (7.44)
14938      0.4912 param 0.198*** 0.083*** 0.002*** 0.001***
14938      0.4912 t (3.89) (3.97) (7.35) (4.46)
14938      0.4937 param 0.198*** 0.108*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.005***
14938      0.4937 t (3.92) (3.18) (9.60) (5.00) (8.38)
14938      0.4972 param 0.197*** 0.144*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.004***
14938      0.4972 t (3.92) (3.95) (8.89) (4.25) (7.48) (10.05)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.3845 param 0.085*** -0.051***
4032      0.3845 t (7.20) (-8.69)
4032      0.3974 param 0.084*** -0.026*** 0.004***
4032      0.3974 t (7.19) (-3.57) (9.10)
4032      0.3976 param 0.075*** -0.027*** 0.004*** 0.001
4032      0.3976 t (5.18) (-3.67) (9.16) (1.16)
4032      0.4006 param 0.075*** 0.045 0.004*** 0.001 0.005***
4032      0.4006 t (5.19) (0.41) (9.42) (1.09) (4.45)
4032      0.4013 param 0.077*** 0.053 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001**
4032      0.4013 t (5.32) (0.69) (9.30) (0.87) (3.34) (2.15)
Australia
Volatility
Volatility
France
Volatility
Germany I (2008)
Canada
Volatility
Germany II (2010)
Volatility
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.6695 param 0.145*** 0.047
11571      0.6695 t (3.97) (0.33)
11571      0.6695 param 0.149*** -0.134*** 0.000
11571      0.6695 t (3.97) (-3.38) (0.46)
11571      0.6709 param 0.093** 0.006 0.000 0.000***
11571      0.6709 t (2.43) (0.47) (0.67) (7.11)
11571      0.6721 param 0.128*** -0.002 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.005***
11571      0.6721 t (3.31) (-0.20) (3.40) (7.18) (6.42)
11571      0.6721 param 0.126*** -0.005 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000
11571      0.6721 t (3.26) (-0.41) (3.34) (7.05) (6.05) (0.63)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.5067 param 0.337** 0.332***
7308      0.5067 t (2.28) (6.15)
7308      0.5067 param 0.338** 0.328*** 0.006
7308      0.5067 t (2.29) (6.07) (1.06)
7308      0.5069 param 0.276* 0.312*** 0.005 0.000
7308      0.5069 t (1.77) (5.61) (0.84) (1.27)
7308      0.5086 param 0.285* 0.438*** 0.000 0.000 0.100***
7308      0.5086 t (1.83) (7.21) (0.08) (0.71) (5.09)
7308      0.5091 param 0.304* 0.481*** 0.000** 0.000 0.057** 0.000***
7308      0.5091 t (1.95) (7.64) (2.06) (0.42) (2.23) (2.60)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.3105 param 0.451*** -0.001
10187      0.3105 t (3.06) (-0.02)
10187      0.3252 param 0.666*** 0.019 7.009***
10187      0.3252 t (4.54) (0.36) (14.75)
10187      0.3256 param 0.695*** 0.036*** 7.138*** 0.001**
10187      0.3256 t (4.73) (3.66) (14.93) (2.48)
10187      0.3257 param 0.695*** 0.055*** 7.122*** 0.001** 1.808
10187      0.3257 t (4.73) (3.87) (14.88) (2.49) (0.58)
10187      0.3260 param 0.694*** 0.010* 7.088*** 0.001** 7.652* 0.005**
10187      0.3260 t (4.72) (1.74) (14.80) (2.46) (1.88) (2.22)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.5769 param 0.412*** -0.074
21847      0.5769 t (8.41) (-1.19)
21847      0.5798 param 0.473*** 0.071 0.005***
21847      0.5798 t (8.11) (1.13) (12.18)
21847      0.5799 param 0.474*** 0.071*** 0.006*** 0.004*
21847      0.5799 t (8.12) (3.14) (12.31) (1.90)
21847      0.5799 param 0.474*** 0.051*** 0.006*** 0.004* 0.001
21847      0.5799 t (8.12) (3.65) (12.29) (1.89) (0.43)
21847      0.5799 param 0.475*** 0.080*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.001 0.002
21847      0.5799 t (8.12) (3.92) (12.29) (2.00) (0.61) (0.78)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.3958 param 0.199*** 0.317***
15678      0.3958 t (3.58) (13.90)
15678      0.3966 param 0.185*** 0.319*** 0.008***
15678      0.3966 t (3.33) (14.00) (4.63)
15678      0.3966 param 0.186*** 0.319*** 0.008*** 0.000
15678      0.3966 t (3.33) (14.00) (4.53) (0.22)
15678      0.3969 param 0.183*** 0.336*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.007**
15678      0.3969 t (3.27) (14.14) (5.05) (0.12) (2.52)
15678      0.3971 param 0.183*** 0.358*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.001 0.001**
15678      0.3971 t (3.27) (14.16) (4.69) (0.70) (0.37) (2.54)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.4157 param 0.109* 0.113***
133057      0.4157 t (1.69) (6.14)
133057      0.4166 param 0.092 0.122*** 0.002***
133057      0.4166 t (0.54) (6.64) (14.34)
133057      0.4171 param 0.050 0.118*** 0.002*** 0.006***
133057      0.4171 t (0.29) (6.43) (14.61) (10.12)
133057      0.4171 param 0.049 0.137*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003***
133057      0.4171 t (0.28) (7.00) (14.57) (10.15) (2.79)
133057      0.4172 param 0.047 0.186*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.003***
133057      0.4172 t (0.27) (8.26) (14.57) (10.66) (1.84) (4.40)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.3911 param 0.166* 0.177***
29066     0.3911 t (1.68) (9.42)
29066     0.3912 param 0.123 0.176*** 0.002*
29066     0.3912 t (0.93) (9.37) (1.91)
29066     0.3913 param 0.141 0.170*** 0.002* 0.000
29066     0.3913 t (1.07) (8.91) (1.74) (1.60)
29066     0.3914 param 0.102 0.163*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.006**
29066     0.3914 t (0.77) (8.41) (2.81) (1.56) (2.38)
29066     0.3918 param 0.088 0.190*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.000***
29066     0.3918 t (0.66) (9.32) (3.04) (0.88) (3.21) (4.27)
Japan
Korea
Volatility
Asian Market
Western Market
Volatility
Volatility
Taiwan
UK
US
Volatility
Volatility
Volatility
Volatility
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The increased volatility on the imposition of the ban is consistent with Boehmer et 
al.‘s (2008c) intra-day volatility finding but contradicts Hypothesis 2 of reduced 
volatility. This may due to the market being driven by a tremendous increase in 
rumours, reactions and news of volatile fluctuation in the market during the 2008 
financial crisis, strengthened by the announcement of a short selling ban by market 
authorities to counteract high volatility during a turbulent period. This signal made 
investors more frustrated and worried about the current market so that they traded 
more actively without rational thinking, hence the increase in volatility. 
The reduction in volatility in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban] during 
bans was clearly consistent with the initial purpose of a short selling ban by market 
regulators, which is to calm the market and smooth volatility. This is also in line with 
Hypothesis 2. Notably, Germany I [2008 ban] was unsuccessful in achieving the 
regulator‘s goal but Germany II [2010 ban] successfully reduced volatility in 
affected stocks. Even though the content of both bans in Germany was considerably 
similar, moving towards the end of the financial crisis in 2010 presented a different 
financial environment, enabling a more effective application of the ban regulations. 
Furthermore, the volatility in both groups decreased after the lifting of the 
restrictions, likely driven by the authorities‘ announcements of the lifting of short 
selling bans, convincing market participants of a continuing reasonably low 
volatility and a healthy economy. Hence the overall volatility was reduced by 
‗happier‘ investors following the reconciliation of the market to a stable equilibrium 
when the bans were lifted. 
In conclusion, realised volatility was high for banned stocks in certain countries, 
likely due to the 2008 market turmoil impact being widespread for both banned and 
control stocks, and the signalling effect of short selling ban announcement. The 
successful reduction in volatility in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban] was 
largely attributed to the effectiveness of market authorities. The findings suggest a 
strong ban impact on volatility, but in either direction, which brings a mixed 
validation of Hypothesis 2. 
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6.4. Spread 
To examine the impact of shorting bans on bid-ask spread, Daily Trade Weighted 
Relative Effective Spread is used, which is twice the difference between the trading 
price and the midpoint prevailing at the time of that trade, weighted by its number of 
trade. It is an illiquidity proxy since the wider the spread, the lower liquidity is. 
Table 6.4 shows two-way fixed effect panel regressions. In all countries under study, 
the ban dummy coefficient was always significantly positive, indicating wider 
bid-ask spread of banned stocks during the ban than control stocks (wider by around: 
Australia 78%, Canada 35%, France 28%, Germany I [2008 ban] 12%, Germany II 
[2010 ban] 1.4%, Japan 5.6%, Korea 37.7%, Taiwan 2.9%, the UK 23%, the US 68%, 
Western markets 24% and Asian market 9.2%).  
The adjusted R square around 50% (average across all countries) indicated quite 
good explanatory power of the ban dummy on spread, but did not increase much 
with more independent variables entering the model. Coefficients of daily trading 
volume, market capitalisation and their interaction variables with ban dummy were 
negative in all countries, suggesting that stocks with lower trading volume and 
smaller market capitalisation would have wider spread. There is no significant 
difference of spread reaction direction between Western markets and Asian markets, 
as discussed above. 
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Table 6.4 Two-way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Bid-Ask Spread  
The table reports fixed effect regression results on daily bid-ask spread in each country. The 
dependent variable of daily Trade Weighted Relative Effective Spread is twice the difference 
between the tick trading price and its prevailing midpoint quote divided by the midpoint quote, 
weighted by its number of traded shares to the daily sum. Explanatory variables are ban 
dummy (I), volume (V), market capitalisation (C), multivariables of ban dummy and trading 
volume (IV) and multivariables of ban dummy and market capitalisation (IC). Ban dummy (I) 
is the dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock is on the ban list and in the ban period, and 0 
otherwise. Volume (V) is the stock daily trade volume. Market capitalisation (C) is the stock 
daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated after data cleaning and removal of 
any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way fixed effect regression at the stock 
level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables are added one by one to the base 
model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show coefficient estimates. T-statistics 
in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically significant levels at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.2636 param 0.032* 0.758***
51504      0.2636 t (1.69) (5.56)
51504      0.2655 param 0.053 0.755*** -0.008***
51504      0.2655 t (0.16) (5.55) (-11.51)
51504      0.2659 param 0.003 0.811*** -0.008*** -0.036***
51504      0.2659 t (0.01) (5.95) (-11.44) (-4.64)
51504      0.2659 param 0.003 0.822*** -0.008*** -0.036*** 0.003
51504      0.2659 t (0.01) (5.21) (-11.44) (-4.57) (0.14)
51504      0.2659 param 0.003 0.779*** -0.008*** -0.036*** -0.013 -0.004
51504      0.2659 t (0.01) (4.44) -(11.43) (-3.57) (0.42) (-0.56)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.3813 param 0.653*** 0.372
20231      0.3813 t (2.59) (1.29)
20231      0.3971 param 1.514*** 0.315 -0.257***
20231      0.3971 t (5.69) (1.11) (-22.85)
20231      0.4004 param 1.934*** 0.079 -0.272*** -0.055***
20231      0.4004 t (7.20) (0.28) (-24.08) (-10.54)
20231      0.4008 param 1.973*** 0.354*** -0.276*** -0.056*** -0.302
20231      0.4008 t (7.35) (2.95) (-24.32) (-10.68) (-0.53)
20231      0.4008 param 1.974*** 0.197 -0.276*** -0.056*** -0.317 -0.005
20231      0.4008 t (7.35) (1.63) (-24.32) (-10.67) (-0.12) (-0.27)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.4620 param 0.309** 0.417***
4827      0.4620 t (2.32) (3.37)
4827      0.5402 param 0.264** 0.561*** -0.090***
4827      0.5402 t (2.14) (3.67) (-28.17)
4827      0.5423 param 0.294** 0.560*** -0.089*** -0.01
4827      0.5423 t (2.39) (3.67) (-27.63) (-0.64)
4827      0.5655 param 0.319*** 0.062 -0.064*** -0.011*** 0.093
4827      0.5655 t (2.66) (1.03) (-18.19) (-5.32) (0.79)
4827      0.5673 param 0.308** 0.281*** -0.066*** 0.011 -0.088 -0.007
4827      0.5673 t (2.57) (3.58) (-18.58) (0.11) (0.76) (-0.32)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.4783 param 0.190** 0.225***
14938      0.4783 t (2.49) (9.64)
14938      0.5008 param 0.168** 0.223*** -0.028***
14938      0.5008 t (2.25) (9.75) (-25.51)
14938      0.5028 param 0.129* 0.228*** -0.029*** -0.005***
14938      0.5028 t (1.73) (9.98) (-25.72) (-7.73)
14938      0.5144 param 0.129* 0.001 -0.022*** -0.006*** -0.048
14938      0.5144 t (1.75) (0.03) (-19.00) (-8.99) (0.52)
14938      0.5169 param 0.126* 0.124*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.050 -0.016
14938      0.5169 t (1.71) (4.23) (-18.37) (-9.64) (0.27) (-0.69)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.5736 param 0.070*** 0.018***
4032      0.5736 t (8.16) (4.34)
4032      0.6301 param 0.068*** 0.012*** -0.007***
4032      0.6301 t (8.51) (3.02) (-24.33)
4032      0.6303 param 0.059*** 0.011*** -0.007*** 0.001
4032      0.6303 t (6.06) (2.83) (-24.38) (1.52)
4032      0.6303 param 0.059*** 0.012*** -0.007*** 0.001 0.000
4032      0.6303 t (6.06) (2.58) (-24.31) (1.53) (0.50)
4032      0.6304 param 0.059*** 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.001* 0.000 0.000
4032      0.6304 t (6.00) (2.60) (-24.31) (-1.69) (0.22) (0.67)
France
Spread
Spread
Spread
Germany I (2008)
Australia
Germany II (2010)
Spread
Canada
Spread
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.5461 param 0.275*** 0.055***
11571      0.5461 t (5.01) (3.38)
11571      0.6029 param 0.203*** 0.057*** -0.025***
11571      0.6029 t (3.86) (3.77) (-40.30)
11571      0.6032 param 0.170*** 0.033* -0.025*** -0.001
11571      0.6032 t (3.16) (1.91) (-39.33) (-0.98)
11571      0.6087 param 0.075 0.056*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.015***
11571      0.6087 t (1.39) (3.22) (-23.63) (-0.88) (12.56)
11571      0.6096 param 0.057 0.022 -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.016*** -0.001
11571      0.6096 t (1.06) (1.20) (-23.21) (-4.26) (13.45) (-0.07)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.4346 param 0.590** -0.043
7308      0.4346 t (2.30) (-0.46)
7308      0.4821 param 0.528** 0.095 -0.228***
7308      0.4821 t (2.15) (1.06) (-25.55)
7308      0.4823 param 0.384 0.057 -0.230*** 0.000
7308      0.4823 t (1.49) (0.62) (-25.50) (0.75)
7308      0.4855 param 0.404 0.331*** -0.241*** 0.000 -0.218
7308      0.4855 t (1.57) (3.29) (-26.36) (1.03) (-0.67)
7308      0.4857 param 0.425* 0.377*** -0.240*** -0.001* -0.172 -0.001
7308      0.4857 t (1.69) (3.62) (-26.23) (1.84) (-0.04) (-1.67)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.3417 param 0.365*** -0.007
10187      0.3417 t (9.09) (-0.50)
10187      0.3454 param 0.335*** -0.010 -0.988***
10187      0.3454 t (8.31) (-0.69) (-7.56)
10187      0.3457 param 0.329*** -0.014 -1.017*** 0.000**
10187      0.3457 t (8.13) (-0.94) (-7.74) (2.04)
10187      0.3459 param 0.329*** 0.029* -1.005*** 0.000** -1.413*
10187      0.3459 t (8.14) (1.77) (-7.63) (2.05) (-1.69)
10187      0.3459 param 0.329*** 0.030* -1.006*** -0.001** -1.283 0.000
10187      0.3459 t (8.13) (1.69) (-7.63) (2.05) (-1.15) (0.18)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.2161 param 1.853*** 1.394
21847      0.2161 t (4.05) (0.62)
21847      0.2679 param 1.395*** 0.309 -0.064***
21847      0.2679 t (3.16) (1.34) (-39.04)
21847      0.2722 param 1.373*** 0.291 -0.062*** -0.094
21847      0.2722 t (3.11) (1.26) (-37.83) (-0.20)
21847      0.2736 param 1.373*** 0.841*** -0.062*** -0.095 -0.034***
21847      0.2736 t (3.12) (2.93) (-37.65) (-0.35) (-6.58)
21847      0.2739 param 1.370*** 0.231*** -0.062*** -0.099* -0.030*** -0.022***
21847      0.2739 t (3.11) (3.88) (-37.66) (-1.68) (-5.71) (-2.87)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.4033 param 0.124 0.679***
15678      0.4033 t (1.34) (17.86)
15678      0.4248 param 0.006 0.698*** -0.067***
15678      0.4248 t (0.06) (18.69) (-24.01)
15678      0.4249 param 0.013 0.700*** -0.067*** -0.001
15678      0.4249 t (0.15) (18.75) (-23.38) (-0.68)
15678      0.4267 param 0.029 0.625*** -0.061*** -0.002 -0.031***
15678      0.4267 t (0.32) (16.06) (-20.53) (-0.03) (-6.84)
15678      0.4272 param 0.029* 0.676*** -0.060*** -0.002* -0.044*** -0.003
15678      0.4272 t (1.68) (16.32) (-19.92) (-1.91) (-7.58) (-0.58)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.2100 param 0.283* -0.178
133057      0.2100 t (1.68) (-0.82)
133057      0.2186 param 0.134 -0.095 -0.021***
133057      0.2186 t (0.23) (-1.52) (-38.12)
133057      0.2186 param 0.118 -0.097 -0.021*** 0.002
133057      0.2186 t (0.20) (-1.54) (-38.14) (1.09)
133057      0.2189 param 0.130 0.265*** -0.021*** 0.002 -0.023***
133057      0.2189 t (0.22) (3.97) (-38.26) (1.02) (-7.34)
133057      0.2189 param 0.129 0.243*** -0.021*** -0.002* -0.024*** -0.001
133057      0.2189 t (0.22) (3.17) (-38.26) (-1.89) (-7.31) (-0.60)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.4483 param 0.268* -0.049
29066     0.4483 t (1.77) (-0.21)
29066     0.4641 param 0.483*** -0.033 -0.043***
29066     0.4641 t (3.18) (-1.52) (-29.04)
29066     0.4705 param 0.236 0.044** -0.040*** -0.001
29066     0.4705 t (1.56) (2.00) (-27.23) (-0.68)
29066     0.4708 param 0.306** 0.057*** -0.044*** -0.001 -0.01
29066     0.4708 t (2.01) (2.58) (-24.18) (-0.62) (-0.71)
29066     0.4712 param 0.287* 0.092*** -0.044*** -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
29066     0.4712 t (1.89) (3.96) (-23.89) (-0.15) (-0.63) (-0.85)
Taiwan
UK
Japan
Korea
Spread
Spread
Spread
Spread
Spread
Western Market
US
Spread
Asian Market
Spread
This is consistent with Hansson and Rudowfors‘ (2009) findings of traders with a 
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negative view actually being prevented from taking a position based on such view, 
and therefore excluded from participating in market activity. The illiquidity of both 
banned and control stocks led to widening spread. Subsequent to the ban, spread 
narrowed down for both banned and control stocks since they can be traded more 
freely. 
To conclude, the regression findings strongly support Hypothesis 3a that spread 
widens during a short selling ban. 
6.5. Volume 
In exploring the impact of short selling bans on banking share trading activities, the 
daily turnover and the daily number of trade are used to indicate the overall trading 
activity. 
As seen from Table 6.5, regression results indicated that the daily turnover of banned 
stocks was lower than that of control stocks when the ban was imposed (lower by 
around: Australia 4.9%, Canada 7.2%, France 23.1%, Germany I [2008 ban] 9.7%, 
Germany II [2010 ban] 14.5%, Japan 4.3%, Korea 16.2%, Taiwan 3%, the UK 
28.9%, the US 11.3%, Western markets 14.6% and Asian market 8.6%). This 
reduction in turnover may have been due to the reduction in trading activities of 
banned stocks during the ban and the increase in those of control stocks.  
In Table 6.5, the adjusted R square of around 50% in turnover models (average 
across all countries) indicated a quite high explanatory power of the ban dummy on 
trading volume, but it was relatively constant with more independent variables 
entering the model. Positive coefficients persisted for market capitalisation and the 
interaction variable with ban dummy, showing that the greater the market 
capitalisation, the higher the trading activities. As discussed above, Western markets 
and Asian markets behaved similarly in relation to the ban in terms of trading 
volume.  
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Table 6.5 Two-way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Turnover  
The table reports fixed effect regression results on daily turnover in each country. The 
dependent variable of turnover is dividing the daily traded volume over the number of stock 
outstanding. Explanatory variables are ban dummy (I), market capitalisation (C) and 
multivariables of ban dummy and market capitalisation (IC). Independent variables having 
volume (V) component are not used to avoid extreme R square issue. Ban dummy (I) is the 
dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock is on the ban list and in a ban period, and 0 otherwise. 
Market capitalisation (C) is the stock daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated 
after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way 
fixed effect regression at the stock level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables 
are added one by one to the base model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.1770 param 0.372*** -0.030
51504      0.1770 t (7.09) (-1.35)
51504      0.1786 param 0.391*** -0.049** 0.012***
51504      0.1786 t (7.45) (-2.22) (9.86)
51504      0.1788 param 0.391*** 0.011 0.013*** 0.003***
51504      0.1788 t (7.46) (0.38) (10.08) (3.44)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.2493 param 0.299*** -0.072**
20231      0.2493 t (16.46) (-1.99)
20231      0.2510 param 0.253*** -0.029* 0.010***
20231      0.2510 t (17.11) (-1.85) (6.69)
20231      0.2510 param 0.253*** -0.247 0.010*** 0.005
20231      0.2510 t (17.12) (-1.15) (6.74) (1.10)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.5986 param 0.242*** -0.189***
4827      0.5986 t (24.10) (-8.63)
4827      0.6008 param 0.256*** -0.189*** 0.005***
4827      0.6008 t (24.39) (-8.63) (5.04)
4827      0.6012 param 0.258*** -0.231*** 0.005*** 0.001**
4827      0.6012 t (24.44) (-8.00) (5.12) (2.24)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.4943 param 0.583*** -0.095***
14938      0.4943 t (7.35) (-3.91)
14938      0.4948 param 0.602*** -0.097*** 0.002***
14938      0.4948 t (7.58) (-4.01) (3.69)
14938      0.4966 param 0.600*** 0.024 0.002*** 0.014***
14938      0.4966 t (7.56) (0.80) (3.18) (7.29)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.5512 param 0.726*** -0.129***
4032      0.5512 t (11.74) (-4.31)
4032      0.5515 param 0.796*** -0.134*** 0.006*
4032      0.5515 t (10.51) (-4.46) (1.71)
4032      0.5515 param 0.794*** -0.145*** 0.006 0.001
4032      0.5515 t (10.47) (-3.65) (1.56) (0.43)
Turnover
Turnover
Germany I (2008)
Germany II (2010)
Turnover
France
Canada
Australia
Turnover
Turnover
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.6875 param 0.656*** -0.099***
11571      0.6875 t (4.91) (-10.08)
11571      0.6908 param 0.720*** -0.043*** 0.000***
11571      0.6908 t (5.29) (-3.87) (10.88)
11571      0.6953 param 0.744*** 0.015 0.000*** 0.000***
11571      0.6953 t (5.32) (1.29) (14.42) (13.05)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.4926 param 0.574*** -0.222***
7308      0.4926 t (4.44) (-4.69)
7308      0.4961 param 0.873*** -0.140*** 0.000***
7308      0.4961 t (6.43) (-2.89) (7.03)
7308      0.4961 param 0.867*** -0.162*** 0.000*** 0.000
7308      0.4961 t (6.38) (-2.97) (6.78) (0.87)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.6220 param 0.301*** -0.021***
10187      0.6220 t (9.66) (-3.15)
10187      0.6220 param 0.301*** -0.029*** 0.000***
10187      0.6220 t (9.65) (-3.14) (3.18)
10187      0.6220 param 0.301*** -0.03** 0.000*** 0.000***
10187      0.6220 t (9.65) (-2.70) (2.88) (3.11)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.3536 param 0.403*** -0.245***
21847      0.3536 t (16.23) (-7.02)
21847      0.3566 param 0.498*** -0.241*** 0.013***
21847      0.3566 t (16.20) (-6.92) (10.05)
21847      0.3567 param 0.498*** -0.289*** 0.013*** 0.002*
21847      0.3567 t (16.19) (-6.59) (10.21) (1.81)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.5809 param 0.179*** -0.080***
15678      0.5809 t (7.41) (-8.13)
15678      0.5886 param 0.196*** -0.073*** 0.003***
15678      0.5886 t (8.17) (-7.43) (17.09)
15678      0.5906 param 0.198*** -0.113*** 0.004*** 0.002***
15678      0.5906 t (8.27) (-10.38) (18.68) (8.47)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.2913 param 0.827*** -0.138***
133057      0.2913 t (7.90) (-12.36)
133057      0.2923 param 0.863*** -0.135*** 0.005***
133057      0.2923 t (8.25) (-12.06) (14.26)
133057      0.2924 param 0.864*** -0.146*** 0.005*** 0.001
133057      0.2924 t (8.25) (-10.89) (14.33) (1.52)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.6098 param 0.596*** -0.156***
29066     0.6098 t (21.07) (-14.23)
29066     0.6227 param 0.762*** -0.091*** 0.000***
29066     0.6227 t (23.61) (-8.28) (3.11)
29066     0.6227 param 0.764*** -0.086*** 0.000*** 0.001
29066     0.6227 t (23.62) (-7.37) (3.25) (1.28)
Taiwan
UK
Japan
Korea
Turnover
Turnover
Turnover
Turnover
Asian Market
Turnover
Turnover
Western Market
Turnover
US
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As shown in Table 6.6, number of trade obviously performed very similarly as daily 
turnover (Table 6.5). For example, the last section of Table 6.6 reports significant 
negative ban dummy coefficient in Asian markets, meaning that when the ban was 
introduced, daily number of trade decreased significantly, compared to control 
stocks. 
Table 6.6 Two-way Fixed Effect Panel Regression: Number of Trade. 
The table reports fixed effect regression results on Number of trade in each country. The 
dependent variable of Number of trade is the daily number of share traded 1,000 measurement 
units. Explanatory variables are ban dummy (I), market capitalisation (C) and multivariables of 
ban dummy and market capitalisation (IC). Independent variables having volume (V) 
component are not used to avoid extreme R square issue. Ban dummy (I) is the dummy 
variable which equals 1 if a stock is on the ban list and in a ban period, and 0 otherwise. Market 
capitalisation (C) is the stock daily market capitalisation value. Statistics are calculated after 
data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Estimates are obtained by OLS with two-way fixed 
effect regression at the stock level. Independent variables and interaction multivariables are 
added one by one to the base model to do the robustness check. The rows of ‗param‘ show 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics in parenthesis marked with *, ** and *** denote statistically 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
51504      0.8574 param 1433.4*** -906.3***
51504      0.8574 t (17.71) (-26.90)
51504      0.8580 param 1475.6*** -949.2*** 27.30***
51504      0.8580 t (18.26) (-28.11) (14.30)
51504      0.8618 param 1480.9*** -930.8 32.29*** 56.51***
51504      0.8618 t (18.57) (-30.73) (17.10) (3.29)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
20231      0.8268 param 2359*** -339***
20231      0.8268 t (53.99) (-11.00)
20231      0.8419 param 2581*** -260*** 233.1***
20231      0.8419 t (60.95) (-8.11) (43.65)
20231      0.8420 param 2585*** -157*** 233.8*** 43.661***
20231      0.8420 t (60.97) (-5.53) (43.73) (2.59)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4827      0.7448 param 2566.4*** -1707***
4827      0.7448 t (15.50) (-7.26)
4827      0.7481 param 2789.2*** -1698*** 74.95***
4827      0.7481 t (15.98) (-7.27) (7.82)
4827      0.7484 param 2813.5*** -2184*** 75.85*** 16.622**
4827      0.7484 t (16.03) (-7.08) (7.91) (2.41)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
14938      0.6885 param 2460.5*** -86.94
14938      0.6885 t (6.08) (-0.70)
14938      0.6937 param 2045.2*** -33.62 52.955***
14938      0.6937 t (5.09) (-0.27) (15.60)
14938      0.6939 param 2038.6*** -68.43* 53.806*** 34.86***
14938      0.6939 t (5.07) (-1.80) (15.82) (3.59)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
4032      0.7475 param 3986.6*** -714.2***
4032      0.7475 t (12.02) (-4.46)
4032      0.7476 param 3616.1*** -687.5*** 32.139
4032      0.7476 t (8.90) (-4.27) (1.58)
4032      0.7484 param 3700.8*** -498.2 25.066 44.99***
4032      0.7484 t (9.11) (-0.93) (1.23) (3.51)
Australia
No. of Trade
Canada
France
No. of Trade
No. of Trade
No. of Trade
Germany II (2010)
Germany I (2008)
No. of Trade
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Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
11571      0.9207 param 3067.9*** -219.3***
11571      0.9207 t (81.04) (-19.53)
11571      0.9265 param 3260.8*** -147.71*** 30.190
11571      0.9265 t (88.12) (-23.90) (1.30)
11571      0.9269 param 3277.0*** -148.701*** 30.206 30.101***
11571      0.9269 t (88.66) (-33.66) (1.06) (7.89)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
7308      0.6780 param 1146.2*** -184***
7308      0.6780 t (12.34) (-11.47)
7308      0.6931 param 1144.1*** -167*** 40.474
7308      0.6931 t (17.85) (-6.93) (0.70)
7308      0.6946 param 1997.5*** -114*** 40.450 30.596***
7308      0.6946 t (17.59) (-8.84) (1.51) (5.82)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
10187      0.6980 param 593.96*** -50.591***
10187      0.6980 t (37.14) (-8.65)
10187      0.6981 param 591.98*** -49.337*** 30.046*
10187      0.6981 t (36.93) (-8.37) (1.77)
10187      0.6983 param 592.01*** -63.901*** 30.045* 20.565***
10187      0.6983 t (36.95) (-8.44) (1.72) (3.06)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
21847      0.7887 param 3853.34*** -392***
21847      0.7887 t (3.72) (-27.15)
21847      0.7917 param 3824.07*** -366*** 76.68***
21847      0.7917 t (3.62) (-27.13) (17.81)
21847      0.7918 param 3824.78*** -329*** 75.49*** 15.853
21847      0.7918 t (3.63) (-20.63) (17.25) (1.54)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
15678      0.8153 param 4528.5*** -1288***
15678      0.8153 t (10.96) (-7.62)
15678      0.8201 param 4866.2*** -1136*** 70.23***
15678      0.8201 t (11.92) (-6.80) (20.26)
15678      0.8217 param 4914.3*** -2062*** 80.25*** 38.846***
15678      0.8217 t (12.09) (-11.18) (22.55) (11.62)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
133057      0.8098 param 3535*** -354***
133057      0.8098 t (29.36) (-29.69)
133057      0.8129 param 3011*** -309*** 65.55***
133057      0.8129 t (30.72) (-28.93) (46.42)
133057      0.8129 param 3016*** -437*** 66.40*** 26.507***
133057      0.8129 t (30.73) (-26.47) (46.57) (4.28)
Measures Obs Adj R
2
_NAME_ Constant I V C IV IC
29066     0.7800 param 1884.3*** -698.2***
29066     0.7800 t (10.01) (-16.75)
29066     0.8029 param 2010.7*** -258.8*** 30.654***
29066     0.8029 t (14.67) (-6.44) (5.81)
29066     0.8032 param 2989.0*** -338.7*** 30.644*** 30.239***
29066     0.8032 t (14.60) (-7.94) (5.25) (5.56)
UK
Japan
Korea
No. of Trade
No. of Trade
Taiwan
No. of Trade
No. of Trade
US
No. of Trade
No. of Trade
Asian Market
No. of Trade
Western Market
 
A significant element of lowered trading activity is the mechanical impacts of 
bearish investors being forced out of the market, even including hedge fund and 
proprietary trade desk, which are not formal market markers but actually provide a 
substantial amount of liquidity through shorting.  
The financial turmoil during the 2008 ban period also influenced the significantly 
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decreased trading activity of banned stocks, evidenced by the consistent panel 
regression results across time and firms. This shows that short selling transactions 
were a considerable part of the trading of affected stocks. Upon ban lifting, the 
opposite happened to both groups of stocks due to the opposite action of investors. In 
summary, the regression results support Hypothesis 3b that the trading activity is 
lower during the ban. 
6.6. Result Summary 
The overall panel regression findings are summarised in Table 6.7, which also shows 
if the results support the hypotheses. 
Table 6.7 Regression Result Summary 
This table presents regression result summary regarding abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask 
spread and trading volume in nine countries, Western markets and Asian markets. In each 
category of measures, the table clarifies whether the empirical results are consistent with the 
hypothesis. The ‗Up‘ and ‗Down‘ arrows show whether the coefficient of ban dummy is 
positive or negative when regressed against various measures The ‗Tick‘ and ‗Cross‘ mean the 
overall results in a specific country are consistent with the hypotheses or against the hypotheses 
respectively. This is the overall conclusion based on two-way fixed effect panel regression 
results. 
Country
Initial 
Ban Scope
AUS All √ ↑ √ ↓ √ ↑ √ ↓
JPN All √ ↑ √ ↓ √ ↑ √ ↓
KOR All √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
TW All √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
CAD 13 √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
FRA 15 √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
GER1 11 √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
GER2 10 √ ↑ √ ↓ √ ↑ √ ↓
UK 35 × ↓ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
US 829 √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
Asian All √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
Western 913 √ ↑ × ↑ √ ↑ √ ↓
Spread Volume
Abnormal 
Return
Volatility
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6.7. Conclusion 
We found that short selling bans were consistent with general perceptions of the 
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impact on abnormal return, bid-ask spread and trading volume in all countries under 
study.  
When short selling was restricted, banned stocks experienced a significant increase 
in abnormal return in all countries except the UK. Upon the lifting of the ban, the 
abnormal return of banned stocks decreased significantly. 
As for volatility, findings in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban] supported 
Hypothesis 2 that banned stocks decreased in volatility when a ban was imposed and 
decreased further after the ban was lifted. However, the rest of the countries did not 
demonstrate this expected outcome since volatility increased during the ban. 
As expected, observations in each country showed that spread widened and trading 
volume decreased significantly for banned stocks when the ban was introduced. 
Spread tightened and trading volume increased for banned stocks when short selling 
was subsequently allowed. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to examine if short selling bans had a significant 
impact on banking stocks‘ abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread and trading 
volume in nine countries. The previous five chapters have addressed these research 
issues.  
In Chapter 1, four hypotheses are proposed to answer the questions: 
Hypothesis 1: Banned stocks have greater abnormal return when significant short 
selling bans are imposed.  
Hypothesis 2: Volatility in banned stocks decreases when short selling bans are 
imposed.  
Hypothesis 3a: Banned stocks have wider spread while bans are imposed.  
Hypothesis 3b: Banned stocks have lower trading activity after short selling bans are 
introduced.  
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the performance of banking stocks 
between Western markets and Asian markets due to short selling bans.  
Chapter 2 offers an overview of short selling definition, arguments and usage 
worldwide. Chapter 3 provides an extensive review of the existing literature relating 
to short selling bans. The methodology is outlined in Chapter 4. Findings and 
detailed analysis are provided in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents conclusions in the 
light of empirical results and the literature review. The contribution of the thesis is 
stated and future research avenues are suggested at the end of Chapter 6. 
7.2. Findings 
In this thesis, empirical evidence of the impact of short selling bans is provided on 
the performance of banking stocks in nine countries during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Four hypotheses are tested on the effects on banking shares, including abnormal 
return, realised volatility, bid ask spread and trading activity. The results are mostly 
consistent with the hypotheses and the literature. However, the findings are more 
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rigorous than most other studies because this study applies comprehensive testing 
methods, multiple measures and better coverage of pre-ban, ban and post-ban 
periods. 
The thesis characterises share abnormal return as market adjusted return and 
cumulative abnormal return. Realised volatility is used to measure stock volatility 
level. Bid-ask spread is used as a proxy for liquidity. Trading volume and turnover 
are considered proxies for trading activity. 
The literature on the effects of restrictions on short selling suggests that, other things 
being equal, a ban period is expected to have higher banned stock abnormal return, 
lower volatility, wider spread and lower trading activity in the market. 
7.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Banned stocks have greater abnormal return when short 
selling bans are imposed. 
On examining the results of bans, it was found that the impact of short selling bans 
on abnormal return are in line with general perceptions in all countries except the 
UK. 
Abnormal return for banned stocks increased significantly when bans were imposed 
in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the US, Western 
markets and Asian markets. After bans were lifted, abnormal return decreased. Both 
Asian markets and Western markets are consistent with the hypothesis on abnormal 
return. Although the opposite pattern was found in the UK, it is insignificant. 
In theory, abnormal return should increase during short selling bans because 
pessimistic investors and arbitrageurs are forced to stay out of the market and cannot 
short sell to push down the price any more (Kolasinksi et al., 2009). Therefore, 
abnormal return would be enhanced by optimistic investors. 
7.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Volatility in banned stocks decreases when short selling 
bans are imposed. 
As for volatility, the findings for bans in Australia, Japan and Germany II [2010 ban] 
supported the hypothesis that banned stocks decrease in volatility when a ban is 
imposed. These banned stocks behaved quite similarly to the control group. On the 
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other hand, the opposite pattern regarding the reaction of realised volatility was 
found in Canada, France, Germany I [2008 ban], Korea, Taiwan, the UK, the US and 
Western and Asian markets. This pattern of volatility is similar to the empirical 
finding of Boehmer et al. (2008c) that the volatility of banned stocks increased 
during a ban period and decreased after the ban was lifted. This was not the expected 
outcome because it was expected that volatility would increase when banned stocks 
were subsequently allowed to be traded without restriction.  
Miller‘s (1977) theory is that volatility decreases when short selling is banned 
because pessimistic traders with bearish views can no longer participate in short 
selling and only ‗normal‘ trading activities are allowed, while demand and supply are 
forced to balance to restore any semblance of stability to the market. Needless to say, 
the extreme stock performances and extraordinary market fluctuations in banking 
shares during the financial crisis period make it hard to isolate the impact of short 
selling restriction. 
7.2.3. Hypothesis 3a: Banned stocks have wider spread while ban are 
imposed.  
Hypothesis 3b: Banned stocks have lower trading activity after short 
selling bans are introduced. 
This thesis confirms theoretical predictions on bid-ask spread. Strong evidence of 
widening bid-ask spread is found for both banned banking stocks and control stocks 
while short selling restrictions were in effect in all countries. The widening of spread 
was more significant in banned stocks than control stocks, which was the expected 
outcome because it is banned stocks which experience the direct impact of short 
selling restrictions. Spread tightened upon lifting of the ban. This is consistent with 
previous research (Hansson and Rudowfors, 2009). 
The hypothesis that trading activity decreases when investors with a pessimistic 
view leave the market is validated. The volume of trade and daily turnover for 
banned stocks decreased significantly following the imposition of a ban and 
increased after the removal of the ban in all countries. Both Asian and Western 
markets are consistent with general perceptions on trading volume as well. 
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In theory, liquidity decreases when short selling is banned because investors are not 
allowed to short sell any longer, hence leading to fewer trades (Miller 1977). 
Lowered trading activity therefore cause a widened bid-ask spread and reduced 
trading volume and turnover. 
7.2.4. Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the performance of 
banking stocks between Western markets and Asian markets due to 
short selling bans. 
This thesis provides an empirical investigation into the comparison between Western 
markets and Asian markets on their reaction direction to short selling bans. Some 
differences between the two markets are attributable to market microstructure 
characteristics, geographical difference and behavioural finance issues. There is no 
previous research on this comparison (Reed, 2007). The evidence does not show any 
significant difference in the influence of short selling bans between the two markets 
in terms of abnormal return, volatility, bid-ask spread and trading volume of banking 
stock, which is in line with the hypotheses. This could be due to the fact that the 
financial crisis was globalised and the overall world economy was affected almost in 
the same manner. 
7.3. Summary of Contributions 
This thesis makes four contributions to the existing literature. 
1. There have been numerous studies on short selling bans due to the 2008 
financial turmoil. However, most of them only use daily data to investigate the 
econometric significance of the bans, and daily data may not provide sufficient 
accuracy (Arnold et al., 2005). Therefore this thesis contributes to the field 
through using ultra high frequency tick by tick stock market data to assess the 
impacts of short selling bans on the banking share characteristics of abnormal 
return, realised volatility, spread and trading volume. This kind of ultra high 
frequency data provides more precise coverage of trading details and enables 
more realistic measurement and analysis of the results than previous empirical 
research.  
This contribution is strengthened by the use of a comprehensive regression 
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testing method (both fixed effect and random effect regression) and the 
Hausman test to select the most suitable one (fixed effect model) in each country 
to verify the impact of a short selling ban on banking stock performance. To date, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is no application of random effect regression 
to test the impact of short selling bans. In previous studies, fixed effect 
regression is most frequently used (Beber and Pagano, 2010).  
2. The second contribution is in undertaking a thorough assessment of the 
comparison of market behaviour in Western markets and Asian markets in 
regard to the impact of short selling restrictions. This area has never been 
touched by previous researchers (Reed, 2007). Although short selling bans were 
introduced in many countries following the 2008 financial crisis, the 
well-documented previous studies on short selling mainly rely on data from 
developed countries such as the UK and the US (Boehmer et al., 2008c) and 
these empirical results do not necessarily extend to other markets. This provides 
a strong motivation for a study of short selling in emerging markets. 
3. The third contribution provides guidance to regulators, investors and market 
participants for a deeper understanding of the appropriateness of short selling 
bans on banking stocks. This thesis carries out a comprehensive analysis on 
short selling ban effects on banking shares prior to, during and after a ban. 
Banks are important because they lubricate the whole economy and facilitate 
capital flow (Moosa, 2010). The failure of banks can bring terrible 
consequences to other sectors (Moosa, 2010). The banking sector suffered more 
severely than other sectors from the 2008 financial turmoil following the 
Lehman Brothers collapse. Due to the significant collapse in the banking sector, 
regulators imposed shorting bans to calm the market during the crisis period.  
Existing literature on short selling generally focuses on the general share market 
and the banking sector is never studied specifically (Clifton and Michayluk, 
2010). Studying the banking sector specifically therefore gives a better 
understanding of the implications of a ban. Collectively, the evidence suggests 
that short selling constraints bring degradation to market quality worldwide. It is 
certainly possible for regulators to claim that a shorting ban is for stabilising the 
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market. It seems that the answer to whether it is effective remains inconclusive. 
4. Finally, the study thoroughly examines the impact of short selling bans on 
market-wide characteristics. Despite extensive discussion on the impact of a 
short selling ban on individual stocks, discussion on the market-wide reaction is 
still limited (Boehmer et al., 2008a). When we consider aggregate market 
reaction, diversification may dilute a regulator‘s initial purpose for imposing a 
short selling ban. It is worth noting that the volatility of banned banking shares 
was not reduced in many countries when a ban was imposed – which is not in 
line with the initial hypothesis. Hence, this research contributes through 
investigation of the aggregate market reaction to short selling bans. 
7.4. Future Research 
While the research in this PhD thesis has carried out the first investigation on several 
fronts into short selling bans, some new questions have arisen from the insights. 
They suggest additional studies focusing on the following points. 
An additional avenue of future study stems from the empirical side. It is obvious that 
the similar studies can be extended to other countries by employing other time 
periods.  
The evidence that volatility increases when a ban is imposed bears further 
investigation, even though other characteristics such as abnormal return, spread and 
trading volume support the hypotheses. On the other hand, the increase of volatility 
can not be explained by conventional finance theory and contradicts the regulators‘ 
initial goal of introducing short selling bans for market stabilisation. 
The comparison of the impacts of short selling bans between the general Western 
markets and the general Asian markets has been done in this thesis and showed very 
similar direction of reaction but with different levels in terms of abnormal return, 
volatility, spread and trade volume. Further studies on this difference would be 
worthwhile, taking into account other factors, for instance, culture difference, 
political factors and the application of behavioural finance.  
Further analysis of options could also be worthwhile because even though bearish 
investors cannot short sell during a short selling ban, they may use options to achieve 
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their purpose, which may dilute the goal of the ban. However, due to the complicity 
of the derivatives market and investors‘ unique investment strategies, investors 
would normally be very cautious about trading options, so the effect of options on a 
short selling ban might therefore not be very significant. 
The scope and type of bans are different in different countries, for instance, a naked 
ban and a covered ban. This thesis does a comparison in general among markets. 
However, a comparative study based on each type of ban could be useful. 
7.5. Closing Comments 
With regard to the regulators‘ goals for short selling bans, I do not find any evidence 
of protection of market liquidity or smoothing of market condition. On the contrary, 
the results present a considerable deterioration in market liquidity measured by 
widened bid-ask spread and decreased trading volume. The market condition was 
also severely compromised given the evidence of higher realised volatility in many 
countries. Whether there would have been more bankrupt banks had the restrictions 
not been imposed is impossible to determine. The blame for the financial turmoil 
was shifted from the banks to the short sellers. It is not clear that the regulators 
achieved their unstated purpose of artificially increasing banking share price but it is 
a fact that market quality suffered a severe degradation. The manipulation of 
shorting activities is a risk for banking shares during a financial crisis. 
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APPENDIX  
Table I Stock List 
This table presents all the sample companies used in this thesis, including banking stocks that 
were subject to short selling ban and control stocks in each country. The stock name 
demonstrated is Reuters Identification Code, ending with the short cut of its related listing stock 
exchange. 
1 ANZ .AX 1 AAX .AX 31 IIF .AX 61 AP N.AX 91 S UN.AX 121 J B H.AX 151 C AB .AX
2 B E N.AX 2 AB C .AX 32 L L C .AX 62 B L D.AX 92 T T S .AX 122 MG R .AX 152 C R G .AX
3 B OQ.AX 3 AB P .AX 33 R HC .AX 63 C F X .AX 93 AS X .AX 123 NWS .AX 153 G F F .AX
4 C B A.AX 4 AG K .AX 34 S MX .AX 64 E X T .AX 94 B P T .AX 124 P P X .AX 154 IF L .AX
5 MOC .AX 5 AG O.AX 35 T OL .AX 65 G WT .AX 95 C OH.AX 125 S G M.AX 155 K C N.AX
6 NAB .AX 6 AIO.AX 36 WOR .AX 66 MAH.AX 96 DOW.AX 126 T AH.AX 156 MML .AX
7 R HG .AX 7 AIX .AX 37 B HP .AX 67 MT S .AX 97 F L T .AX 127 WAN.AX 157 OR I.AX
8 R OK .AX 8 AL L .AX 38 C E U.AX 68 P DN.AX 98 HIL .AX 128 AWB .AX 158 P T M.AX
9 WB B .AX 9 AL S .AX 39 C T X .AX 69 R MD.AX 99 MC C .AX 129 B WP .AX 159 S HL .AX
10 WB C .AX 10 AL Z .AX 40 E S G .AX 70 S R L .AX 100 NC M.AX 130 F X J .AX 160 T E L .AX
11 AMC .AX 41 G P T .AX 71 T R S .AX 101 P NA.AX 131 HV N.AX 161 WE C .AX
12 AMP .AX 42 IL U.AX 72 WS A.AX 102 S DL .AX 132 J HX .AX 162 AX A.AX
13 B B G .AX 43 L NC .AX 73 AQA.AX 103 UG L .AX 133 MG X .AX 163 E NV .AX
14 C C L .AX 44 R IO.AX 74 B L Y .AX 104 AUN.AX 134 OMH.AX 164 G MG .AX
15 C S L .AX 45 S P N.AX 75 C G F .AX 105 B S L .AX 135 P R U.AX 165 K Z L .AX
16 E QN.AX 46 T P I.AX 76 DJ S .AX 106 C P A.AX 136 S G P .AX 166 MMX .AX
17 G NC .AX 47 WOW.AX 77 F G L .AX 107 DUE .AX 137 T AL .AX 167 OS H.AX
18 IG O.AX 48 AP A.AX 78 HDF .AX 108 F MG .AX 138 AWC .AX 168 QAN.AX
19 L E I.AX 49 B K N.AX 79 IR E .AX 109 HS P .AX 139 B X B .AX 169 S IP .AX
20 MND.AX 50 C E Y .AX 80 MAP .AX 110 IV C .AX 140 E HL .AX 170 T E N.AX
21 OS T .AX 51 C V N.AX 81 R OC .AX 111 MC R .AX 141 G B G .AX 171 WE S .AX
22 QB E .AX 52 E WC .AX 82 S T O.AX 112 NUF .AX 142 IAG .AX
23 S K I.AX 53 G UD.AX 83 T S E .AX 113 P P T .AX 143 K AR .AX
24 T L S .AX 54 IOF .AX 84 WT F .AX 114 S E K .AX 144 MIN.AX
25 WHC .AX 55 L Y C .AX 85 AQP .AX 115 V B A.AX 145 OR G .AX
26 ANN.AX 56 MR M.AX 86 C HC .AX 116 AV O.AX 146 P R Y .AX
27 C DU.AX 57 P B G .AX 87 F K P .AX 117 B T A.AX 147 S G T .AX
28 C S R .AX 58 R IV .AX 88 MB N.AX 118 C P U.AX 148 T C L .AX
29 E R A.AX 59 S P T .AX 89 P L A.AX 119 F WD.AX 149 WDC .AX
30 G NS .AX 60 WP L .AX 90 S B M.AX 120 HS T .AX 150 AWE .AX
1 C M.T O 1 C U.T O 29 QB R b.T O 57 S C .T O 85 AG U.T O 113 C NQ.T O 141 F G L .T O
2 B MO.T O 2 QL T .T O 30 R C Ib.T O 58 E MA.T O 86 MB T .T O 114 S .T O 142 T DG .T O
3 T D.T O 3 AAH.T O 31 R US .T O 59 S L W.T O 87 AV M.T O 115 E L D.T O 143 F T S .T O
4 B NS .T O 4 AB X .T O 32 E C A.T O 60 E S I.T O 88 B C B .T O 116 S J R b.T O 144 T NX .T O
5 R Y .T O 5 C WB .T O 33 S G F .T O 61 S V Y .T O 89 C AS .T O 117 E QN.T O 145 G IL .T O
6 R B I.T O 34 E NB .T O 62 T C W.T O 90 C G .T O 118 S U.T O 146 HC G .T O
7 R E T a.T O 35 S S O.T O 63 T IH.T O 91 C L S .T O 119 F E L .T O 147 V T .T O
8 DIIb.T O 36 T A.T O 64 G C .T O 92 P OT .T O 120 T C L a.T O 148 AG F b.T O
9 S AP .T O 37 F T T .T O 65 T R P .T O 93 DW.T O 121 T HI.T O 149 AT A.T O
10 E L R .T O 38 T R I.T O 66 G WO.T O 94 S C C .T O 122 G AM.T O 150 MF I.T O
11 S V M.T O 39 WF T .T O 67 UUU.T O 95 S NC .T O 123 UE X .T O 151 NA.T O
12 F E S .T O 40 IMG .T O 68 IAG .T O 96 F S V .T O 124 HS E .T O 152 NG X .T O
13 T C M.T O 41 Y R I.T O 69 K .T O 97 T L M.T O 125 WN.T O 153 C AE .T O
14 F R G .T O 42 AC E b.T O 70 L NR .T O 98 G IB a.T O 126 IMO.T O 154 NX Y .T O
15 T F I.T O 43 K R Y .T O 71 ANP .T O 99 T R Z b.T O 127 AC Ox.T O 155 C F P .T O
16 G B U.T O 44 AG I.T O 72 MDS .T O 100 HB M.T O 128 L B .T O 156 C NR .T O
17 T R E .T O 45 MB .T O 73 B V F .T O 101 IG M.T O 129 MDA.T O 157 P WF .T O
18 G S C .T O 46 AT Db.T O 74 NV A.T O 102 X .T O 130 MR E .T O 158 AR E .T O
19 UT S .T O 47 MG a.T O 75 C C L b.T O 103 L UN.T O 131 B C E .T O 159 HR G .T O
20 IV N.T O 48 B B Db.T O 76 P AA.T O 104 B AMa.T O 132 B P O.T O 160 J AG .T O
21 AE M.T O 49 NK O.T O 77 P S I.T O 105 MX .T O 133 OP C .T O 161 E G U.T O
22 MDI.T O 50 OC X .T O 78 S T N.T O 106 B L D.T O 134 C G S .T O 162 ML .T O
23 MR Ua.T O 51 C F W.T O 79 T C K b.T O 107 NG .T O 135 P OU.T O 163 T IM.T O
24 NB D.T O 52 C L L .T O 80 F M.T O 108 B WR .T O 136 C P .T O 164 B IR .T O
25 C C A.T O 53 C OM.T O 81 G .T O 109 C C O.T O 137 R ON.T O 165 C R .T O
26 OT C .T O 54 C T C a.T O 82 WJ A.T O 110 P B G .T O 138 S C L a.T O 166 B NK .T O
27 C MT .T O 55 R IM.T O 83 IMN.T O 111 C J R b.T O 139 E MP a.T O 167 NG D.T O
28 P OW.T O 56 DML .T O 84 AC Ma.T O 112 P J C a.T O 140 T .T O 168 R B A.T O
1 B NP P .P A 1 AC C P .P A 7 B OUY .P A 13 C AR R .P A 19 P R T P .P A 25 E S S I.P A 31 L V MH.P A
2 C AG R .P A 2 AIR F .P A 8 L AG A.P A 14 P E R P .P A 20 R E NA.P A 26 S C HN.P A 32 T OT F .P A
3 S OG N.P A 3 AIR P .P A 9 V L L P .P A 15 S G E F .P A 21 E AD.P A 27 F T E .P A 33 L AF P .P A
4 C NAT .P A 4 AL UA.P A 10 C AP P .P A 16 P E UP .P A 22 S G OB .P A 28 S T M.P A 34 UNB P .P A
5 DE X I.P A 5 AL S O.P A 11 MIC P .P A 17 V IV .P A 23 E DF .P A 29 OR E P .P A
6 C C .P A 6 MT P .P A 12 V IE .P A 18 DANO.P A 24 S AS Y .P A 30 L Y OE .P A
7 HB C .P A
Aus tralia
C anada
B anned S toc k C ontrol S toc k
B anned S toc k C ontrol S toc k
B anned S toc k
F ranc e
C ontrol S toc k
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1 CBKG.DE 1 ADSG.DE 6 LING.DE 11 DAIGn.DE 16 RWEG.DE 21 TKAG.DE 26 FREG_p.DE
2 DBKGn.DE 2 FMEG.DE 7 MANG.DE 12 MEOG.DE 17 DB1Gn.DE 22 DTEGn.DE 27 VOWG_p.DE
3 ARLG.DE 3 HNKG_p.DE 8 CONG.DE 13 VOWG.DE 18 SAPG.DE 23 SDFG.DE 28 HEIG.DE
4 DPBGn.DE 4 BMWG.DE 9 MRCG.DE 14 MUVGn.DE 19 LHAG.DE 24 BEIG.DE
5 IFXGn.DE 10 TUIGn.DE 15 DPWGn.DE 20 SIEGn.DE 25 SZGG.DE
1 CBKG.DE 1 ADSG.DE 6 LING.DE 11 DAIGn.DE 16 RWEG.DE 21 TKAG.DE 26 FREG_p.DE
2 DBKGn.DE 2 FMEG.DE 7 MANG.DE 12 MEOG.DE 17 DB1Gn.DE 22 DTEGn.DE 27 VOWG_p.DE
3 ARLG.DE 3 HNKG_p.DE 8 CONG.DE 13 VOWG.DE 18 SAPG.DE 23 SDFG.DE 28 HEIG.DE
4 DPBGn.DE 4 BMWG.DE 9 MRCG.DE 14 MUVGn.DE 19 LHAG.DE 24 BEIG.DE
5 IFXGn.DE 10 TUIGn.DE 15 DPWGn.DE 20 SIEGn.DE 25 SZGG.DE
1 8303.T 16 8338.T 1 2914.T 16 4502.T 31 8360.T 46 8388.T 61 8418.T
2 8304.T 17 8339.T 2 5401.T 17 9984.T 32 8361.T 47 8390.T 62 8521.T
3 8308.T 18 8341.T 3 7203.T 18 6752.T 33 8362.T 48 8392.T 63 8529.T
4 8309.T 19 8342.T 4 9020.T 19 7974.T 34 8363.T 49 8393.T 64 8536.T
5 8316.T 20 8343.T 5 3382.T 20 8604.T 35 8364.T 50 8394.T 65 8542.T
6 8324.T 21 8344.T 6 5411.T 21 9437.T 36 8367.T 51 8395.T 66 8543.T
7 8325.T 22 8345.T 7 7267.T 22 4503.T 37 8368.T 52 8396.T 67 8544.T
8 8327.T 23 8346.T 8 9432.T 23 6758.T 38 8369.T 53 8397.T 68 8545.T
9 8328.T 24 8349.T 9 4063.T 24 8058.T 39 8374.T 54 8399.T 69 8550.T
10 8331.T 25 8350.T 10 6501.T 25 8766.T 40 8377.T 55 8403.T 70 8551.T
11 8332.T 26 8354.T 11 7751.T 26 9501.T 41 8379.T 56 8404.T 71 8558.T
12 8333.T 27 8355.T 12 7201.T 27 4901.T 42 8381.T 57 8409.T 72 8562.T
13 8334.T 28 8356.T 13 8591.T 28 6301.T 43 8385.T 58 8411.T 73 8563.T
14 8336.T 29 8358.T 14 9433.T 29 8031.T 44 8386.T 59 8415.T
15 8337.T 30 8359.T 15 8802.T 30 4568.T 45 8387.T 60 8416.T
1 005280.KS 11 006220.KS 1 000210.KS 11 003600.KS 21 053000.KS 31 009150.KS 41 012330.KS
2 024110.KS 12 005270.KS 2 000270.KS 12 004170.KS 22 005940.KS 32 034020.KS 42 042660.KS
3 024100.KS 13 006350.KS 3 000660.KS 13 005380.KS 23 055550.KS 33 086790.KS 43 012630.KS
4 007200.KS 4 000720.KS 14 016360.KS 24 006360.KS 34 009540.KS 44 042670.KS
5 004940.KS 5 000810.KS 15 047050.KS 25 030200.KS 35 034220.KS 45 015760.KS
6 025610.KS 6 000830.KS 16 005490.KS 26 006400.KS 36 096770.KS 46 003550.KS
7 016560.KS 7 001040.KS 17 017670.KS 27 066570.KS 37 010140.KS 47 004020.KS
8 031920.KQ 8 001740.KS 18 051910.KS 28 006800.KS 38 035250.KS 48 011200.KS
9 007330.KQ 9 002380.KS 19 005930.KS 29 033780.KS 39 010950.KS
10 007800.KS 10 003490.KS 20 023530.KS 30 078930.KS 40 036460.KS
1 2801.TW 1 1101.TW 10 2303.TW 18 2325.TW 26 2353.TW 34 2887.TW 42 2454.TW
2 2809.TW 2 1102.TW 11 2308.TW 19 2880.TW 27 2883.TW 35 8046.TW 43 2892.TW
3 2812.TW 3 1216.TW 12 2311.TW 20 2330.TW 28 2354.TW 36 2408.TW 44 2474.TW
4 2834.TW 4 1301.TW 13 2317.TW 21 2881.TW 29 2885.TW 37 2888.TW 45 2912.TW
5 2836.TW 5 1303.TW 14 2498.TW 22 3474.TW 30 2357.TW 38 9904.TW 46 1722.TW
6 2838.TW 6 1326.TW 15 3009.TW 23 2347.TW 31 2886.TW 39 2409.TW 47 2603.TW
7 2845.TW 7 1402.TW 16 2324.TW 24 2882.TW 32 6505.TW 40 2890.TW 48 3231.TW
8 2847.TW 8 2002.TW 17 3034.TW 25 3481.TW 33 2382.TW 41 2891.TW 49 2105.TW
9 2849.TW 9 2301.TW
10 5854.TW
1 BARC.L 1 AAL.L 19 BG.L 37 TLW.L 55 MKS.L 73 HMSO.L 91 PFC.L
2 EIIB.L 2 CPG.L 20 VED.L 38 NG.L 56 CBRY.L 74 BSY.L 92 ISYS.L
3 HSBA.L 3 IPR.L 21 PSN.L 39 CNA.L 57 DGE.L 75 XTA.L 93 DRX.L
4 ISLB.L 4 PSON.L 22 SMIN.L 40 JMAT.L 58 TSCO.L 76 AZN.L 94 FXPO.L
5 LLOY.L 5 SHP.L 23 RDSb.L 41 DSGI.L 59 RTO.L 77 TATE.L 95 ISA.L
6 RBS.L 6 ABF.L 24 LII.L 42 BAY.L 60 IHG.L 78 MRW.L 96 AUTN.L
7 STAN.L 7 CPI.L 25 GSK.L 43 ULVR.L 61 KAZ.L 79 IAP.L 97 SGC.L
8 ITV.L 26 BLT.L 44 SAB.L 62 EMG.L 80 CCL.L 98 SRP.L
9 PUB.L 27 WPP.L 45 IMT.L 63 BDEV.L 81 LSE.L 99 AML.L
10 CPW.L 28 SGE.L 46 LAND.L 64 UU.L 82 AMEC.L 100 RRS.L
11 DMGOa.L 29 ANTO.L 47 EXPN.L 65 SBRY.L 83 CNE.L 101 PNN.L
12 BATS.L 30 RIO.L 48 VOD.L 66 RDSa.L 84 TCG.L 102 BALF.L
13 TW.L 31 MAB.L 49 SN.L 67 BLND.L 85 TT.L 103 ITRK.L
14 NXT.L 32 HOME.L 50 REL.L 68 WOS.L 86 FGP.L 104 FRCL.L
15 III.L 33 BT.L 51 BP.L 69 SDRt.L 87 GFS.L
16 RB.L 34 YELL.L 52 WTB.L 70 SSE.L 88 COB.L
17 KGF.L 35 CW.L 53 SVT.L 71 REX.L 89 WG.L
18 ETI.L 36 BAES.L 54 RR.L 72 LMI.L 90 BNZL.L
1 AF.N 19 FBC.N 37 SNV.N 1 AA.N 20 MMM.N 39 HPQ.N 58 TXN.N
2 AIB.N 20 FBP.N 38 STI.N 2 PFE.N 21 CBS.N 40 ATI.N 59 F.N
3 BAC.N 21 FHN.N 39 STL.N 3 PG.N 22 PEP.N 41 KO.N 60 HAL.N
4 BBT.N 22 FNB.N 40 TCB.N 4 ABT.N 23 ROK.N 42 MO.N 61 BAX.N
5 BBX.N 23 IRE.N 41 USB.N 5 COP.N 24 CVX.N 43 RTN.N 62 CAT.N
6 BCA.N 24 JPM.N 42 VLY.N 6 HNZ.N 25 TGT.N 44 DD.N 63 CVS.N
7 BCS.N 25 KEY.N 43 WAL.N 7 AEP.N 26 ETR.N 45 TWX.N 64 T.N
8 BLX.N 26 LYG.N 44 WBS.N 8 LTD.N 27 VZ.N 46 EXC.N 65 EP.N
9 BNS.N 27 MTU.N 45 WFC.N 9 CL.N 28 XRX.N 47 JNJ.N 66 UTX.N
10 BOH.N 28 NYB.N 46 WL.N 10 COV.N 29 AES.N 48 MDT.N 67 XOM.N
11 BXS.N 29 OFG.N 11 SLB.N 30 IP.N 49 NSC.N 68 NOV.N
12 C.N 30 ONB.N 12 DIS.N 31 BA.N 50 SO.N 69 MA.N
13 CBC.N 31 PFS.N 13 TYC.N 32 MCD.N 51 EMC.N 70 OXY.N
14 CBU.N 32 PNC.N 14 FDX.N 33 CPB.N 52 WY.N 71 LMT.N
15 CFR.N 33 RBS.N 15 WMB.N 34 SLE.N 53 IBM.N 72 LOW.N
16 CMA.N 34 RF.N 16 HD.N 35 DOW.N 54 AVP.N 73 DVN.N
17 CPF.N 35 RY.N 17 HON.N 36 UPS.N 55 BMY.N 74 NKE.N
18 DB.N 36 SHG.N 18 KFT.N 37 GD.N 56 MRK.N 75 WAG.N
19 BHI.N 38 WMT.N 57 S.N
Banned Stock
US
Banned Stock
Banned Stock Control Stock
UK
Control Stock
Banned Stock
Banned Stock
Taiwan
Control Stock
Germany I (2008)
Control Stock
Germany II (2010)
Banned Stock Control Stock
Japan
Control Stock
Korea
Banned Stock Control Stock
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Table II Descriptive Statistics: Each Banned Stock 
The table shows descriptive statistics of each individual banned stock in the sample, in pre-ban, ban 
and post-ban periods and percentage change of market adjusted return, cumulative abnormal return 
(250-day pre-event window), realized volatility, bid-ask spread, turnover and Number of trades. 
Market Adjusted Return (MAR) is the difference between the actual return and the market index 
return on any given day calculated from tick data. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is the 
difference between the stock actual return and the expected return calculated from tick data on any 
given day by applying OLS parameters estimated from 250-day pre-event period window and the 
index return. Realized volatility is the sum of squared tick return during a day. Spread is the daily 
Trade-Weighted-Relative-Effective-Spread which is twice the difference between tick trading price 
and its prevailing midpoint quote divided by the midpoint quote, weighted by its number of traded 
shares to the daily sum. Turnover is dividing the daily traded volume over the number of stock 
outstanding. Number of trade is the daily number of trade figure in 1,000 measurement unit. Statistics 
are calculated after data cleaning and removal of any outliers. Statistics are presented for three periods: 
90-day prior to the ban (Pre-ban), Ban period and 90-day after the ban was lifted (Post-ban). Columns 
of ‗pre-ban. ‗ban‘ and ‗post-ban‘ show equally weighted average value of each banned stock in the 
referred period. In the ‗% Change‘ column, statistics represent the measure‘s percentage change 
between periods in its adjacent columns. 
stock pre-ban %change ban %change post-ban
CAR(250-d) -0.93 -32.62% -0.63 -46.21% -0.34
MAR -1.08 -27.48% -0.79 -44.10% -0.44
Volatility 2.69 -39.52% 1.63 -37.25% 1.02
Spread 0.38 6.26% 0.40 -23.16% 0.31
Turnover 0.71 -41.15% 0.42 31.53% 0.55
No. of trade 10808.02 -28.75% 7700.91 35.63% 10444.76
CAR(250-d) -0.27 32.94% -0.36 -60.21% -0.14
MAR -0.24 39.78% -0.34 -81.56% -0.06
Volatility 0.52 66.36% 0.87 -52.58% 0.41
Spread 0.46 31.63% 0.61 -38.80% 0.37
Turnover 0.34 -28.14% 0.24 83.17% 0.44
No. of trade 2243.18 -34.08% 1478.80 35.30% 2000.80
CAR(250-d) 0.01 -2165.08% -0.29 -189.11% 0.25
MAR -0.06 532.34% -0.35 -138.23% 0.13
Volatility 0.42 91.23% 0.80 -55.78% 0.35
Spread 0.53 8.72% 0.57 -32.79% 0.38
Turnover 0.27 0.78% 0.27 26.37% 0.34
No. of trade 1448.15 -25.22% 1082.93 44.56% 1565.43
CAR(250-d) 0.15 -301.57% -0.29 -112.42% 0.04
MAR 0.04 -1002.08% -0.40 -93.07% -0.03
Volatility 0.73 31.26% 0.96 -57.71% 0.41
Spread 0.34 6.04% 0.36 -20.56% 0.29
Turnover 0.46 -27.37% 0.33 1.87% 0.34
No. of trade 9913.95 -18.06% 8123.96 23.43% 10027.56
CAR(250-d) 0.94 -49.79% 0.47 123.67% 1.06
MAR 0.41 -111.49% -0.05 -648.21% 0.26
Volatility 0.37 -31.69% 0.25 -22.27% 0.20
Spread 1.50 72.64% 2.59 -62.26% 0.98
Turnover 0.12 -40.08% 0.07 161.03% 0.18
No. of trade 69.85 -73.21% 18.71 302.04% 75.24
CAR(250-d) -1.05 -74.46% -0.27 -51.93% -0.13
MAR -1.15 -66.75% -0.38 -59.90% -0.15
Volatility 1.71 -14.64% 1.46 -50.54% 0.72
Spread 0.35 5.15% 0.37 -10.83% 0.33
Turnover 0.69 -44.39% 0.38 36.89% 0.53
No. of trade 11569.29 -35.07% 7511.58 43.08% 10747.60
CAR(250-d) 0.85 100.54% 1.69 -35.35% 1.10
MAR -0.11 -752.13% 0.74 -65.62% 0.25
Volatility 1.06 -46.34% 0.57 -61.39% 0.22
Spread 3.50 -12.95% 3.05 -60.95% 1.19
Turnover 0.40 -36.99% 0.25 -12.04% 0.22
No. of trade 46.80 -29.29% 33.10 95.92% 64.84
CAR(250-d) -0.02 -381.32% 0.06 712.94% 0.51
MAR -0.09 -182.09% 0.07 264.45% 0.26
Volatility 0.10 14.34% 0.12 -37.66% 0.07
Spread 3.36 7.18% 3.60 7.86% 3.89
Turnover 0.03 -0.16% 0.03 -30.83% 0.02
No. of trade 4.02 -12.36% 3.53 -25.64% 2.62
CAR(250-d) 0.09 -165.60% -0.06 -790.79% 0.43
MAR 0.04 -378.70% -0.10 -279.10% 0.18
Volatility 0.03 168.62% 0.08 -25.90% 0.06
Spread 1.11 54.33% 1.72 -21.51% 1.35
Turnover 0.05 -28.88% 0.04 -28.09% 0.03
No. of trade 14.26 -26.03% 10.55 -20.60% 8.38
CAR(250-d) -0.81 -39.10% -0.49 -61.07% -0.19
MAR -0.85 -37.19% -0.53 -59.85% -0.21
Volatility 2.11 -45.54% 1.15 -44.30% 0.64
Spread 0.42 3.56% 0.44 -18.84% 0.35
Turnover 0.61 -42.40% 0.35 -4.42% 0.34
No. of trade 10773.19 -23.09% 8285.12 14.50% 9486.20
ANZ.AX
ROK.AX
WBB.AX
BEN.AX
BOQ.AX
RHG.AX
WBC.AX
CBA.AX
MOC.AX
NAB.AX
Australia
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stock pre-ban %change ban %change post-ban
CAR(250-d) 0.85 -133.77% -0.29 -19.82% -0.23
MAR 0.68 -152.02% -0.35 26.62% -0.44
Volatility 0.13 257.92% 0.47 24.53% 0.58
Spread 0.10 129.95% 0.24 -1.38% 0.23
Turnover 0.58 1.78% 0.59 1.33% 0.60
No. of trade 10287.91 -23.01% 7920.38 36.29% 10794.74
CAR(250-d) 0.26 10.78% 0.29 -287.64% -0.55
MAR 0.30 53.52% 0.47 -219.40% -0.56
Volatility 0.11 465.39% 0.60 -12.16% 0.53
Spread 0.08 195.48% 0.24 -20.39% 0.19
Turnover 0.35 24.81% 0.44 -5.00% 0.41
No. of trade 10542.61 -5.20% 9994.33 36.68% 13660.16
CAR(250-d) 0.56 -45.24% 0.31 -43.24% 0.17
MAR 0.32 -29.07% 0.23 -150.31% -0.11
Volatility 0.15 1000.36% 1.60 -71.01% 0.46
Spread 0.08 112.14% 0.17 -3.35% 0.17
Turnover 0.70 -14.56% 0.60 7.45% 0.64
No. of trade 9981.59 -32.42% 6745.23 42.32% 9599.98
CAR(250-d) 0.41 119.84% 0.91 -131.88% -0.29
MAR 0.34 163.70% 0.91 -141.94% -0.38
Volatility 0.13 329.45% 0.56 -20.97% 0.44
Spread 0.07 113.75% 0.16 9.13% 0.17
Turnover 0.38 48.93% 0.56 -14.10% 0.48
No. of trade 14041.96 -0.08% 14031.42 35.20% 18970.90
CAR(250-d) 0.23 234.73% 0.78 -148.51% -0.38
MAR 0.24 308.34% 1.00 -143.91% -0.44
Volatility 0.11 337.26% 0.50 -12.74% 0.44
Spread 0.09 120.18% 0.20 -10.47% 0.18
Turnover 0.44 22.31% 0.54 -6.77% 0.50
No. of trade 12082.18 -15.60% 10197.00 43.93% 14676.74
stock pre-ban %change ban
CAR(250-d) 0.19 -668.94% -1.08
MAR 0.26 -539.07% -1.16
Volatility 0.26 314.80% 1.07
Spread 0.08 122.97% 0.17
Turnover 0.66 3.58% 0.69
No. of trade 19552.51 11.22% 21747.08
CAR(250-d) 0.22 -313.99% -0.46
MAR 0.08 -1068.39% -0.77
Volatility 0.67 58.44% 1.07
Spread 0.13 41.97% 0.18
Turnover 0.55 -35.53% 0.36
No. of trade 11064.21 -6.52% 10342.54
CAR(250-d) -0.26 -174.12% 0.20
MAR -0.50 -144.89% 0.22
Volatility 0.09 112.45% 0.19
Spread 1.32 24.98% 1.65
Turnover 0.00 256.03% 0.00
No. of trade 12.94 85.78% 24.05
CAR(250-d) -1.30 65.63% -2.16
MAR -1.50 72.41% -2.59
Volatility 1.63 157.59% 4.21
Spread 0.28 118.37% 0.61
Turnover 0.61 -30.05% 0.42
No. of trade 6627.71 -16.49% 5534.54
CAR(250-d) 0.14 -1325.06% -1.70
MAR -0.07 2814.31% -2.07
Volatility 0.49 193.55% 1.43
Spread 0.21 62.44% 0.34
Turnover 0.54 -50.46% 0.27
No. of trade 4841.23 -33.77% 3206.31
CAR(250-d) 0.41 -214.32% -0.47
MAR 0.38 -218.55% -0.45
Volatility 0.11 122.36% 0.24
Spread 0.31 44.64% 0.44
Turnover 0.00 443.26% 0.00
No. of trade 42.23 78.85% 75.52
CAR(250-d) 0.41 -247.86% -0.61
MAR 0.17 -659.35% -0.96
Volatility 0.53 152.42% 1.34
Spread 0.10 99.07% 0.20
Turnover 0.88 -5.70% 0.83
No. of trade 16125.17 -0.82% 15993.29
France
BMO.TO
BNS.TO
CM.TO
Canada
BNPP.P
CAGR.P
CC.PA
CNAT.P
DEXI.P
HBC.PA
SOGN.P
TD.TO
RY.TO
 
 130 
stock pre-ban %change ban %change post-ban
CAR(250-d) 0.18 24.63% 0.22 65.00% 0.37
MAR -0.08 -74.17% -0.02 -1158.18% 0.21
Volatility 0.25 170.58% 0.67 -79.28% 0.14
Spread 0.25 112.26% 0.53 -62.66% 0.20
Turnover 0.79 -19.51% 0.64 21.06% 0.77
No. of trade 747.39 -37.16% 469.69 86.61% 876.49
CAR(250-d) -0.25 73.14% -0.44 -66.19% -0.15
MAR -0.33 53.10% -0.51 -79.79% -0.10
Volatility 0.34 132.66% 0.78 -85.75% 0.11
Spread 0.09 110.21% 0.19 -44.81% 0.10
Turnover 1.53 -22.80% 1.18 -25.30% 0.88
No. of trade 7417.82 -24.61% 5591.95 -21.36% 4397.46
CAR(250-d) 0.26 -114.75% -0.04 -589.69% 0.19
MAR 0.13 -225.33% -0.17 -152.22% 0.09
Volatility 0.20 143.50% 0.48 -81.65% 0.09
Spread 0.06 62.74% 0.09 -20.71% 0.07
Turnover 1.62 -24.15% 1.23 -17.16% 1.02
No. of trade 14491.40 1.82% 14754.89 -21.00% 11655.71
CAR(250-d) -0.79 -55.57% -0.35 -75.32% -0.09
MAR -0.64 -69.57% -0.19 -143.81% 0.08
Volatility 0.23 63.90% 0.38 -81.59% 0.07
Spread 0.11 95.21% 0.22 -42.74% 0.12
Turnover 1.47 -69.82% 0.44 -38.21% 0.27
No. of trade 5078.84 -64.02% 1827.35 -19.51% 1470.81
stock pre-ban %change ban
CAR(250-d) -0.23 -48.12% -0.12
MAR 0.02 118.95% 0.05
Volatility 0.14 -26.48% 0.11
Spread 0.22 34.71% 0.29
Turnover 0.74 -47.93% 0.39
No. of trade 905.15 -43.30% 513.25
CAR(250-d) -0.10 -352.77% 0.24
MAR -0.09 -289.42% 0.17
Volatility 0.12 -31.58% 0.08
Spread 0.11 -2.67% 0.11
Turnover 0.96 -33.14% 0.64
No. of trade 4750.50 -14.49% 4062.31
CAR(250-d) -0.02 -791.34% 0.16
MAR -0.05 -206.74% 0.06
Volatility 0.11 -21.96% 0.08
Spread 0.09 -3.40% 0.09
Turnover 1.11 -21.31% 0.87
No. of trade 13003.65 -12.33% 11399.83
CAR(250-d) -0.04 178.46% -0.12
MAR 0.00 1970.89% -0.09
Volatility 0.08 0.83% 0.08
Spread 0.13 18.15% 0.16
Turnover 0.30 -29.17% 0.22
No. of trade 1568.76 -26.98% 1145.52
Germany II (2010)
ARLG.DE
CBKG.DE
DBKGn.DE
DBKGn.DE
DPBGn.DE
ARLG.DE
CBKG.DE
DPBGn.DE
Germany I (2008)
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stock pre-ban %change ban stock pre-ban %change ban
CAR(250-d) -0.93 -2.14% -0.91 CAR(250-d) 0.01 3548.24% 0.47
MAR -0.93 -2.50% -0.91 MAR 0.10 358.11% 0.46
Volatility 1.04 36.16% 1.41 Volatility 0.34 -34.31% 0.22
Spread 0.45 58.91% 0.72 Spread 0.32 9.39% 0.35
Turnover 0.63 -23.65% 0.48 Turnover 0.34 -6.49% 0.31
No. of trade 997.91 -25.41% 744.30 No. of trade 347.98 -9.50% 314.93
CAR(250-d) -2.07 -66.32% -0.70 CAR(250-d) 0.23 20.23% 0.28
MAR -2.07 -63.26% -0.76 MAR 0.33 3.87% 0.35
Volatility 1.71 33.82% 2.29 Volatility 0.34 -26.98% 0.25
Spread 0.69 64.72% 1.14 Spread 0.31 -1.70% 0.31
Turnover 0.34 22.20% 0.42 Turnover 0.17 -21.56% 0.13
No. of trade 549.11 -1.63% 540.18 No. of trade 324.63 -14.77% 276.67
CAR(250-d) 0.47 155.32% 1.19 CAR(250-d) 0.42 -204.31% -0.44
MAR 0.09 1017.92% 0.98 MAR 0.32 -263.79% -0.52
Volatility 0.54 -55.24% 0.24 Volatility 0.43 -39.26% 0.26
Spread 0.12 8.85% 0.13 Spread 0.34 22.89% 0.42
Turnover 1.02 -55.28% 0.46 Turnover 0.46 -8.16% 0.43
No. of trade 2854.80 -17.91% 2343.52 No. of trade 431.48 -17.80% 354.68
CAR(250-d) -0.15 -408.63% 0.47 CAR(250-d) 0.31 185.16% 0.88
MAR -0.52 -159.87% 0.31 MAR 0.05 1091.00% 0.55
Volatility 0.58 -7.12% 0.54 Volatility 0.49 -37.53% 0.31
Spread 0.23 42.39% 0.32 Spread 0.23 5.06% 0.24
Turnover 0.88 -39.30% 0.53 Turnover 0.56 -23.65% 0.42
No. of trade 1241.39 -21.31% 976.81 No. of trade 700.11 -17.99% 574.18
CAR(250-d) -0.53 -41.58% -0.31 CAR(250-d) 0.02 987.11% 0.23
MAR -0.84 -53.70% -0.39 MAR 0.14 79.38% 0.25
Volatility 0.76 54.01% 1.17 Volatility 0.25 -27.30% 0.18
Spread 0.18 57.41% 0.28 Spread 0.24 15.95% 0.27
Turnover 1.11 -4.32% 1.06 Turnover 0.37 -25.51% 0.28
No. of trade 2561.96 -1.36% 2527.04 No. of trade 469.36 -21.68% 367.61
CAR(250-d) 0.21 -24.75% 0.16 CAR(250-d) 0.36 -49.22% 0.18
MAR 0.47 -44.64% 0.26 MAR 0.67 -62.01% 0.26
Volatility 0.18 -24.35% 0.13 Volatility 0.19 -46.39% 0.10
Spread 0.31 17.49% 0.36 Spread 0.38 -2.67% 0.37
Turnover 0.14 -30.61% 0.10 Turnover 0.14 -0.21% 0.14
No. of trade 219.30 -21.66% 171.81 No. of trade 134.21 -3.21% 129.91
CAR(250-d) 0.10 -153.92% -0.06 CAR(250-d) 0.51 -68.01% 0.16
MAR 0.43 -90.80% 0.04 MAR 0.66 -72.61% 0.18
Volatility 0.24 -11.38% 0.22 Volatility 0.22 -45.65% 0.12
Spread 0.58 10.97% 0.64 Spread 0.40 -2.72% 0.39
Turnover 0.10 4.77% 0.11 Turnover 0.11 0.13% 0.11
No. of trade 122.70 -2.41% 119.74 No. of trade 122.09 -13.78% 105.26
CAR(250-d) -0.15 -257.16% 0.23 CAR(250-d) 0.52 -94.86% 0.03
MAR -0.07 -586.79% 0.33 MAR 0.86 -85.81% 0.12
Volatility 0.46 -21.92% 0.36 Volatility 0.14 -61.01% 0.05
Spread 0.44 15.33% 0.51 Spread 0.32 -16.68% 0.27
Turnover 0.27 -40.15% 0.16 Turnover 0.13 -26.04% 0.09
No. of trade 377.21 -17.62% 310.74 No. of trade 136.96 -27.01% 99.96
CAR(250-d) 0.03 321.75% 0.14 CAR(250-d) 0.49 -100.18% 0.00
MAR -0.09 -78.28% -0.02 MAR 0.80 -94.17% 0.05
Volatility 0.29 -4.63% 0.28 Volatility 0.12 -41.47% 0.07
Spread 0.25 34.57% 0.34 Spread 0.27 1.69% 0.27
Turnover 0.26 -15.19% 0.22 Turnover 0.16 -9.90% 0.15
No. of trade 382.57 12.80% 431.54 No. of trade 168.04 -14.53% 143.61
CAR(250-d) 0.32 29.96% 0.42 CAR(250-d) 0.39 -76.65% 0.09
MAR 0.29 17.05% 0.34 MAR 0.64 -67.10% 0.21
Volatility 0.47 -43.45% 0.27 Volatility 0.17 -21.01% 0.14
Spread 0.21 12.90% 0.24 Spread 0.36 11.23% 0.41
Turnover 0.65 -34.94% 0.43 Turnover 0.10 -4.66% 0.09
No. of trade 1010.80 -25.77% 750.30 No. of trade 125.73 -1.84% 123.42
CAR(250-d) 0.16 -4.95% 0.16 CAR(250-d) 0.04 527.98% 0.28
MAR 0.19 -17.70% 0.15 MAR 0.35 -9.27% 0.32
Volatility 0.52 -48.98% 0.27 Volatility 0.31 -54.98% 0.14
Spread 0.21 10.85% 0.24 Spread 0.90 -4.04% 0.86
Turnover 0.72 -36.50% 0.46 Turnover 0.12 -43.80% 0.07
No. of trade 1199.91 -24.86% 901.56 No. of trade 49.29 -39.49% 29.82
CAR(250-d) 0.69 -49.24% 0.35 CAR(250-d) 0.21 -92.11% 0.02
MAR 0.64 -51.45% 0.31 MAR 0.40 -98.10% 0.01
Volatility 0.22 -28.42% 0.16 Volatility 0.36 -63.83% 0.13
Spread 0.25 2.59% 0.26 Spread 0.67 2.28% 0.69
Turnover 0.31 -32.70% 0.21 Turnover 0.10 -40.09% 0.06
No. of trade 500.48 -15.03% 425.26 No. of trade 78.63 -42.07% 45.54
CAR(250-d) 0.06 614.76% 0.41 CAR(250-d) 0.27 57.13% 0.42
MAR 0.25 66.03% 0.42 MAR 0.11 123.78% 0.24
Volatility 0.25 -18.41% 0.21 Volatility 0.49 -33.84% 0.32
Spread 0.22 9.65% 0.25 Spread 0.31 8.06% 0.34
Turnover 0.30 -12.24% 0.26 Turnover 0.47 -26.66% 0.35
No. of trade 462.48 -5.67% 436.26 No. of trade 690.89 -17.82% 567.75
Japan
8325.T
8327.T
8341.T
8342.T
8303.T
8304.T
8308.T
8309.T
8316.T
8324.T
8336.T
8337.T
8338.T
8339.T
8343.T
8344.T
8345.T
8346.T
8349.T
8350.T
8331.T
8332.T
8333.T
8328.T
8334.T 8354.T
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CAR(250-d) 0.21 67.70% 0.36 CAR(250-d) -0.01 -3080.58% 0.24
MAR 0.53 -21.01% 0.42 MAR 0.28 27.33% 0.36
Volatility 0.25 -25.15% 0.18 Volatility 0.41 -55.37% 0.18
Spread 0.16 13.35% 0.18 Spread 0.61 -15.44% 0.51
Turnover 0.33 -21.33% 0.26 Turnover 0.13 -23.14% 0.10
No. of trade 742.29 -12.85% 646.91 No. of trade 122.39 -14.76% 104.33
CAR(250-d) 0.29 96.99% 0.58 CAR(250-d) -0.18 -261.29% 0.29
MAR 0.32 49.07% 0.47 MAR 0.19 112.34% 0.41
Volatility 0.25 -42.19% 0.15 Volatility 0.21 -26.06% 0.16
Spread 0.31 7.32% 0.33 Spread 0.38 4.06% 0.40
Turnover 0.15 -38.35% 0.09 Turnover 0.14 -19.91% 0.11
No. of trade 223.68 -28.91% 159.02 No. of trade 153.32 -18.80% 124.49
CAR(250-d) 0.34 -108.45% -0.03 CAR(250-d) 0.52 -4.39% 0.50
MAR 0.48 -93.73% 0.03 MAR 0.38 -9.08% 0.35
Volatility 0.31 -31.76% 0.21 Volatility 0.20 -35.84% 0.13
Spread 0.18 18.24% 0.21 Spread 0.24 11.29% 0.27
Turnover 0.53 -21.72% 0.42 Turnover 0.37 -42.16% 0.22
No. of trade 625.78 -21.64% 490.37 No. of trade 392.57 -27.42% 284.95
CAR(250-d) 0.08 301.69% 0.31 CAR(250-d) 0.00 -28669.86% 0.56
MAR 0.17 62.50% 0.27 MAR -0.33 -242.69% 0.48
Volatility 0.21 -21.89% 0.16 Volatility 0.50 -7.24% 0.47
Spread 0.22 22.35% 0.27 Spread 0.19 32.89% 0.25
Turnover 0.23 -26.48% 0.17 Turnover 0.74 -24.67% 0.56
No. of trade 413.96 -26.31% 305.07 No. of trade 1523.59 -21.46% 1196.65
CAR(250-d) 0.35 -28.90% 0.25 CAR(250-d) -0.36 72.78% -0.62
MAR 0.49 -53.23% 0.23 MAR -0.63 11.07% -0.70
Volatility 0.17 -12.71% 0.15 Volatility 1.76 -14.90% 1.50
Spread 0.33 8.58% 0.36 Spread 0.74 26.27% 0.94
Turnover 0.15 -30.56% 0.10 Turnover 0.28 -48.50% 0.14
No. of trade 158.98 -23.31% 121.93 No. of trade 648.13 -34.13% 426.89
CAR(250-d) 0.16 -98.49% 0.00 CAR(250-d) -0.43 -236.70% 0.59
MAR 0.40 -84.28% 0.06 MAR -0.07 -1130.82% 0.72
Volatility 0.20 -32.02% 0.14 Volatility 0.40 -37.08% 0.25
Spread 0.27 20.12% 0.32 Spread 0.47 1.28% 0.47
Turnover 0.16 -24.54% 0.12 Turnover 0.24 -16.40% 0.20
No. of trade 224.86 -16.28% 188.25 No. of trade 188.11 -11.56% 166.37
CAR(250-d) 0.52 -67.98% 0.16 CAR(250-d) -0.37 -70.09% -0.11
MAR 0.78 -70.01% 0.23 MAR -0.90 -73.89% -0.23
Volatility 0.16 -44.65% 0.09 Volatility 1.14 19.72% 1.37
Spread 0.44 -10.67% 0.39 Spread 0.23 -18.42% 0.18
Turnover 0.11 -16.94% 0.09 Turnover 1.67 -14.57% 1.43
No. of trade 118.91 -13.99% 102.28 No. of trade 2818.62 25.16% 3527.92
CAR(250-d) 0.74 -90.09% 0.07 CAR(250-d) 0.28 -154.14% -0.15
MAR 0.79 -105.71% -0.04 MAR 0.34 -166.79% -0.23
Volatility 0.18 -20.10% 0.14 Volatility 0.59 -41.82% 0.34
Spread 0.33 16.93% 0.38 Spread 1.39 8.78% 1.52
Turnover 0.20 -20.24% 0.16 Turnover 0.08 7.73% 0.08
No. of trade 243.68 -16.71% 202.96 No. of trade 59.96 -17.73% 49.33
CAR(250-d) 0.16 79.58% 0.28 CAR(250-d) -0.38 50.93% -0.58
MAR 0.47 -12.51% 0.41 MAR -0.12 353.79% -0.54
Volatility 0.23 -36.84% 0.15 Volatility 0.88 -8.24% 0.81
Spread 0.28 -4.84% 0.26 Spread 1.52 18.23% 1.80
Turnover 0.18 -11.84% 0.16 Turnover 0.12 10.39% 0.13
No. of trade 234.21 -14.71% 199.75 No. of trade 83.32 -15.90% 70.07
CAR(250-d) 0.33 -82.55% 0.06 CAR(250-d) -0.27 -115.24% 0.04
MAR 0.66 -66.46% 0.22 MAR -0.13 -64.41% -0.05
Volatility 0.26 -48.24% 0.14 Volatility 0.80 -50.09% 0.40
Spread 0.36 2.49% 0.37 Spread 1.49 15.20% 1.72
Turnover 0.18 -20.34% 0.14 Turnover 0.21 -27.64% 0.15
No. of trade 150.70 -0.46% 150.00 No. of trade 65.93 -33.63% 43.75
CAR(250-d) 0.29 17.06% 0.34 CAR(250-d) 0.26 109.15% 0.55
MAR 0.44 -22.43% 0.34 MAR 0.49 23.59% 0.60
Volatility 0.20 -48.07% 0.10 Volatility 0.17 -7.55% 0.16
Spread 0.46 -0.62% 0.46 Spread 0.42 4.41% 0.44
Turnover 0.23 -62.93% 0.08 Turnover 0.26 -11.51% 0.23
No. of trade 152.52 -53.22% 71.35 No. of trade 172.68 -22.12% 134.47
CAR(250-d) 0.47 -62.54% 0.18 CAR(250-d) 0.42 61.83% 0.69
MAR 0.60 -69.83% 0.18 MAR 0.49 48.65% 0.73
Volatility 0.24 -48.27% 0.12 Volatility 0.14 -37.64% 0.09
Spread 0.28 16.22% 0.32 Spread 1.20 53.63% 1.85
Turnover 0.14 -25.93% 0.10 Turnover 0.01 -50.58% 0.00
No. of trade 166.34 -13.59% 143.74 No. of trade 5.46 -31.82% 3.72
CAR(250-d) 0.32 -27.28% 0.23 CAR(250-d) 0.33 -136.72% -0.12
MAR 0.47 -46.22% 0.25 MAR 0.54 -101.48% -0.01
Volatility 0.25 -26.23% 0.19 Volatility 0.19 -7.55% 0.17
Spread 0.57 -16.58% 0.48 Spread 0.25 23.84% 0.31
Turnover 0.12 9.79% 0.13 Turnover 0.15 -16.01% 0.13
No. of trade 117.45 19.89% 140.81 No. of trade 209.73 -10.64% 187.42
8356.T
8358.T
8359.T
8360.T
8363.T
8364.T
8367.T
8355.T 8396.T
8397.T
8411.T
8563.T
8558.T
8368.T
8390.T
8361.T
8362.T
8562.T
8399.T
8403.T
8404.T
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8394.T
8395.T
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stock pre-ban %change ban stock pre-ban %change ban
CAR(250-d) 0.48 -75.83% 0.12 CAR(250-d) 0.45 -134.97% -0.16
MAR 0.62 -81.51% 0.11 MAR 0.75 -109.57% -0.07
Volatility 0.21 -20.83% 0.17 Volatility 0.20 -49.63% 0.10
Spread 0.17 16.79% 0.20 Spread 0.45 3.42% 0.47
Turnover 0.47 -30.03% 0.33 Turnover 0.07 11.23% 0.08
No. of trade 647.39 -19.62% 520.39 No. of trade 75.55 7.60% 81.30
CAR(250-d) -0.06 -33.36% -0.04 CAR(250-d) -0.21 -177.57% 0.16
MAR 0.22 -94.85% 0.01 MAR 0.04 571.58% 0.30
Volatility 0.17 -10.88% 0.15 Volatility 0.43 -40.90% 0.25
Spread 0.38 11.46% 0.42 Spread 0.55 24.99% 0.69
Turnover 0.22 -39.34% 0.14 Turnover 0.15 -55.68% 0.07
No. of trade 172.14 -29.52% 121.33 No. of trade 148.98 -49.81% 74.77
CAR(250-d) 0.16 -88.79% 0.02 CAR(250-d) 0.37 -25.66% 0.28
MAR 0.16 -112.90% -0.02 MAR 0.67 -51.58% 0.32
Volatility 0.55 -18.84% 0.44 Volatility 0.28 -65.98% 0.10
Spread 0.49 11.62% 0.55 Spread 1.01 -30.94% 0.70
Turnover 0.29 -40.24% 0.17 Turnover 0.05 8.91% 0.05
No. of trade 462.73 -15.78% 389.72 No. of trade 34.64 -2.21% 33.88
CAR(250-d) 0.44 6.57% 0.47 CAR(250-d) -0.45 -267.28% 0.76
MAR 0.40 -11.79% 0.36 MAR -0.28 -371.17% 0.75
Volatility 0.31 -37.05% 0.20 Volatility 0.43 -55.07% 0.19
Spread 0.29 12.52% 0.33 Spread 1.57 -14.85% 1.33
Turnover 0.41 -58.10% 0.17 Turnover 0.01 -5.97% 0.00
No. of trade 485.30 -37.05% 305.51 No. of trade 8.76 -37.56% 5.47
CAR(250-d) 0.24 -64.93% 0.08 CAR(250-d) 0.24 -49.88% 0.12
MAR 0.44 -72.47% 0.12 MAR 0.42 -57.68% 0.18
Volatility 0.16 -19.58% 0.13 Volatility 0.28 -32.86% 0.19
Spread 0.30 5.58% 0.32 Spread 0.26 11.98% 0.30
Turnover 0.17 -26.75% 0.12 Turnover 0.34 -42.93% 0.20
No. of trade 172.79 -21.15% 136.25 No. of trade 388.00 -34.73% 253.26
CAR(250-d) 0.23 -117.76% -0.04 CAR(250-d) -0.18 -608.67% 0.93
MAR 0.59 -77.90% 0.13 MAR -0.34 -290.35% 0.64
Volatility 0.19 -36.03% 0.12 Volatility 0.53 -67.14% 0.17
Spread 0.24 -8.56% 0.22 Spread 1.20 11.86% 1.34
Turnover 0.14 4.03% 0.15 Turnover 0.02 -74.84% 0.00
No. of trade 264.79 0.60% 266.39 No. of trade 25.91 -74.36% 6.64
CAR(250-d) 0.36 -117.08% -0.06 CAR(250-d) 0.29 -101.96% -0.01
MAR 0.60 -86.42% 0.08 MAR 0.60 -79.72% 0.12
Volatility 0.18 -15.97% 0.15 Volatility 0.19 -25.38% 0.14
Spread 0.26 21.39% 0.32 Spread 0.40 -6.09% 0.38
Turnover 0.17 -36.36% 0.11 Turnover 0.18 -5.85% 0.17
No. of trade 222.07 -23.17% 170.61 No. of trade 137.52 -1.30% 135.74
CAR(250-d) 0.58 -38.88% 0.36 CAR(250-d) 0.04 910.78% 0.45
MAR 0.79 -44.96% 0.43 MAR 0.18 129.96% 0.43
Volatility 0.22 -56.42% 0.09 Volatility 0.16 -17.41% 0.13
Spread 0.44 -17.43% 0.36 Spread 0.61 -19.13% 0.50
Turnover 0.11 -24.72% 0.08 Turnover 0.10 25.15% 0.12
No. of trade 133.23 -21.31% 104.84 No. of trade 48.34 38.02% 66.72
CAR(250-d) 0.63 -90.22% 0.06
MAR 0.90 -87.56% 0.11
Volatility 0.13 -35.69% 0.08
Spread 0.27 -2.19% 0.26
Turnover 0.14 -23.58% 0.11
No. of trade 177.57 -18.48% 144.75
CAR(250-d) 0.15 -387.41% -0.42
MAR 0.57 -156.04% -0.32
Volatility 0.44 -24.90% 0.33
Spread 0.69 13.58% 0.79
Turnover 0.18 -32.55% 0.12
No. of trade 235.29 -21.42% 184.89
CAR(250-d) -0.49 -118.89% 0.09
MAR -0.15 -110.34% 0.02
Volatility 0.46 -10.56% 0.41
Spread 1.94 17.95% 2.28
Turnover 0.05 80.20% 0.10
No. of trade 15.82 67.77% 26.54
CAR(250-d) -0.19 -204.30% 0.20
MAR 0.08 295.29% 0.31
Volatility 0.19 2.73% 0.19
Spread 0.22 13.43% 0.25
Turnover 0.24 -21.42% 0.19
No. of trade 342.59 -19.60% 275.44
CAR(250-d) 0.64 -15.08% 0.54
MAR 0.64 -31.18% 0.44
Volatility 0.29 -28.89% 0.20
Spread 1.11 -9.04% 1.01
Turnover 0.06 -12.37% 0.05
No. of trade 33.27 -13.88% 28.65
8381.T
8379.T
8369.T
8374.T
8377.T
8521.T
8388.T
8385.T
8386.T
8387.T
8415.T
8416.T
8418.T
8529.T
8536.T
8542.T
8543.T
8544.T
8545.T
8550.T
8551.T
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stock pre-ban %change ban
CAR(250-d) -1.04 20.62% -1.26
MAR -0.94 11.24% -1.05
Volatility 1.35 10.01% 1.49
Spread 0.74 -30.73% 0.51
Turnover 0.42 96.81% 0.83
No. of trade 3528.43 111.79% 7472.90
CAR(250-d) -0.54 26.09% -0.68
MAR -0.52 18.03% -0.61
Volatility 0.65 45.48% 0.95
Spread 0.60 -18.88% 0.48
Turnover 0.54 171.05% 1.47
No. of trade 1537.14 205.04% 4688.94
CAR(250-d) -0.68 52.68% -1.05
MAR -0.67 41.78% -0.96
Volatility 1.03 8.15% 1.12
Spread 0.59 -22.12% 0.46
Turnover 0.70 125.08% 1.57
No. of trade 2318.26 121.58% 5136.77
CAR(250-d) -0.47 -9.36% -0.42
MAR -0.26 -58.49% -0.11
Volatility 0.29 277.79% 1.09
Spread 2.23 69.43% 3.78
Turnover 0.02 -5.44% 0.01
No. of trade 29.66 -30.03% 20.75
CAR(250-d) -0.17 7.31% -0.18
MAR -0.15 -95.36% -0.01
Volatility 0.31 87.74% 0.58
Spread 0.52 57.05% 0.81
Turnover 0.59 -26.20% 0.44
No. of trade 748.55 -7.04% 695.85
CAR(250-d) -0.29 281.02% -1.11
MAR -0.30 224.35% -0.96
Volatility 0.23 342.06% 1.04
Spread 1.14 79.46% 2.04
Turnover 0.11 82.60% 0.21
No. of trade 143.78 45.65% 209.40
CAR(250-d) -1.34 29.60% -1.74
MAR -1.23 17.72% -1.45
Volatility 2.13 13.92% 2.43
Spread 3.92 16.04% 4.55
Turnover 0.04 23.77% 0.05
No. of trade 53.07 -36.02% 33.95
CAR(250-d) -0.53 76.76% -0.93
MAR -0.80 41.15% -1.13
Volatility 0.46 232.32% 1.54
Spread 1.06 6.40% 1.13
Turnover 0.17 1272.68% 2.30
No. of trade 202.26 407.02% 1025.50
CAR(250-d) 0.08 -1296.70% -0.98
MAR -0.44 190.39% -1.28
Volatility 0.67 129.47% 1.54
Spread 4.60 9.61% 5.05
Turnover 0.16 85.93% 0.30
No. of trade 18.13 112.52% 38.52
CAR(250-d) -0.25 268.69% -0.92
MAR -0.44 96.98% -0.88
Volatility 0.41 316.19% 1.70
Spread 1.30 92.98% 2.51
Turnover 0.13 146.56% 0.33
No. of trade 108.31 8.44% 117.45
CAR(250-d) -0.58 134.59% -1.36
MAR -0.52 131.46% -1.20
Volatility 1.17 54.44% 1.81
Spread 0.61 2.88% 0.62
Turnover 0.47 137.52% 1.12
No. of trade 3609.02 134.48% 8462.31
CAR(250-d) -0.42 140.31% -1.01
MAR -0.37 123.89% -0.82
Volatility 0.40 377.37% 1.90
Spread 2.75 37.28% 3.77
Turnover 0.04 165.85% 0.11
No. of trade 28.41 113.16% 60.57
CAR(250-d) -2.12 130.15% -4.89
MAR -2.31 116.66% -4.99
Volatility 4.35 113.81% 9.30
Spread 2.80 6.50% 2.98
Turnover 0.03 402.98% 0.17
No. of trade 42.10 73.81% 73.18
Korea
005280.KS
006220.KS
006350.KS
007200.KS
007330.KQ
007800.KS
031920.KQ
004940.KS
005270.KS
016560.KS
024100.KS
024110.KS
025610.KS
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CAR(250-d) -0.21 50.11% -0.32 92.52% -0.62
MAR -0.13 87.91% -0.24 140.69% -0.57
Volatility 0.29 105.29% 0.60 -36.31% 0.38
Spread 0.79 31.49% 1.04 -34.40% 0.68
Turnover 0.00 -14.20% 0.00 25.98% 0.00
No. of trade 499.75 -3.91% 480.22 16.82% 560.98
CAR(250-d) -0.05 351.26% -0.20 83.74% -0.37
MAR 0.00 24853.58% -0.18 155.94% -0.45
Volatility 0.29 26.53% 0.37 -58.96% 0.15
Spread 0.98 29.43% 1.27 1.47% 1.28
Turnover 0.00 -25.28% 0.00 13.21% 0.00
No. of trade 105.11 -33.05% 70.37 -9.21% 63.89
CAR(250-d) -0.38 -30.28% -0.26 37.17% -0.36
MAR -0.24 -47.02% -0.13 202.84% -0.39
Volatility 0.19 76.77% 0.33 -54.89% 0.15
Spread 0.69 74.53% 1.20 -22.69% 0.93
Turnover 0.00 -0.64% 0.00 -0.10% 0.00
No. of trade 173.60 13.26% 196.61 -28.29% 140.98
CAR(250-d) -0.69 -63.60% -0.25 121.38% -0.55
MAR -0.35 -119.55% 0.07 -638.13% -0.37
Volatility 0.33 3.83% 0.34 -61.94% 0.13
Spread 0.81 10.42% 0.89 -55.08% 0.40
Turnover 0.00 12.49% 0.00 -25.51% 0.00
No. of trade 470.56 1.85% 479.25 4.66% 501.59
CAR(250-d) -0.19 98.17% -0.38 -68.39% -0.12
MAR -0.17 117.19% -0.38 -46.51% -0.20
Volatility 0.30 48.23% 0.44 -59.43% 0.18
Spread 1.07 -5.56% 1.01 -16.25% 0.84
Turnover 0.00 31.69% 0.00 -18.81% 0.00
No. of trade 157.43 -24.69% 118.56 -4.05% 113.76
CAR(250-d) -0.69 -169.80% 0.48 -163.29% -0.31
MAR -0.57 -206.97% 0.61 -166.63% -0.40
Volatility 0.43 -9.78% 0.39 -22.56% 0.30
Spread 1.41 -4.67% 1.34 8.63% 1.46
Turnover 0.00 -10.55% 0.00 -3.70% 0.00
No. of trade 100.77 -4.02% 96.72 -29.25% 68.43
CAR(250-d) -0.42 -107.60% 0.03 -872.18% -0.25
MAR -0.46 -96.95% -0.01 2281.08% -0.33
Volatility 0.21 113.25% 0.46 -52.72% 0.22
Spread 0.66 69.83% 1.12 -25.28% 0.84
Turnover 0.00 13.54% 0.00 -34.17% 0.00
No. of trade 227.70 -19.51% 183.27 -15.19% 155.43
CAR(250-d) -0.26 135.26% -0.61 -20.37% -0.49
MAR -0.12 303.00% -0.49 10.11% -0.54
Volatility 0.18 112.35% 0.39 -36.23% 0.25
Spread 0.71 88.03% 1.33 -36.21% 0.85
Turnover 0.00 -48.16% 0.00 157.07% 0.00
No. of trade 206.40 -41.53% 120.68 68.82% 203.74
CAR(250-d) -0.97 -103.22% 0.03 -3385.28% -1.03
MAR -0.91 -110.47% 0.09 -1235.10% -1.08
Volatility 0.87 -33.78% 0.58 -0.26% 0.58
Spread 2.92 47.51% 4.31 23.75% 5.33
Turnover 0.00 -24.18% 0.00 -55.43% 0.00
No. of trade 14.42 -53.60% 6.69 -53.62% 3.10
CAR(250-d) -0.66 -92.31% -0.05 1052.72% -0.58
MAR -0.42 -145.15% 0.19 -327.28% -0.43
Volatility 0.26 40.12% 0.36 -23.14% 0.28
Spread 0.68 64.81% 1.13 -39.38% 0.68
Turnover 0.00 7.80% 0.00 -29.71% 0.00
No. of trade 547.67 -11.45% 484.94 9.32% 530.13
Taiwan
2847.TW
2849.TW
5854.TW
2838.TW
2845.TW
2801.TW
2809.TW
2812.TW
2834.TW
2836.TW
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CAR(250-d) -3.61 0.42% -3.63 -7.77% -3.35
MAR -3.88 3.17% -4.00 -8.06% -3.68
Volatility 8.98 -18.26% 7.34 58.93% 11.67
Spread 0.33 46.00% 0.49 30.66% 0.64
Turnover 1.27 -55.94% 0.56 99.37% 1.12
No. of trade 15175.64 -39.02% 9253.89 54.44% 14291.94
CAR(250-d) -1.24 -31.66% -0.85 87.37% -1.59
MAR -0.68 -120.56% 0.14 -978.33% -1.24
Volatility 0.26 992.98% 2.79 -9.89% 2.52
Spread 4.95 132.76% 11.53 64.07% 18.92
Turnover 0.01 -9.89% 0.01 53.02% 0.02
No. of trade 2.67 57.93% 4.21 -40.94% 2.49
CAR(250-d) -0.16 990.57% -1.77 0.73% -1.79
MAR -0.13 1204.61% -1.76 2.73% -1.81
Volatility 0.69 359.52% 3.18 42.64% 4.54
Spread 0.17 103.80% 0.35 26.41% 0.45
Turnover 0.45 -19.23% 0.36 51.95% 0.55
No. of trade 13553.36 -9.90% 12210.92 55.02% 18929.74
CAR(250-d) -0.39 367.25% -1.84 -114.11% 0.26
MAR 0.02 -5762.24% -1.04 -205.00% 1.09
Volatility 0.14 1049.46% 1.63 58.82% 2.59
Spread 3.78 152.33% 9.55 44.32% 13.78
Turnover 0.02 47.02% 0.02 -61.29% 0.01
No. of trade 3.27 47.92% 4.84 -39.37% 2.93
CAR(250-d) -2.23 76.33% -3.93 15.89% -4.55
MAR -2.45 69.42% -4.15 13.87% -4.72
Volatility 5.84 50.73% 8.81 53.50% 13.52
Spread 0.51 21.28% 0.61 5.77% 0.65
Turnover 1.15 -53.05% 0.54 -21.01% 0.43
No. of trade 11738.55 -39.79% 7067.41 21.17% 8563.77
CAR(250-d) -3.75 9.12% -4.09 -9.65% -3.70
MAR -4.16 9.82% -4.57 -10.68% -4.08
Volatility 8.66 0.99% 8.74 54.88% 13.54
Spread 0.33 102.25% 0.67 15.01% 0.78
Turnover 0.90 -59.62% 0.36 13.47% 0.41
No. of trade 14969.62 -43.45% 8465.48 -18.82% 6872.07
CAR(250-d) -0.13 1147.79% -1.57 -27.08% -1.15
MAR -0.13 1116.66% -1.59 -29.60% -1.12
Volatility 0.77 241.71% 2.63 26.03% 3.31
Spread 0.22 84.35% 0.41 -7.04% 0.38
Turnover 0.59 -28.29% 0.42 52.27% 0.64
No. of trade 8961.41 -24.50% 6766.16 41.95% 9604.56
UK
BARC.L
EIIB.L
HSBA.L
ISLB.L
STAN.L
LLOY.L
RBS.L
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stock pre-ban %change ban %change post-ban stock pre-ban %change ban %change post-ban
CAR(250-d) 0.24 35.64% 0.32 -139.89% -0.13 CAR(250-d) 0.16 1075.38% 1.87 -125.65% -0.48
MAR 0.21 -45.79% 0.12 -204.47% -0.12 MAR 0.09 1426.36% 1.36 -134.74% -0.47
Volatility 0.19 295.34% 0.75 -58.14% 0.32 Volatility 0.31 293.28% 1.20 -47.78% 0.63
Spread 0.11 251.47% 0.38 -53.86% 0.18 Spread 0.19 194.11% 0.56 -56.24% 0.24
Turnover 0.72 -34.07% 0.48 11.15% 0.53 Turnover 0.33 44.80% 0.47 -14.77% 0.40
No. of trade 3439.78 -38.70% 2108.67 22.17% 2576.22 No. of trade 24448.82 49.86% 36638.47 -0.82% 36337.75
CAR(250-d) -0.71 -42.77% -0.41 296.77% -1.62 CAR(250-d) 0.84 -208.13% -0.91 -45.95% -0.49
MAR -0.90 -8.62% -0.82 114.56% -1.76 MAR 0.28 -770.77% -1.88 -47.90% -0.98
Volatility 0.27 400.14% 1.33 -32.96% 0.89 Volatility 0.54 620.55% 3.93 -65.77% 1.34
Spread 0.25 88.30% 0.47 87.83% 0.89 Spread 0.21 273.68% 0.79 -53.88% 0.36
Turnover 0.06 23.40% 0.08 -37.86% 0.05 Turnover 0.82 -26.64% 0.60 -19.42% 0.49
No. of trade 1081.05 55.10% 1676.67 -56.62% 727.35 No. of trade 8244.98 -5.77% 7769.13 0.32% 7793.78
CAR(250-d) 0.57 -102.01% -0.01 5476.07% -0.64 CAR(250-d) -0.11 340.52% -0.47 101.84% -0.96
MAR 0.26 -371.53% -0.69 27.90% -0.89 MAR -0.34 184.79% -0.98 17.22% -1.14
Volatility 0.52 275.50% 1.96 -49.57% 0.99 Volatility 0.20 535.32% 1.28 -32.19% 0.87
Spread 0.29 157.37% 0.75 -46.50% 0.40 Spread 0.34 140.10% 0.81 22.53% 1.00
Turnover 0.42 12.60% 0.47 -6.73% 0.44 Turnover 0.02 22.79% 0.02 -53.50% 0.01
No. of trade 33229.22 19.81% 39812.53 -4.43% 38047.70 No. of trade 1092.85 20.44% 1316.27 -52.70% 622.63
CAR(250-d) 1.24 -41.27% 0.73 -147.42% -0.35 CAR(250-d) -0.26 -597.63% 1.31 -139.89% -0.52
MAR 1.04 -84.81% 0.16 -401.01% -0.48 MAR -0.23 -621.23% 1.18 -138.70% -0.46
Volatility 0.36 294.23% 1.40 -55.34% 0.63 Volatility 0.19 438.33% 1.00 -40.02% 0.60
Spread 0.20 399.24% 1.02 -69.89% 0.31 Spread 0.18 314.31% 0.73 -39.89% 0.44
Turnover 0.59 -11.66% 0.52 -25.46% 0.39 Turnover 0.01 -44.94% 0.01 154.62% 0.01
No. of trade 10999.55 -17.33% 9093.13 -5.51% 8592.47 No. of trade 2209.07 -39.01% 1347.27 84.07% 2479.93
CAR(250-d) 0.16 2160.92% 3.55 -97.58% 0.09 CAR(250-d) -0.06 582.49% -0.39 6.57% -0.41
MAR -0.78 -438.32% 2.62 -131.28% -0.82 MAR 0.09 -400.18% -0.26 4.32% -0.27
Volatility 1.43 4.93% 1.50 -41.52% 0.88 Volatility 0.17 423.70% 0.92 -61.44% 0.35
Spread 1.03 110.34% 2.17 -42.31% 1.25 Spread 0.13 610.22% 0.90 -76.65% 0.21
Turnover 0.55 -54.40% 0.25 131.59% 0.58 Turnover 0.50 -41.42% 0.29 18.62% 0.35
No. of trade 635.90 -70.66% 186.57 57.34% 293.56 No. of trade 5487.29 -40.31% 3275.47 34.76% 4413.88
CAR(250-d) -0.21 476.87% -1.20 -80.84% -0.23 CAR(250-d) -0.04 -766.46% 0.29 -745.86% -1.84
MAR -0.06 1103.74% -0.76 -33.99% -0.50 MAR 0.23 57.92% 0.37 -516.16% -1.53
Volatility 0.05 557.26% 0.36 -29.17% 0.25 Volatility 0.19 199.00% 0.58 -10.31% 0.52
Spread 1.45 20.14% 1.74 12.94% 1.96 Spread 0.26 141.43% 0.62 -22.77% 0.48
Turnover 0.01 20.05% 0.01 -1.03% 0.01 Turnover 0.50 -24.93% 0.37 44.55% 0.54
No. of trade 6.34 48.26% 9.40 28.77% 12.10 No. of trade 728.67 -38.49% 448.20 53.54% 688.15
CAR(250-d) 0.40 -32.94% 0.27 -441.69% -0.92 CAR(250-d) 0.54 -221.86% -0.65 -95.65% -0.03
MAR 0.00 -17517.69% -0.64 89.92% -1.22 MAR 0.65 -217.44% -0.76 -115.86% 0.12
Volatility 0.27 481.65% 1.56 -30.57% 1.08 Volatility 0.24 361.44% 1.13 -54.61% 0.51
Spread 0.23 222.15% 0.74 11.73% 0.83 Spread 0.20 316.30% 0.82 -60.46% 0.32
Turnover 0.03 13.48% 0.03 -41.49% 0.02 Turnover 0.77 -22.49% 0.60 -15.43% 0.51
No. of trade 2073.84 19.40% 2476.13 -46.95% 1313.55 No. of trade 2458.04 -24.24% 1862.20 -10.52% 1666.37
CAR(250-d) 0.50 -278.80% -0.90 -134.77% 0.31 CAR(250-d) 0.32 -199.62% -0.32 -179.77% 0.26
MAR 0.37 -415.24% -1.17 -117.68% 0.21 MAR 0.32 -277.28% -0.57 -152.70% 0.30
Volatility 0.11 476.63% 0.62 -28.18% 0.45 Volatility 0.25 252.28% 0.89 -43.13% 0.51
Spread 0.32 728.27% 2.65 -73.17% 0.71 Spread 0.23 268.51% 0.86 -62.48% 0.32
Turnover 0.26 44.32% 0.37 -25.82% 0.28 Turnover 0.73 -28.95% 0.52 0.04% 0.52
No. of trade 396.75 -4.15% 380.27 -1.35% 375.15 No. of trade 2188.98 -38.00% 1357.13 11.99% 1519.90
CAR(250-d) -0.20 -475.55% 0.74 -177.20% -0.57 CAR(250-d) 0.75 -31.26% 0.52 -195.00% -0.49
MAR -0.13 -778.89% 0.86 -159.21% -0.51 MAR 0.71 -61.24% 0.28 -278.99% -0.49
Volatility 0.06 260.58% 0.20 19.42% 0.24 Volatility 0.19 270.90% 0.71 -38.15% 0.44
Spread 0.08 323.20% 0.33 -38.82% 0.20 Spread 0.12 209.49% 0.38 -55.43% 0.17
Turnover 0.02 -55.96% 0.01 117.08% 0.02 Turnover 0.55 -10.10% 0.49 27.04% 0.63
No. of trade 1392.16 -54.62% 631.80 110.98% 1332.97 No. of trade 8989.60 -17.25% 7438.53 33.42% 9924.17
CAR(250-d) 0.35 -59.93% 0.14 -316.77% -0.31 CAR(250-d) -0.22 -407.47% 0.67 -158.79% -0.39
MAR 0.46 -69.55% 0.14 -228.77% -0.18 MAR -0.68 -98.43% -0.01 7460.84% -0.81
Volatility 0.14 161.88% 0.36 -32.14% 0.24 Volatility 0.52 705.07% 4.21 -64.56% 1.49
Spread 0.14 328.13% 0.59 -64.50% 0.21 Spread 0.56 147.77% 1.38 -23.59% 1.05
Turnover 0.79 -50.47% 0.39 6.50% 0.42 Turnover 0.01 64.71% 0.01 -15.83% 0.01
No. of trade 2303.33 -51.59% 1114.93 12.82% 1257.83 No. of trade 1013.11 30.15% 1318.57 -58.41% 548.44
CAR(250-d) 0.72 -50.55% 0.35 -95.60% 0.02 CAR(250-d) 0.48 590.67% 3.32 -97.93% 0.07
MAR 0.70 -76.63% 0.16 -83.04% 0.03 MAR -0.04 -6785.05% 2.76 -113.47% -0.37
Volatility 0.23 139.82% 0.55 -30.15% 0.38 Volatility 0.93 283.71% 3.56 -65.23% 1.24
Spread 0.19 378.75% 0.89 -72.95% 0.24 Spread 0.34 253.76% 1.20 -72.06% 0.34
Turnover 0.63 28.63% 0.81 -49.71% 0.41 Turnover 0.65 -24.39% 0.49 -16.18% 0.41
No. of trade 2497.71 -24.10% 1895.87 -4.65% 1807.63 No. of trade 9687.11 -10.76% 8644.86 -10.90% 7702.65
CAR(250-d) -0.58 63.14% -0.95 161.11% -2.49 CAR(250-d) 0.07 2424.30% 1.79 -165.82% -1.18
MAR -0.87 73.84% -1.51 81.52% -2.74 MAR -0.46 -230.46% 0.60 -401.25% -1.80
Volatility 0.35 305.67% 1.42 9.87% 1.56 Volatility 0.54 307.41% 2.21 -32.12% 1.50
Spread 0.44 359.52% 2.04 -17.58% 1.68 Spread 0.27 146.83% 0.67 -26.48% 0.49
Turnover 0.03 -16.53% 0.03 -1.83% 0.03 Turnover 0.42 19.94% 0.50 -5.66% 0.47
No. of trade 330.84 -23.14% 254.27 -9.73% 229.53 No. of trade 28635.40 9.97% 31491.47 -17.10% 26105.60
US
BBT.N
BCS.N
BLX.N
BCA.N
AF.N
AIB.N
BAC.N
BBX.N
BNS.N
BOH.N
BXS.N
RBS.N
IRE.N
RF.N
JPM.N
KEY.N
LYG.N
MTU.N
NYB.N
ONB.N
PFS.N
PNC.N
C.N
OFG.N
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CAR(250-d) 1.44 -201.19% -1.46 -62.05% -0.55 CAR(250-d) 0.70 -107.85% -0.06 1105.35% -0.66
MAR 1.05 -321.51% -2.32 -61.67% -0.89 MAR 0.58 -177.75% -0.45 63.73% -0.74
Volatility 0.21 246.78% 0.74 29.42% 0.96 Volatility 0.52 614.39% 3.72 -81.05% 0.71
Spread 0.37 216.29% 1.18 39.05% 1.65 Spread 0.22 279.30% 0.85 -60.29% 0.34
Turnover 0.31 -26.34% 0.23 -8.27% 0.21 Turnover 0.68 -35.02% 0.44 -0.21% 0.44
No. of trade 326.62 -41.17% 192.14 1.04% 194.15 No. of trade 6117.42 -38.45% 3765.00 17.24% 4414.02
CAR(250-d) 0.32 -6.62% 0.29 -101.99% -0.01 CAR(250-d) 1.36 -67.53% 0.44 -191.88% -0.41
MAR 0.46 -64.72% 0.16 15.62% 0.19 MAR 1.01 -124.07% -0.24 184.58% -0.69
Volatility 0.13 534.52% 0.83 -53.21% 0.39 Volatility 0.40 307.98% 1.61 -55.17% 0.72
Spread 0.18 261.74% 0.64 -30.10% 0.45 Spread 0.18 216.89% 0.57 -58.29% 0.24
Turnover 0.58 -12.89% 0.50 -24.85% 0.38 Turnover 0.77 -15.82% 0.65 -16.25% 0.54
No. of trade 961.31 -32.89% 645.13 4.32% 672.98 No. of trade 10636.38 -19.22% 8591.73 -2.49% 8377.68
CAR(250-d) 0.35 -161.30% -0.21 -33.98% -0.14 CAR(250-d) 0.37 -58.52% 0.15 -82.59% 0.03
MAR 0.49 -152.37% -0.25 -109.07% 0.02 MAR 0.47 -127.85% -0.13 -248.79% 0.19
Volatility 0.12 174.36% 0.33 -27.88% 0.24 Volatility 0.15 215.93% 0.48 -11.57% 0.43
Spread 0.12 269.44% 0.45 -56.51% 0.19 Spread 0.30 158.68% 0.78 -20.30% 0.62
Turnover 0.59 -10.34% 0.53 -3.57% 0.51 Turnover 0.39 4.45% 0.41 -19.65% 0.33
No. of trade 2186.76 -25.68% 1625.27 11.91% 1818.87 No. of trade 412.62 -21.98% 321.93 0.79% 324.48
CAR(250-d) 0.76 -69.71% 0.23 -221.07% -0.28 CAR(250-d) 1.47 -64.06% 0.53 -96.07% 0.02
MAR 0.46 -206.28% -0.49 3.26% -0.50 MAR 1.11 -115.35% -0.17 66.73% -0.28
Volatility 0.40 241.47% 1.35 -56.64% 0.59 Volatility 0.38 182.18% 1.07 -55.44% 0.48
Spread 0.15 384.56% 0.73 -66.43% 0.24 Spread 0.16 330.78% 0.69 -64.54% 0.24
Turnover 1.23 -39.42% 0.75 -15.35% 0.63 Turnover 0.96 -33.42% 0.64 -29.23% 0.45
No. of trade 8331.62 -45.30% 4557.60 4.68% 4771.12 No. of trade 4831.33 -31.81% 3294.53 -15.53% 2782.93
CAR(250-d) 1.31 40.21% 1.83 -116.04% -0.29 CAR(250-d) 0.43 -88.00% 0.05 -1154.26% -0.54
MAR 0.81 -2.79% 0.79 -188.85% -0.70 MAR 0.48 -107.26% -0.03 1265.26% -0.47
Volatility 0.59 82.44% 1.08 -35.05% 0.70 Volatility 0.24 356.64% 1.10 -56.66% 0.48
Spread 0.34 124.41% 0.77 -42.50% 0.44 Spread 0.15 236.64% 0.51 -49.82% 0.25
Turnover 1.05 -44.06% 0.59 -18.30% 0.48 Turnover 0.31 13.64% 0.36 -19.26% 0.29
No. of trade 1612.15 -43.93% 904.00 -12.37% 792.22 No. of trade 12341.91 6.95% 13200.20 3.17% 13618.15
CAR(250-d) -0.15 332.78% -0.64 -28.45% -0.46 CAR(250-d) 0.67 9.75% 0.73 -77.62% 0.16
MAR -0.28 248.34% -0.97 -42.85% -0.55 MAR 0.58 -1.60% 0.57 -84.38% 0.09
Volatility 0.13 303.09% 0.53 22.03% 0.64 Volatility 0.26 208.38% 0.81 -47.95% 0.42
Spread 0.13 108.61% 0.26 -0.23% 0.26 Spread 0.18 308.46% 0.72 -51.99% 0.34
Turnover 0.08 -23.62% 0.06 30.05% 0.08 Turnover 0.45 -39.51% 0.27 29.64% 0.35
No. of trade 2002.55 -17.88% 1644.40 32.19% 2173.75 No. of trade 2874.55 -54.68% 1302.87 28.86% 1678.83
CAR(250-d) 0.84 -298.34% -1.66 75.04% -2.91 CAR(250-d) 1.91 1.81% 1.95 -97.17% 0.06
MAR 0.29 -1230.04% -3.25 -0.18% -3.24 MAR 1.36 -69.67% 0.41 -203.37% -0.43
Volatility 0.92 141.03% 2.21 79.04% 3.95 Volatility 0.39 26.16% 0.49 43.64% 0.70
Spread 0.55 137.84% 1.31 113.43% 2.79 Spread 0.67 39.77% 0.94 -15.06% 0.80
Turnover 0.33 3.00% 0.34 -46.48% 0.18 Turnover 0.19 -53.43% 0.09 110.32% 0.19
No. of trade 862.31 5.35% 908.47 -52.52% 431.30 No. of trade 303.93 -42.75% 174.00 80.13% 313.43
CAR(250-d) 0.64 205.92% 1.95 -92.83% 0.14 CAR(250-d) 0.82 -32.32% 0.55 -138.59% -0.21
MAR 0.48 135.30% 1.14 -91.18% 0.10 MAR 0.45 -91.66% 0.04 -1565.54% -0.55
Volatility 0.37 111.83% 0.79 -13.86% 0.68 Volatility 0.34 200.57% 1.02 -57.15% 0.44
Spread 0.29 209.46% 0.89 -34.25% 0.58 Spread 0.18 433.61% 0.97 -70.13% 0.29
Turnover 0.48 -19.38% 0.39 -24.36% 0.29 Turnover 1.14 -41.14% 0.67 -6.14% 0.63
No. of trade 1735.75 -24.95% 1302.67 -6.92% 1212.48 No. of trade 2944.05 -39.47% 1781.93 -6.23% 1670.85
CAR(250-d) 1.60 8.05% 1.72 -55.02% 0.78 CAR(250-d) 0.80 -17.98% 0.65 -137.26% -0.24
MAR 0.87 9.07% 0.95 -82.36% 0.17 MAR 0.68 -87.34% 0.09 -422.29% -0.28
Volatility 0.83 259.44% 2.97 -66.28% 1.00 Volatility 0.35 322.05% 1.48 -51.82% 0.71
Spread 0.22 367.68% 1.02 -67.68% 0.33 Spread 0.25 231.91% 0.82 -52.71% 0.39
Turnover 1.11 -25.32% 0.83 -28.69% 0.59 Turnover 0.35 11.45% 0.39 6.75% 0.41
No. of trade 6375.38 -16.85% 5301.07 -13.21% 4600.95 No. of trade 21558.22 12.27% 24203.53 16.88% 28289.47
CAR(250-d) 0.58 -71.85% 0.16 -84.87% 0.02 CAR(250-d) 0.08 1276.44% 1.05 -123.02% -0.24
MAR 0.45 -168.99% -0.31 -86.41% -0.04 MAR 0.02 3090.42% 0.78 -132.68% -0.26
Volatility 0.32 234.30% 1.08 -36.56% 0.69 Volatility 0.23 567.43% 1.57 -79.14% 0.33
Spread 0.37 173.03% 1.00 -47.01% 0.53 Spread 0.16 249.75% 0.55 -54.49% 0.25
Turnover 0.48 -30.95% 0.33 -26.82% 0.24 Turnover 0.96 -43.72% 0.54 -19.20% 0.44
No. of trade 1869.18 -46.55% 999.00 -5.23% 946.78 No. of trade 3238.25 -43.40% 1832.87 -12.15% 1610.17
CAR(250-d) -0.02 -3084.84% 0.64 -147.97% -0.31
MAR -0.03 -1986.32% 0.58 -152.95% -0.31
Volatility 0.06 354.83% 0.27 -11.05% 0.24
Spread 0.08 496.83% 0.48 -64.42% 0.17
Turnover 0.03 -50.13% 0.01 158.45% 0.04
No. of trade 1948.05 -52.11% 932.87 164.94% 2471.50
CAR(250-d) 0.36 -545.74% -1.60 -108.72% 0.14
MAR 0.10 -2329.09% -2.28 -98.16% -0.04
Volatility 0.11 695.89% 0.87 40.65% 1.22
Spread 0.32 202.09% 0.98 -11.18% 0.87
Turnover 0.02 37.53% 0.02 10.87% 0.02
No. of trade 191.60 47.70% 283.00 -6.85% 263.62
WFC.N
WL.N
STL.N
TCB.N
USB.N
VLY.N
WAL.N
WBS.N
RY.N
SHG.N
SNV.N
STI.N
FHN.N
FNB.N
DB.N
FBC.N
FBP.N
CBC.N
CBU.N
CFR.N
CMA.N
CPF.N
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Table III Hausman Test 
The table presents Hausman test results. ‗Model‘ column refers to robustness check regression 
models referred to Table 3. ‗DF‘ column is degree of freedom. ‗mValue‘ column gives Hausman 
statistics value. ‗Prob‘ column denotes probability in Hausman test. The null hypothesis is 
Random effect regression is appropriate in the panel regression. This null hypothesis is rejected 
for most models, thus fixed effect regression is chosen. 
Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob
RanTwo MODEL1 1 1.32 0.25 RanTwo MODEL1 1 0.80 0.37 RanTwo MODEL1 1 0.34 0.56
RanTwo MODEL2 2 40.66 0.00 RanTwo MODEL2 2 1.98 0.37 RanTwo MODEL2 2 4.83 0.09
RanTwo MODEL3 3 41.76 0.00 RanTwo MODEL3 3 7.03 0.07 RanTwo MODEL3 3 13.94 0.00
RanTwo MODEL4 4 43.38 0.00 RanTwo MODEL4 4 8.54 0.07 RanTwo MODEL4 4 15.23 0.00
RanTwo MODEL5 5 43.17 0.00 RanTwo MODEL5 5 8.69 0.12 RanTwo MODEL5 5 15.34 0.01
RanTwo MODEL8 1 2.93 0.09 RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.28 0.60 RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.01 0.91
RanTwo MODEL9 2 23.17 0.00 RanTwo MODEL9 2 0.60 0.74 RanTwo MODEL9 2 3.50 0.17
RanTwo MODEL10 3 26.55 0.00 RanTwo MODEL10 3 1.42 0.70 RanTwo MODEL10 3 18.68 0.00
RanTwo MODEL11 4 27.80 0.00 RanTwo MODEL11 4 1.93 0.75 RanTwo MODEL11 4 19.52 0.00
RanTwo MODEL12 5 27.79 0.00 RanTwo MODEL12 5 2.24 0.81 RanTwo MODEL12 5 19.63 0.00
RanTwo MODEL15 1 2.95 0.09 RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.73 0.39 RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.35 0.55
RanTwo MODEL16 2 25.54 0.00 RanTwo MODEL16 2 1.10 0.58 RanTwo MODEL16 2 4.68 0.10
RanTwo MODEL17 3 28.47 0.00 RanTwo MODEL17 3 2.19 0.53 RanTwo MODEL17 3 19.06 0.00
RanTwo MODEL18 4 31.49 0.00 RanTwo MODEL18 4 2.78 0.60 RanTwo MODEL18 4 19.81 0.00
RanTwo MODEL19 5 31.43 0.00 RanTwo MODEL19 5 3.29 0.66 RanTwo MODEL19 5 19.94 0.00
RanTwo MODEL22 1 4.26 0.04 RanTwo MODEL22 1 0.92 0.34 RanTwo MODEL22 1 0.19 0.66
RanTwo MODEL23 2 31.08 0.00 RanTwo MODEL23 2 1.42 0.49 RanTwo MODEL23 2 4.59 0.10
RanTwo MODEL24 3 33.30 0.00 RanTwo MODEL24 3 2.82 0.42 RanTwo MODEL24 3 16.85 0.00
RanTwo MODEL25 4 35.92 0.00 RanTwo MODEL25 4 4.26 0.37 RanTwo MODEL25 4 17.77 0.00
RanTwo MODEL26 5 35.75 0.00 RanTwo MODEL26 5 4.34 0.50 RanTwo MODEL26 5 17.93 0.00
RanTwo MODEL29 1 0.01 0.92 RanTwo MODEL29 1 1.23 0.27 RanTwo MODEL29 1 17.82 0.00
RanTwo MODEL30 2 59.01 0.00 RanTwo MODEL30 2 5.81 0.05 RanTwo MODEL30 2 13.24 0.00
RanTwo MODEL31 3 72.07 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 82.68 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 14.63 0.00
RanTwo MODEL32 4 76.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 83.48 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 24.80 0.00
RanTwo MODEL33 5 77.78 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 83.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 25.60 0.00
RanTwo MODEL36 1 15.21 0.00 RanTwo MODEL36 1 1.65 0.20 RanTwo MODEL36 1 11.44 0.00
RanTwo MODEL37 2 16.61 0.00 RanTwo MODEL37 2 2.29 0.32 RanTwo MODEL37 2 11.59 0.00
RanTwo MODEL38 3 58.03 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 113.84 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 8.80 0.03
RanTwo MODEL39 4 54.44 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 115.66 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 12.31 0.02
RanTwo MODEL40 5 62.22 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 115.86 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 13.88 0.02
RanTwo MODEL43 1 0.01 0.92 RanTwo MODEL43 1 1.23 0.27 RanTwo MODEL43 1 17.82 0.00
RanTwo MODEL44 2 59.01 0.00 RanTwo MODEL44 2 5.81 0.05 RanTwo MODEL44 2 13.24 0.00
RanTwo MODEL45 3 72.07 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 82.68 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 14.63 0.00
RanTwo MODEL46 4 76.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 83.48 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 24.80 0.00
RanTwo MODEL47 5 77.78 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 83.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 25.60 0.00
RanTwo MODEL50 1 14.05 0.00 RanTwo MODEL50 1 3.54 0.06 RanTwo MODEL50 1 1.09 0.30
RanTwo MODEL51 2 48.84 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 1.36 0.51 RanTwo MODEL51 2 29.28 0.00
RanTwo MODEL52 3 71.13 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 49.45 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 40.28 0.00
RanTwo MODEL53 4 79.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 61.51 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 42.09 0.00
RanTwo MODEL54 5 87.52 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 63.05 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 56.09 0.00
RanTwo MODEL55 2 51.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 13.58 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 1.68 0.43
RanTwo MODEL56 3 57.38 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 13.69 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 6.26 0.10
RanTwo MODEL57 1 7.13 0.01 RanTwo MODEL57 1 13.43 0.00 RanTwo MODEL57 1 7.23 0.01
RanTwo MODEL58 2 46.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 120.79 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 48.59 0.00
RanTwo MODEL59 3 193.13 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 179.59 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 61.61 0.00
RanTwo MODEL60 4 205.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 182.28 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 60.43 0.00
RanTwo MODEL61 5 208.30 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 182.76 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 61.87 0.00
RanTwo MODEL62 2 172.95 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 75.86 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 18.61 0.00
RanTwo MODEL63 3 178.87 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 75.97 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 18.38 0.00
Australia Canada France
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Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob
RanTwo MODEL1 1 0.15 0.70 RanTwo MODEL1 1 0.01 0.92 RanTwo MODEL1 1 9.85 0.00
RanTwo MODEL2 2 1.80 0.41 RanTwo MODEL2 2 0.01 0.99 RanTwo MODEL2 2 4.18 0.12
RanTwo MODEL3 3 5.67 0.13 RanTwo MODEL3 3 8.74 0.03 RanTwo MODEL3 3 33.44 0.00
RanTwo MODEL4 4 5.97 0.20 RanTwo MODEL4 4 9.65 0.05 RanTwo MODEL4 4 33.83 0.00
RanTwo MODEL5 5 6.77 0.24 RanTwo MODEL5 5 9.06 0.11 RanTwo MODEL5 5 45.25 0.00
RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.00 1.00 RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.16 0.69 RanTwo MODEL8 1 12.16 0.00
RanTwo MODEL9 2 7.79 0.02 RanTwo MODEL9 2 2.43 0.30 RanTwo MODEL9 2 6.78 0.03
RanTwo MODEL10 3 9.85 0.02 RanTwo MODEL10 3 9.85 0.02 RanTwo MODEL10 3 29.86 0.00
RanTwo MODEL11 4 10.15 0.04 RanTwo MODEL11 4 10.81 0.03 RanTwo MODEL11 4 29.94 0.00
RanTwo MODEL12 5 12.01 0.03 RanTwo MODEL12 5 10.28 0.07 RanTwo MODEL12 5 36.30 0.00
RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.00 0.97 RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.68 0.41 RanTwo MODEL15 1 13.34 0.00
RanTwo MODEL16 2 5.22 0.07 RanTwo MODEL16 2 1.52 0.47 RanTwo MODEL16 2 7.53 0.02
RanTwo MODEL17 3 6.75 0.08 RanTwo MODEL17 3 9.44 0.02 RanTwo MODEL17 3 31.49 0.00
RanTwo MODEL18 4 7.82 0.10 RanTwo MODEL18 4 10.31 0.04 RanTwo MODEL18 4 31.64 0.00
RanTwo MODEL19 5 9.68 0.08 RanTwo MODEL19 5 9.70 0.08 RanTwo MODEL19 5 38.19 0.00
RanTwo MODEL22 1 0.03 0.87 RanTwo MODEL22 1 0.00 0.95 RanTwo MODEL22 1 11.34 0.00
RanTwo MODEL23 2 2.11 0.35 RanTwo MODEL23 2 0.36 0.83 RanTwo MODEL23 2 5.73 0.06
RanTwo MODEL24 3 3.38 0.34 RanTwo MODEL24 3 8.71 0.03 RanTwo MODEL24 3 29.81 0.00
RanTwo MODEL25 4 4.00 0.41 RanTwo MODEL25 4 9.74 0.05 RanTwo MODEL25 4 29.96 0.00
RanTwo MODEL26 5 5.37 0.37 RanTwo MODEL26 5 9.05 0.11 RanTwo MODEL26 5 37.04 0.00
RanTwo MODEL29 1 9.28 0.00 RanTwo MODEL29 1 6.22 0.01 RanTwo MODEL29 1 2.07 0.15
RanTwo MODEL30 2 41.37 0.00 RanTwo MODEL30 2 2.61 0.27 RanTwo MODEL30 2 0.75 0.69
RanTwo MODEL31 3 97.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 12.77 0.01 RanTwo MODEL31 3 6.09 0.11
RanTwo MODEL32 4 108.00 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 13.49 0.01 RanTwo MODEL32 4 21.59 0.00
RanTwo MODEL33 5 117.69 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 13.86 0.02 RanTwo MODEL33 5 26.46 0.00
RanTwo MODEL36 1 77.99 0.00 RanTwo MODEL36 1 3.37 0.07 RanTwo MODEL36 1 0.03 0.87
RanTwo MODEL37 2 120.13 0.00 RanTwo MODEL37 2 3.22 0.20 RanTwo MODEL37 2 5.10 0.08
RanTwo MODEL38 3 166.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 11.65 0.01 RanTwo MODEL38 3 60.22 0.00
RanTwo MODEL39 4 162.24 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 15.52 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 62.95 0.00
RanTwo MODEL40 5 208.95 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 14.73 0.01 RanTwo MODEL40 5 63.36 0.00
RanTwo MODEL43 1 9.28 0.00 RanTwo MODEL43 1 6.22 0.01 RanTwo MODEL43 1 2.07 0.15
RanTwo MODEL44 2 41.37 0.00 RanTwo MODEL44 2 2.61 0.27 RanTwo MODEL44 2 0.75 0.69
RanTwo MODEL45 3 97.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 12.77 0.01 RanTwo MODEL45 3 6.09 0.11
RanTwo MODEL46 4 108.00 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 13.49 0.01 RanTwo MODEL46 4 21.59 0.00
RanTwo MODEL47 5 117.69 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 13.86 0.02 RanTwo MODEL47 5 26.46 0.00
RanTwo MODEL50 1 1.12 0.29 RanTwo MODEL50 1 4.88 0.03 RanTwo MODEL50 1 0.37 0.54
RanTwo MODEL51 2 260.82 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 44.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 31.59 0.00
RanTwo MODEL52 3 256.88 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 65.12 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 38.66 0.00
RanTwo MODEL53 4 256.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 66.34 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 24.85 0.00
RanTwo MODEL54 5 257.81 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 66.39 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 52.05 0.00
RanTwo MODEL55 2 1.85 0.40 RanTwo MODEL55 2 4.90 0.09 RanTwo MODEL55 2 18.00 0.00
RanTwo MODEL56 3 2.91 0.41 RanTwo MODEL56 3 8.75 0.03 RanTwo MODEL56 3 48.06 0.00
RanTwo MODEL57 1 0.24 0.63 RanTwo MODEL57 1 0.04 0.84 RanTwo MODEL57 1 11.68 0.00
RanTwo MODEL58 2 263.74 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 38.28 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 79.08 0.00
RanTwo MODEL59 3 240.82 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 21.42 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 91.99 0.00
RanTwo MODEL60 4 233.56 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 21.88 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 87.34 0.00
RanTwo MODEL61 5 238.10 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 29.94 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 92.76 0.00
RanTwo MODEL62 2 10.80 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 7.19 0.03 RanTwo MODEL62 2 20.90 0.00
RanTwo MODEL63 3 14.65 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 13.82 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 30.95 0.00
Germany I (2008) Germany II (2010) Japan
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Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob
RanTwo MODEL1 1 4.62 0.03 RanTwo MODEL1 1 7.94 0.00 RanTwo MODEL1 1 29.35 0.00
RanTwo MODEL2 2 6.15 0.05 RanTwo MODEL2 2 11.70 0.00 RanTwo MODEL2 2 15.14 0.00
RanTwo MODEL3 3 9.47 0.02 RanTwo MODEL3 3 11.17 0.01 RanTwo MODEL3 3 30.82 0.00
RanTwo MODEL4 4 11.07 0.03 RanTwo MODEL4 4 11.28 0.02 RanTwo MODEL4 4 36.12 0.00
RanTwo MODEL5 5 12.42 0.03 RanTwo MODEL5 5 11.19 0.05 RanTwo MODEL5 5 37.52 0.00
RanTwo MODEL8 1 5.03 0.02 RanTwo MODEL8 1 7.17 0.01 RanTwo MODEL8 1 24.98 0.00
RanTwo MODEL9 2 7.25 0.03 RanTwo MODEL9 2 10.89 0.00 RanTwo MODEL9 2 15.23 0.00
RanTwo MODEL10 3 7.64 0.05 RanTwo MODEL10 3 11.09 0.01 RanTwo MODEL10 3 33.35 0.00
RanTwo MODEL11 4 9.67 0.05 RanTwo MODEL11 4 11.34 0.02 RanTwo MODEL11 4 37.13 0.00
RanTwo MODEL12 5 12.67 0.03 RanTwo MODEL12 5 11.26 0.05 RanTwo MODEL12 5 38.71 0.00
RanTwo MODEL15 1 4.32 0.04 RanTwo MODEL15 1 10.60 0.00 RanTwo MODEL15 1 34.04 0.00
RanTwo MODEL16 2 6.44 0.04 RanTwo MODEL16 2 14.50 0.00 RanTwo MODEL16 2 21.52 0.00
RanTwo MODEL17 3 7.06 0.07 RanTwo MODEL17 3 11.54 0.01 RanTwo MODEL17 3 35.30 0.00
RanTwo MODEL18 4 8.98 0.06 RanTwo MODEL18 4 11.88 0.02 RanTwo MODEL18 4 38.78 0.00
RanTwo MODEL19 5 12.07 0.03 RanTwo MODEL19 5 11.79 0.04 RanTwo MODEL19 5 40.31 0.00
RanTwo MODEL22 1 4.29 0.04 RanTwo MODEL22 1 10.41 0.00 RanTwo MODEL22 1 34.97 0.00
RanTwo MODEL23 2 6.21 0.04 RanTwo MODEL23 2 14.83 0.00 RanTwo MODEL23 2 22.21 0.00
RanTwo MODEL24 3 7.49 0.06 RanTwo MODEL24 3 11.92 0.01 RanTwo MODEL24 3 33.04 0.00
RanTwo MODEL25 4 9.32 0.05 RanTwo MODEL25 4 12.28 0.02 RanTwo MODEL25 4 37.08 0.00
RanTwo MODEL26 5 12.11 0.03 RanTwo MODEL26 5 12.12 0.03 RanTwo MODEL26 5 38.83 0.00
RanTwo MODEL29 1 16.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL29 1 23.93 0.00 RanTwo MODEL29 1 82.50 0.00
RanTwo MODEL30 2 22.42 0.00 RanTwo MODEL30 2 30.84 0.00 RanTwo MODEL30 2 47.93 0.00
RanTwo MODEL31 3 24.64 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 37.75 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 61.23 0.00
RanTwo MODEL32 4 23.04 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 37.93 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 65.33 0.00
RanTwo MODEL33 5 26.23 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 37.97 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 66.65 0.00
RanTwo MODEL36 1 16.29 0.00 RanTwo MODEL36 1 36.86 0.00 RanTwo MODEL36 1 63.38 0.00
RanTwo MODEL37 2 17.12 0.00 RanTwo MODEL37 2 28.73 0.00 RanTwo MODEL37 2 61.33 0.00
RanTwo MODEL38 3 18.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 27.71 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 88.09 0.00
RanTwo MODEL39 4 17.87 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 43.82 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 109.04 0.00
RanTwo MODEL40 5 20.49 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 50.48 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 113.02 0.00
RanTwo MODEL43 1 16.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL43 1 23.93 0.00 RanTwo MODEL43 1 82.50 0.00
RanTwo MODEL44 2 22.42 0.00 RanTwo MODEL44 2 30.84 0.00 RanTwo MODEL44 2 47.93 0.00
RanTwo MODEL45 3 24.64 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 37.75 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 61.23 0.00
RanTwo MODEL46 4 23.04 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 37.93 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 65.33 0.00
RanTwo MODEL47 5 26.23 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 37.97 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 66.65 0.00
RanTwo MODEL50 1 21.57 0.00 RanTwo MODEL50 1 9.57 0.00 RanTwo MODEL50 1 0.48 0.49
RanTwo MODEL51 2 55.17 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 72.20 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 6.66 0.04
RanTwo MODEL52 3 64.39 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 84.31 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 12.28 0.01
RanTwo MODEL53 4 64.37 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 84.38 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 12.44 0.01
RanTwo MODEL54 5 64.39 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 84.04 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 17.87 0.00
RanTwo MODEL55 2 31.26 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 12.21 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 9.36 0.01
RanTwo MODEL56 3 30.59 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 12.98 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 13.72 0.00
RanTwo MODEL57 1 20.47 0.00 RanTwo MODEL57 1 77.88 0.00 RanTwo MODEL57 1 27.17 0.00
RanTwo MODEL58 2 54.01 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 90.79 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 65.55 0.00
RanTwo MODEL59 3 99.84 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 86.44 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 105.05 0.00
RanTwo MODEL60 4 100.25 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 185.97 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 104.36 0.00
RanTwo MODEL61 5 100.47 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 207.19 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 106.39 0.00
RanTwo MODEL62 2 69.96 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 74.86 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 84.91 0.00
RanTwo MODEL63 3 69.64 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 107.14 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 89.23 0.00
Korea Taiwan UK
 142 
Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob Method Model DF mValue Prob
RanTwo MODEL1 1 4.92 0.03 RanTwo MODEL1 1 24.12 0.00 RanTwo MODEL1 1 0.01 0.94
RanTwo MODEL2 2 6.61 0.04 RanTwo MODEL2 2 21.92 0.00 RanTwo MODEL2 2 15.37 0.00
RanTwo MODEL3 3 23.35 0.00 RanTwo MODEL3 3 80.38 0.00 RanTwo MODEL3 3 17.68 0.00
RanTwo MODEL4 4 20.91 0.00 RanTwo MODEL4 4 80.45 0.00 RanTwo MODEL4 4 45.95 0.00
RanTwo MODEL5 5 21.44 0.00 RanTwo MODEL5 5 85.59 0.00 RanTwo MODEL5 5 54.08 0.00
RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.01 0.93 RanTwo MODEL8 1 21.77 0.00 RanTwo MODEL8 1 0.01 0.90
RanTwo MODEL9 2 0.67 0.72 RanTwo MODEL9 2 20.03 0.00 RanTwo MODEL9 2 10.55 0.01
RanTwo MODEL10 3 28.39 0.00 RanTwo MODEL10 3 70.86 0.00 RanTwo MODEL10 3 19.50 0.00
RanTwo MODEL11 4 27.12 0.00 RanTwo MODEL11 4 70.96 0.00 RanTwo MODEL11 4 43.91 0.00
RanTwo MODEL12 5 27.43 0.00 RanTwo MODEL12 5 74.35 0.00 RanTwo MODEL12 5 54.83 0.00
RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.04 0.84 RanTwo MODEL15 1 25.48 0.00 RanTwo MODEL15 1 0.02 0.90
RanTwo MODEL16 2 0.46 0.80 RanTwo MODEL16 2 23.42 0.00 RanTwo MODEL16 2 11.27 0.00
RanTwo MODEL17 3 28.43 0.00 RanTwo MODEL17 3 71.76 0.00 RanTwo MODEL17 3 17.60 0.00
RanTwo MODEL18 4 26.63 0.00 RanTwo MODEL18 4 71.81 0.00 RanTwo MODEL18 4 41.92 0.00
RanTwo MODEL19 5 26.80 0.00 RanTwo MODEL19 5 75.48 0.00 RanTwo MODEL19 5 51.75 0.00
RanTwo MODEL22 1 1.23 0.27 RanTwo MODEL22 1 22.35 0.00 RanTwo MODEL22 1 0.00 0.95
RanTwo MODEL23 2 1.68 0.43 RanTwo MODEL23 2 20.49 0.00 RanTwo MODEL23 2 11.91 0.00
RanTwo MODEL24 3 27.73 0.00 RanTwo MODEL24 3 72.12 0.00 RanTwo MODEL24 3 20.09 0.00
RanTwo MODEL25 4 25.71 0.00 RanTwo MODEL25 4 72.17 0.00 RanTwo MODEL25 4 46.32 0.00
RanTwo MODEL26 5 25.93 0.00 RanTwo MODEL26 5 75.78 0.00 RanTwo MODEL26 5 58.24 0.00
RanTwo MODEL29 1 4.03 0.04 RanTwo MODEL29 1 0.61 0.44 RanTwo MODEL29 1 0.98 0.32
RanTwo MODEL30 2 6.52 0.04 RanTwo MODEL30 2 2.80 0.25 RanTwo MODEL30 2 23.93 0.00
RanTwo MODEL31 3 12.37 0.01 RanTwo MODEL31 3 99.61 0.00 RanTwo MODEL31 3 91.78 0.00
RanTwo MODEL32 4 20.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 99.02 0.00 RanTwo MODEL32 4 88.72 0.00
RanTwo MODEL33 5 25.18 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 104.09 0.00 RanTwo MODEL33 5 112.10 0.00
RanTwo MODEL36 1 15.61 0.00 RanTwo MODEL36 1 1.47 0.22 RanTwo MODEL36 1 0.62 0.43
RanTwo MODEL37 2 15.30 0.00 RanTwo MODEL37 2 2.81 0.25 RanTwo MODEL37 2 40.47 0.00
RanTwo MODEL38 3 22.90 0.00 RanTwo MODEL38 3 9.09 0.03 RanTwo MODEL38 3 96.34 0.00
RanTwo MODEL39 4 24.26 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 18.71 0.00 RanTwo MODEL39 4 93.65 0.00
RanTwo MODEL40 5 34.71 0.00 RanTwo MODEL40 5 14.73 0.01 RanTwo MODEL40 5 122.85 0.00
RanTwo MODEL43 1 4.03 0.04 RanTwo MODEL43 1 0.61 0.44 RanTwo MODEL43 1 0.98 0.32
RanTwo MODEL44 2 6.52 0.04 RanTwo MODEL44 2 2.80 0.25 RanTwo MODEL44 2 23.93 0.00
RanTwo MODEL45 3 12.37 0.01 RanTwo MODEL45 3 99.61 0.00 RanTwo MODEL45 3 91.78 0.00
RanTwo MODEL46 4 20.32 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 99.02 0.00 RanTwo MODEL46 4 88.72 0.00
RanTwo MODEL47 5 25.18 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 104.09 0.00 RanTwo MODEL47 5 112.10 0.00
RanTwo MODEL50 1 4.17 0.04 RanTwo MODEL50 1 6.90 0.01 RanTwo MODEL50 1 7.44 0.01
RanTwo MODEL51 2 4.47 0.11 RanTwo MODEL51 2 12.24 0.00 RanTwo MODEL51 2 48.12 0.00
RanTwo MODEL52 3 7.14 0.07 RanTwo MODEL52 3 103.74 0.00 RanTwo MODEL52 3 156.08 0.00
RanTwo MODEL53 4 7.38 0.12 RanTwo MODEL53 4 99.30 0.00 RanTwo MODEL53 4 187.08 0.00
RanTwo MODEL54 5 58.76 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 100.61 0.00 RanTwo MODEL54 5 216.87 0.00
RanTwo MODEL55 2 35.41 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 112.85 0.00 RanTwo MODEL55 2 135.51 0.00
RanTwo MODEL56 3 43.97 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 115.87 0.00 RanTwo MODEL56 3 141.15 0.00
RanTwo MODEL57 1 2.16 0.14 RanTwo MODEL57 1 7.26 0.01 RanTwo MODEL57 1 7.13 0.01
RanTwo MODEL58 2 47.72 0.00 RanTwo MODEL58 2 9.01 0.01 RanTwo MODEL58 2 46.56 0.00
RanTwo MODEL59 3 76.09 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 140.02 0.00 RanTwo MODEL59 3 193.13 0.00
RanTwo MODEL60 4 75.91 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 138.65 0.00 RanTwo MODEL60 4 205.56 0.00
RanTwo MODEL61 5 78.15 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 139.52 0.00 RanTwo MODEL61 5 208.30 0.00
RanTwo MODEL62 2 61.59 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 140.15 0.00 RanTwo MODEL62 2 172.95 0.00
RanTwo MODEL63 3 65.58 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 141.46 0.00 RanTwo MODEL63 3 178.87 0.00
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